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Intelligence

FM 30-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
FM 30-5

This manual supersedes FM 30-5, 1 February 1946

COMBAT
INTELLIGENCE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY • FEBRUARY 1951

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FOREWORD

"... What enables the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is *foreknowledge*."

SUN TZU, *On the Art of War*

This manual sets forth the intelligence functions, the operations involved in the collection and processing of information, and the production and use of combat intelligence by divisions and lower units in combat. It contains the basic military intelligence doctrine at these echelons for intelligence personnel of tactical units, and is the primary reference for all commanders at these echelons. It is the basic manual upon which branch intelligence manuals will be based.

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PART ONE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE

This manual is published primarily for the use and guidance of all concerned with combat intelligence at the division, regimental, and battalion echelons.

2. SCOPE

a. For divisions and lower units this manual describes the organization which produces intelligence; the production of intelligence from information; the means and methods of obtaining information; counterintelligence organization and functions; communication intelligence and communication security; and intelligence training and planning. Sufficient references are made to activities at corps and higher echelons to furnish minimum basic guidance.

b. Details of procedures and techniques of many subjects and operations related to combat intelligence are omitted from this manual when they are contained in other intelligence manuals and basic branch manuals.

c. This manual contains samples of forms used

by the intelligence officer to aid him in the production of intelligence, and forms and examples of the intelligence estimates, reports, plans, and studies for which the intelligence officer is responsible.

3. INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER

The commander is responsible for all intelligence activities of his command. He is responsible for seeing that his command, within the limits of its capabilities, gathers all pertinent information of the enemy, the weather, and the terrain, and transmits this information to all other units that require it. The commander is also responsible for the conversion into intelligence of all information that is pertinent to his command, and for the dissemination of this intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent units. Furthermore, in connection with the security of his command, the commander is responsible for appropriate counterintelligence measures.

4. MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

The term "intelligence officer," as used in this manual, includes the assistant chief of staff, G-2, of units provided with a general staff, and, where appropriate, the intelligence officer, or S-2, of lower units.

5. MILITARY INFORMATION

Military information includes all documents, facts, material, photographs, diagrams, maps, reports, or observations of any kind which may serve to throw light on a possible or actual enemy or theater of operations. No information should be neglected. In-

formation that seems unimportant at first glance may, upon being compared with other information, assume primary importance. The value of information is increased when the circumstances concerning its origin, including the time when it was obtained, are known; in fact, failure of reporting units to include these circumstances will often make the information valueless to the recipient. Negative information is often of great value, and sometimes is more important than positive information. Negative information may at times be all-important. Information of enemy inactivity in one direction, for example, may lend great weight in analysis of other possible courses of enemy action.

6. INTELLIGENCE

a. Definition. Military intelligence is knowledge, acquired by the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning a possible or actual enemy or areas of operations, including weather and terrain. It includes deductions concerning current and future enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action which can affect the accomplishment of our mission. It is used as a basis for all operational plans and estimates. Military Intelligence also includes counterintelligence.

b. Strategic Intelligence. Strategic intelligence pertains to the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations. It is produced primarily for use of high level military commanders charged with the planning and execution of national security measures in time of peace

and with the conduct of military operations in time of war.

c. Combat Intelligence. Combat intelligence is military intelligence required for use in a combat situation, whether based upon information collected locally or provided by higher headquarters. Combat intelligence has two objectives—

- (1) To reduce to a minimum all uncertainties regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain, and thus to assist the commander in making a decision and the troops in executing their missions.
- (2) To assist the commander in applying counterintelligence and security measures that will conceal from the enemy our intentions and activities and will neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities.

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence relating to all security control measures, both active and passive, designed to insure the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment, and installations against the espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissident groups or individuals which constitute a threat to the national security. It is accomplished through passive means such as secrecy discipline and through active means such as seizure of enemy agents and saboteurs. It includes the detection of treason, sedition, and disaffection within the ranks and among the civilian employees of the Army. It deals with the

neutralization or destruction of the effectiveness of actually or potentially hostile intelligence and subversive activities.

b. Counterintelligence is inseparable from intelligence. By its very nature, counterintelligence makes valuable contributions to the over-all production of intelligence. Surprise, an important principle of war, is not dependent alone on reliable intelligence of the enemy and rapidity of movement; it may also be attained from the efficiency of a well organized and soundly operated counterintelligence system and from the effectiveness of the counterintelligence measures employed.

8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

a. Both combat intelligence and strategic intelligence are concerned with information of military significance on foreign powers and with areas of actual or possible operations. Basically, they use the same techniques: available information on the subject of interest is assembled, examined, compared with other information, and interpreted so as to arrive as closely as possible at the truth. Such distinction as exists is chiefly in terms of scope, perspective, and level of use.

- (1) *Combat* intelligence is produced largely in the field in time of war. It is used mainly by tactical commanders and their staffs. It is concerned with a relatively local situation; namely, the enemy forces opposing a combat unit, and the weather and terrain

as they affect that unit. The production of combat intelligence generally involves rapid evaluation and interpretation of current information, and prompt dissemination of the intelligence produced.

- (2) *Strategic* intelligence is produced continuously, both in peace and in war, usually by theater and higher headquarters, or by agencies under their control. It is used mainly by senior military commanders and their staffs in connection with strategic plans and operations. It is not limited to a local situation. Rather, it is concerned with *all* factors that contribute to the war potential of nations. Unlike combat intelligence, strategic intelligence is seldom produced rapidly. For the most part, it is the result of an assembly of much detailed information. Its production requires the services of specialized personnel and takes much time.

b. Many of the subjects of interest to combat intelligence and strategic intelligence are closely related. In some instances, they are identical. It is important that this be recognized at all echelons.

- (1) Although strategic intelligence is used primarily at strategic levels, its influence is felt by all members of the armed forces. The determination of national capabilities and vulnerabilities requires the collection and processing of a large amount of detailed information. Much of the resultant intelli-

gence is very useful in localized combat situations. Examples are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other critical terrain features; studies of transportation and communication systems; and data on soil trafficability, climate, and hydrography. All this intelligence is initially produced for strategic purposes in peacetime. Most of the strategic intelligence about foreign armed forces is readily translated into combat intelligence. This is clearly seen in the example of detailed studies of the identities, strengths, and command structures of foreign armies, navies, and air forces (order of battle). Such studies are produced for strategic purposes both in peace and war. They are immediately available, on the outbreak of hostilities, to the field commander who must depend on strategic intelligence for his initial material on the enemy and the area of operations. Hence, in the production of strategic intelligence during peace, preparations must be made for its use by field commanders.

- (2) Similarly, much information collected by combat intelligence agencies is of great interest at the strategic echelon. Some, like order of battle information, is converted into both combat intelligence and strategic intelligence. Other information may have little use at the combat echelon, but will be very significant for strategic intelligence

purposes. Examples are, information obtained from prisoners of war relative to enemy political and economic conditions; and captured matériel that may throw light on the enemy's munitions industries. Commanders and staffs of combat echelons will habitually report such information, or its sources, to higher authority.

9. INTELLIGENCE SECURITY

a. General. Intelligence security is counterintelligence within the intelligence service. It is an individual responsibility of all persons, military or civilian, who now perform, or who *have ever been engaged upon*, duties or activities of an intelligence nature. This responsibility does not cease with transfer to other duties, retirement, or release to private pursuits.

b. Object. The object of intelligence security is the preservation of absolute secrecy regarding the nature, type, extent, and success of our intelligence services and their activities.

c. Aspects. Intelligence security embraces five main aspects. These are—

- (1) *Sources.* The development of sources of information, sufficiently numerous and dependable to meet the exacting requirements of intelligence, is a long, delicate, and costly process. The disclosure of a source can be accomplished in many startlingly easy ways. Neglect of intelligence security can quickly deprive us of more sources of important, and

perhaps vital, intelligence than can the opposing forces of potentially hostile and enemy intelligence services.

- (2) *Methods.* Every intelligence service possesses certain methods or techniques which it prizes more highly than others because these particular methods have consistently paid greater dividends than have the others. If, however, the degree of intelligence security surrounding the less productive methods were lowered it is possible that other national intelligence services would be quick to assume that such methods were not considered valuable. They would immediately intensify their search for, and counter-measures against, the first-class techniques. Furthermore, an intelligence service can never be certain that any currently nonproductive method may not suddenly become a valuable source of information. Obviously, even the slightest relaxation of intelligence security must never be condoned.
- (3) *Information.* The quantity, type, degree of accuracy, and urgency of information sought or already obtained are sure indications of current interest and possible future intentions. They also reveal the extent of intelligence coverage. Any disclosure of these or of a lack of certain types of information would give a most valuable insight into the objectives, strength, weakness, or failure of our intelligence operations.
- (4) *Results.* The results of intelligence opera-

tions are elements of the foundation upon which decisions are based. Any alert and efficient intelligence service, once aware of the results of our intelligence activities, could formulate a reasonable estimate as to the direction in which our decisions might lead. In addition, such valuable information would serve to alert an opposing intelligence service to the weaknesses in their counterintelligence system. Corrective measures would then serve to deprive us of further exploitation in that field.

- (5) *Personnel*. Because it affects directly all other aspects, the subject of personnel is doubtless the most important element in the field of intelligence security. Individuals entrusted with intelligence duties must be chosen for such assignments not only because of the possession of requisite professional abilities but also because they are considered to be of unimpeachable loyalty, discretion, and integrity. Those responsible for selecting persons for intelligence duties must make a point never to approve any individual, however brilliant or efficient, against whom the slightest doubt exists regarding his loyalty, discretion, or integrity.

CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Section I. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION

10. GENERAL

Current intelligence organization provides cellular teams or detachments of intelligence specialists for attachment to combat units, and minimum numbers of organic intelligence specialists assigned to combat units. The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Organization (T/O & E 30-600) furnishes the theater of operations specialists as required. The specialists now organic to the intelligence sections of divisions are air photo interpreters and order of battle personnel. These specialists can be efficiently and economically employed throughout a campaign or war regardless of the mission, the situation, or the language spoken by friendly civilians or allied or enemy military personnel. All other intelligence specialists required by a division G-2 section are furnished by the Military Intelligence Service Organization, as normally attached detachments or as supplementary detachments, except for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel who are attached by theater (T/O & E 30-500). The Military Intelligence Service Organization also includes augmentation teams for those specialists who are now organic to the division.

11. COMPOSITION, BASIS OF ALLOCATION, AND FUNCTIONS

a. A military intelligence service organization may be a group, battalion, company, or platoon, consisting of appropriate headquarters and administrative teams and any combination of the many intelligence specialist teams. For composition and basis of allocation of MIS teams refer to T/O & E 30-600.

b. The primary functions of the intelligence specialist teams that comprise a military intelligence service organization are shown in figure 1. The primary functions of the specialists who are organic within the type G-2 section of division (fig. 2) are identical with those of the military intelligence service teams bearing the same title.

12. MISSION

The Military Intelligence Service Organization has a threefold mission—

Team	Specialty	Functions
AL, AM-----	Microphone and recording.	Install, operate, and maintain hidden microphones and recording devices employed in conjunction with interrogation activities.
AN, AO-----	Documents, shipping-----	Receive and unpack documents; pack, crate, and haul documents to higher headquarters; maintain records of documents received and shipped; provide labor for the maintenance of documents warehouses.
AP, AQ-----	Guard-----	Escort and guard important prisoners of war and enemy civilians being held for interrogation. Especially trained in interrogation techniques to provide maximum assistance to interrogators.
BA, BB, BC, BD-----	Interrogator-----	Interrogate prisoners of war and interned enemy civilians in their native language. At lower echelons teams screen prisoners of war for detailed interrogation by high headquarters.

Figure 1. Functions of military intelligence teams.

Team	Specialty	Functions
BE, BF, BG, BH-----	Translator-----	Translate foreign language documents of combat intelligence value captured by tactical troops, acquired by technical intelligence coordinator teams, or received by the headquarters which they support.
BI, BJ, BK, BL-----	Interpreter-----	Provide linguists for commanders and their staffs in dealing with allied armies or civilians of a friendly nation. Employed primarily where information of intelligence value is sought.
BM, BN, BO, BP-----	Documents-----	Scan and analyze all captured enemy documents for timely combat and strategic information of intelligence value; assist in complete exploitation of these documents.
CA, CB, CC, CD-----	Order of battle-----	Provide order of battle information on opposing enemy forces. Maintain cross-indexed files on enemy organization, strength, equipment, locations, dispositions, movements, tactics, installations, and personalities.

CE, CF, CG, CH,----	Aerial photo interpretation.	Interpret air photos with special reference to disposition of enemy forces, location and identification of enemy weapons, defenses, and fixed installations.
CI, CJ, CK, CL,----	Technical intelligence coordinator.	Coordinate technical and scientific intelligence collecting and disseminating agencies; assist special staff officers and technical service intelligence detachments (TSID) in obtaining translations of enemy technical documents and interrogation reports pertaining to matériel for which the technical services are responsible, and in obtaining items of captured matériel in which one technical service is interested but for which another has primary responsibility.
CM, CN, CO, CP,----	Editorial.-----	Edit and rewrite reports prepared by the operational teams, consolidate these reports, and prepare consolidations in final form; reproduce reports in sufficient copies for required distribution; maintain an indexed file of reports.

Figure 1. Functions of military intelligence teams—Continued.

a. It furnishes cellular teams of intelligence specialists for normal attachment to intelligence sections of divisions and higher tactical headquarters or to supplement, during operations, intelligence specialists already assigned or attached to these intelligence sections.

b. It furnishes cellular teams of headquarters and administrative personnel whenever the number of attached specialists is 40 or more individuals.

c. It provides a parent organization for all military intelligence service teams, administering those teams that are awaiting attachment, as well as those which have already been attached to G-2 sections. Thus a direct chain of headquarters is provided to administer all teams and individuals wherever they may be operating. This insures action being taken in such matters as promotions, individual transfers, pay, records, equipment, and other matters.

Section II. TACTICAL UNITS

13. DIVISION

a. The duties of the division intelligence officer (G-2) are outlined in FM 101-5.

b. A type organization of the intelligence (G-2) section of a division is shown in figure 2. The section contains organic order of battle specialists and air photo interpreters. Interrogators, normally attached during combat, may become organic if specifically authorized by Department of the Army. When required, military intelligence specialist teams may be provided as attachments.




Figure 2. Type organization of a division intelligence (G-2) section.

- ¹ May be attached if Military Intelligence Service personnel strength warrants.
² Attached from theater Counter Intelligence Corps allotment.
³ Attachments from Military Intelligence Service Organization.

14. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

a. The branch may be augmented by the attachment of additional military intelligence service specialist detachments from the corps or army organization. The exact strength of the combat intelligence branch will vary with these attachments and with the number of stenographers and draftsmen assigned to the G-2 section from the organic pool allotted to the general staff sections in the division tables of organization. The combat intelligence branch is divided into two duty teams to permit 24-hour operation. These duty teams are supervised by the officers assigned to the branch. The organic and attached specialists operating with the combat intelligence branch may be assigned to either duty team as the need arises.

b. Functions of the combat intelligence branch are shown in figure 3.

15. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

a. The counterintelligence branch assists the G-2 in formulating and supervising counterintelligence measures or activities, which include counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversive operations within the division and in the division area. Specific functions are shown in figure 3.

b. There are no organic commissioned or enlisted counterintelligence personnel in the G-2 section of divisions; however, the counterintelligence branch block in figure 2 is shown by a solid line, because normally it will always be a functional part of the

division G-2 section. The branch is headed by an organic officer of the G-2 section, assigned by G-2. However, if none is available, the commander of the normally attached Counter Intelligence Corps detachment may act as the Counter Intelligence Branch Chief as well.

16. ALLOCATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE UNITS

Each division will normally receive the attachments shown in figure 2, and additional teams needed to supplement the organic specialists. If the aggregate of intelligence specialist personnel attached to a division headquarters reaches 40 or more individuals, a platoon headquarters detachment (separate) may be attached. Military intelligence service administrative teams are allocated on the basis shown in T/O & E 30-600.

17. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

Army Security Agency (ASA) support at division is furnished by a communication reconnaissance liaison detachment which is attached from the Communication Reconnaissance Battalion at Corps (T/O & E 32-500). This detachment will assist G-2 in cryptologic matters, arrange for direct operational assistance by higher ASA organizations in matters of communication security and communication intelligence, and perform technical intelligence functions in relation to captured cryptologic material (Ch. 11).

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Collect and process information and disseminate combat intelligence.

Maintain G-2 situation map, journal, work sheet and files.

Supervise intelligence liaison activities.

Prepare, edit, reproduce, and disseminate intelligence estimates, plans, summaries and reports.

Circulate and disseminate all information and documents from other headquarters.

Maintain enemy order of battle records.

Conduct briefings on the enemy situation

Establish air photo policies and plans.

Arrange for air reconnaissance missions and prepare photo interpretation reports.

Arrange for and supervise the interrogation of prisoners of war and refugees.

Arrange for and supervise translation of captured enemy documents.

Provide interpreters for securing information from friendly civilians and allied military personnel.

Coordinate activities of the communication reconnaissance liaison team.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Interrogate friendly and enemy civilians.

Maintain record of enemy agents and collaborators

Report pertinent information obtained to combat intelligence branch.

Recommend counterintelligence policy.

Prepare counterintelligence plans, directives, and reports.

Supervise measures for counterespionage, counter-sabotage, and countersubversive activities.

Check security of headquarters and documents.

Supervise censorship regulations.

Recommend program and supervise counterintelligence training.

Assist in intelligence planning for future operations.

Maintain record of counterintelligence funds.

Determine credibility of all alleged escapers and evaders and turn them over to combat intelligence branch for further interrogation.

Coordinate and assist technical service intelligence detachments.
Coordinate with G-3 on intelligence training, plans, and troops for reconnaissance missions.
Coordinate with G-3 in, and provide intelligence for psychological warfare.
Coordinate procurement and distribution of maps with division engineer.
Prepare appropriate portions of command report.
Conduct research and planning for future operations.

Figure 3. Functions, division G-2 section.

18. UNITS BELOW DIVISION

a. The intelligence officer (S-2) of regiments, battalions, and commensurate units keeps his commander informed of the enemy situation. He determines the enemy capabilities, their relative probability of adoption, and their effect upon the accomplishment of the mission of the unit. He collects and disseminates information and intelligence concerning the enemy, weather, and terrain. He assists his commander in the formulation and supervision of counterintelligence measures.

b. Generally, the detailed duties of a unit S-2 are similar to the duties discussed in this manual and those outlined in FM 101-5 for the G-2 of division and higher units. The unit S-2 is assisted in the performance of duties by organic intelligence personnel, troops, and in some instances intelligence specialists attached from higher headquarters. For the specific intelligence organization within various type units, refer to appropriate branch field manuals and tables of organization and equipment.

PART TWO

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER 3

PRODUCTION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

19. STEPS

a. The production of combat intelligence may be divided into four steps—

- (1) Collection of information.
- (2) Processing of the collected information to produce intelligence.
- (3) Use of the resulting intelligence.
- (4) Direction of the collection effort.

b. These steps are concurrent. At the same time that new information is being *collected*, other information is being *processed*, and intelligence is being *used*. The entire operation must be constantly *directed*.

c. The four steps are the lowest common denominator of the operational cycle of intelligence. Each is indispensable. If one step fails, the entire intelligence process will fail.

20. COLLECTION

For purposes of logical presentation only, this manual will consider the collection of information as the first of the four steps in the operational cycle.

Collection is the systematic exploitation of sources of information by collecting agencies and the delivery of the information thus obtained to the proper intelligence section. Provision is made for the necessary collecting agencies in tables of organization and equipment and by the attachment of intelligence specialists. (Collection sources and agencies are discussed in detail in chapter 4.)

21. PROCESSING

After the information has been collected and delivered, it must be processed into intelligence. Information is *not* intelligence. Information is converted into intelligence by recording, evaluation, and interpretation. Recording is subordinate to, and must not hamper, evaluation and interpretation. Recording is the least critical component of processing. Evaluation and interpretation are the decisive actions that transform information into combat intelligence. The intelligence officer is assisted in evaluation and interpretation by the organic intelligence section, by attached specialist teams, and by other members of the staff. (Processing is discussed in detail in chapter 5.)

22. USE

a. The chief use of combat intelligence is its immediate integration by the commander into his continuing estimate of the situation. This requires the intelligence officer to concentrate on the intelligence estimate so that he can give the commander an appraisal of the enemy situation at any moment. The

only way he can be assured of doing this is by using every significant item of newly produced intelligence to keep his estimate current. The intelligence estimate must always be directed toward the mission of the unit so that the commander can analyze the effect of this intelligence on his own possible courses of action and thus reach a decision.

b. If intelligence is to be used effectively, it must be disseminated. The object of dissemination is to insure that intelligence reaches the individuals or units concerned in time to serve their purposes. Urgent information and intelligence should be transmitted promptly to the commander and other staff sections and to lower, higher, and adjacent headquarters. Intelligence reports, conferences, and messages are the general headings under which the many methods of dissemination may be grouped. (Use of combat intelligence is discussed in detail in chapter 6.)

23. DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

a. After presentation of the intelligence estimate to the commander, the fourth step of combat intelligence production (direction of the collection effort) becomes operative. The intelligence estimate includes all pertinent intelligence currently available. The commander's estimate of the situation will indicate additional information and intelligence required to answer fully all specific questions regarding the enemy, the weather, and the terrain. These vital questions of the commander are known as the essential elements of information (EEI). EEI result from a *lack* of explicit intelligence. They announce

to the command and its agencies the items of information and intelligence that are necessary to a complete understanding of the situation. The intelligence officer, in coordination with other staff sections, assists the commander in determining EEI.

b. The collection plan is the intelligence officer's program for securing the answers to the EEI. In the plan, the EEI are analytically broken down and a scheme of collection is formulated. The actual orders and requests to the selected collecting agencies are the end product of the collection plan. These intelligence directives and requests indicate the information desired and the time and place of reporting it.

c. The receipt of specific directives and requests by the collecting agencies completes the operational cycle of combat intelligence. The entire operational effort is dominated by the mission. When a new mission is announced, the intelligence officer must always be prepared to give an intelligence estimate. EEI will almost invariably result, imparting new impetus to the continuing operational cycle by redirection of the collection effort. (Direction of the collection effort is discussed in detail in chapter 7.)

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTION-SOURCES AND AGENCIES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

24. SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTION

The commander must be assured of continuing reliable information as to the disposition, strength, composition, and movement of hostile forces, as well as information on weather and terrain. He must use every means at his disposal to gain information of the enemy forces on his front, and of enemy forces on other fronts and in other areas, which may affect the preparation and execution of his plans. A failure to exploit every source of information may deny important information of hostile dispositions, movements, and operations, and consequent decisive exploitation of enemy weaknesses. Because his primary function is to keep the commander and others informed of the enemy situation and capabilities, and the area of operations, the intelligence officer is faced with the continuing problem of employing efficiently all available collecting agencies to gather this necessary information.

25. DIFFICULTIES IN COLLECTION

The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions based thereon are many. These difficulties are due

principally to the fact that the interests of the enemy demand that he make every possible effort to foil attempts made to gain information. He will conceal his movements by every means possible. To do this he will make use of ground, cover, darkness, and weather conditions; and he will supplement natural cover with camouflage. He will resort to any tactical measures that offer a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or surprise. He will enforce both a strict censorship and communication security measures to prevent leaks of information. He may distribute false information and institute other measures to deceive our collecting agencies. He will sometimes adopt a course of action that may appear illogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest to our own, as well as the independence of his will, makes him more or less an unknown factor in every situation. To a lesser degree, the weather and the terrain also are unknown factors.

26. SOURCES AND AGENCIES

Sources of information differ from collecting agencies in that agencies are the means employed to obtain enemy information, whereas the source is the actual *origin* from which the desired information is obtained. Agencies are under our guidance and control; sources as a rule are not.

Section II. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

27. GENERAL

a. Sources of information are the person, thing, or action from which information of the enemy,

weather, or terrain is derived. Sources are extensive and varied. At the outset of operations the intelligence officer will not be devoid of information from which to produce intelligence for initial estimates since many sources of information will be available to him. These include order of battle books, enemy weapons and equipment handbooks, terrain studies, and other reference materials prepared by or for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, General Staff, United States Army, and similar agencies. Other sources must be uncovered or developed by the intelligence officer and his collecting agencies as operations progress. Considerable effort and ingenuity are required if full advantage is to be taken of all possible sources.

b. Through his collecting agencies and from sources of information the intelligence officer obtains information in three categories—the enemy, the weather, and the terrain. Some of the types of information collected are—

- (1) Unit identifications.
- (2) Boundaries and other details of the enemy's dispositions.
- (3) Movement of enemy troops.
- (4) Location of enemy observation posts and command posts.
- (5) Emplacements of artillery and automatic weapons.
- (6) Presence of armor.
- (7) Location of supply points.
- (8) Location of defensive works and obstacles.
- (9) Daily routine of the enemy.
- (10) Routes most frequently used by the enemy.

- (11) The effect of weather on terrain and visibility, for example, trafficability, fog or haze.
- (12) Light data (for an example, see par. 2, app. II).
- (13) Status of roads, bridges, and rivers.
- (14) Favorable observation points of the terrain.
- (15) Soil trafficability.
- (16) Areas which afford concealment or cover.

c. Information can be evaluated only if there is knowledge of the degree of accuracy and reliability of the source, the circumstances under which the information was obtained, and the relationship of the source and the collecting agency. (Evaluation is discussed in chapter 5.)

28. DETERMINATION OF SOURCES

In determining which sources of information to exploit, the following questions must be considered:

- a. What type of information is required?
- b. Of the available sources, which are the most reliable?
- c. Will the appropriate agencies be able to exploit the sources in time?

29. DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES

(ch. 9)

a. *Enemy Military Personnel* (FM 30-15).

- (1) One of the best sources of information available to ground units is enemy military personnel, including prisoners of war, wounded, dead, and deserters. From pris-

oners of war, information is obtained on enemy identifications, troop dispositions, combat efficiency and training, contemplated movements, arms, equipment, morale, roads, fortifications, and effects of our psychological warfare. In order to obtain maximum information, care must be taken to handle prisoners of war skillfully from the time of their capture throughout all interrogations.

- (2) Enemy deserters are handled as prisoners of war, but are segregated from them. However, since the enemy may "plant" false deserters, reports of examination of deserters should bear a notation at the head of the report: "Information from deserter."
- (3) Enemy wounded and dead are searched for documents and marks of identification and provide an excellent source for order of battle and other information.
- (4) Prisoner of war interrogators operate under the supervision of G-2 to obtain information from enemy military personnel. The G-2 will furnish his interrogators with EEI and other guidance concerning the specific information desired. Interrogators base their interrogation plan on current EEI.

b. Enemy Documents (FM 30-15). When examined systematically by competent personnel, captured documents reveal information on the enemy's order of battle, plans, organization, armament, morale, tactical methods, and on his codes, ciphers, and other cryptomaterial. Documents are cataloged, exam-

ined, and handled so as to disclose maximum information of immediate tactical value. This procedure is followed by a more detailed study for strategic implications. Information from documents is more authentic and reliable than that from enemy military personnel because it is less biased and less representative of personnel opinion than is information obtained from prisoners of war.

c. Enemy Matériel (FM 30-15). Information of technical, tactical, and strategic value can be obtained from items of equipment captured from the enemy or overrun by our own troops. When properly processed, it furnishes all echelons with intelligence for both immediate and future use. Reports on the enemy use of matériel against our forces provide technically trained specialists information with which to determine the characteristics or functions of matériel. Such reports thereby enable the commander's technical staff to advise him on countermeasures or methods of exploiting new ideas for our own benefit.

d. Enemy Signal Communication (ch. 11 and par. 17). Intercepted enemy signal communications are a source of information on enemy forces, plans, movements, operations, and locations of units and headquarters. The division intelligence officer has access to this source of information from higher headquarters and from the communication reconnaissance liaison detachment attached to the division.

e. Enemy Activity, Weather and Terrain. These sources are usually exploited as a result of direct observation by such agencies as observers, reconnaissance patrols, listening posts, and gas sentries.

f. Air Photos. Air photos provide information on the terrain, the enemy's use of the terrain and enemy activity. In conjunction with maps, air photos provide reliable and recent information on the terrain, and, in addition, information as to enemy fortifications, installations, lines of communication, location of his forces, gun positions, and similar activities. Trained air photo interpreters study and make detailed analyses of the air photos for the intelligence officer.

g. Maps and Terrain Models.

- (1) Maps are the basic source of information used by the intelligence officer in making tactical terrain studies and preparing terrain estimates. The intelligence officer prepares and maintains defense and situation maps. Defense maps are maps overprinted with detailed information on enemy fixed defensive installations. Situation maps show the current disposition of enemy forces.
- (2) A terrain model is a three dimensional graphic representation of an area, showing the conformation of the ground, modeled to scale and usually colored to emphasize the various physical features. The vertical scale is usually exaggerated without severe distortion to convey the aspect of relief. Terrain models with exaggerated scales may be used for special studies and in oral presentation of special estimates.

h. Weather Forecasts and Studies.

- (1) A weather forecast is a prediction of weather conditions for the future. The forecast describes the most probable, anticipated meteorological conditions that are expected to prevail for a given location for a definite period of future time.
- (2) There are three classes of weather forecasts—long range, a prediction for a period longer than 48 hours; medium range, a prediction for a period between 12 and 48 hours; and short range, a prediction for a period of approximately 12 hours.
- (3) Climatological studies and special weather forecasts for specific needs may be obtained upon request to appropriate agencies.
- (4) Weather service is furnished to the Army by the Air Weather Service, whose detachments are available at corps and higher headquarters. Divisions and lower units receive weather forecasts through intelligence channels.

i. Miscellaneous.

- (1) Refugees, civilians, escapers, and evaders are possible sources of information on communication centers, supply dumps, troop concentrations, location of defenses, weapons emplacements, command post signs and symbols, artillery positions, and other matters. Information from these sources will vary in importance to the commander, depending on the time element, the locale and the type of operation.

- (2) Enemy press and radio broadcasts are sources of information on enemy organization, assignment of important military and political matters, status of the national economy, psychological reactions of the enemy population, and casualty data. Such of this information as is of interest to the division and lower units can be secured through the attached Communication Reconnaissance Liaison Detachment.
- (3) Other sources of information include strategic and tactical terrain studies prepared by various agencies, all intelligence studies of other echelons or units, and reference materials prepared by or for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, General Staff, United States Army, and similar agencies.

Section III. INFORMATION COLLECTING AGENCIES

30. GENERAL

a. A collecting agency is any person, unit, or instrumentality that acquires information by research, observation, or interrogation of a source, and through which information may be obtained. At all echelons of field command from the battalion upwards, the intelligence officer is aided in the performance of his duties by *specialized collecting agencies*. In a broad sense, however, *all* troops are in a position to collect information. Intelligence is not solely the affair of a few specialists.

b. Commanders depend on their intelligence officers to exploit the means at their disposal to gain information of the enemy. Intelligence officers therefore must effectively employ all available intelligence agencies.

c. Figure 4 shows the intelligence agencies organic, attached, or available to an infantry division. Other divisions are similar, with slight modifications to conform with differences in organization.

31. TYPES OF COLLECTING AGENCIES

Collecting agencies are of three types—intelligence personnel, troops, and special information services.

a. *Intelligence Personnel.* This type includes the intelligence section and attached personnel with exclusive intelligence duties. Some of this personnel—observers, interrogators, translators, and interpreters—collect information.

b. *Troops.* The term “troops” refers to the organic and supporting units of divisions and lower units which collect information, for the most part, by actual contact with the enemy. This type comprises ground reconnaissance units, and infantry, artillery, engineer, and tank units. All of these units are capable of collecting information from the battle area. Normally, this is accomplished by patrolling; by capturing prisoners; by securing enemy documents, equipment, and matériel; and by ground and aerial observation.

c. *Special Information Services.* Special information services are those agencies that are, in general, technical or highly specialized. With the exception of the Army Security Agency, they are

operated by the branches, usually in the interest of the branch concerned. They may be attached, organic, or available at higher echelons. Usually, special information services do not depend upon actual contact with the enemy to gain information. Close




Figure 4. Intelligence agencies, infantry division.

liaison is maintained between these agencies and the intelligence officer. Special information services include the Army Security Agency; military police, quartermaster, ordnance, signal, medical, and chemical units; shelling report personnel; cooperat-

ing air forces; and technical service intelligence detachments.

32. TYPES OF TROOPS

a. Reconnaissance Units (par. 81). Reconnaissance units normally found within ground combat elements include an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon in each infantry regiment; a reconnaissance platoon in each tank and armored infantry battalion, a reconnaissance company in each infantry and airborne division, a reconnaissance battalion in each armored division, an armored cavalry regiment (light) in each corps, and in some instances an armored cavalry regiment (light) in each army. Reconnaissance units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform mounted or dismounted missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and movement. They possess excellent radio communication facilities, great mobility on roads, good cross-country mobility, great fire power, and trained reconnaissance personnel. However, their continuous operation is dependent upon favorable road conditions, favorable weather, and a constant fuel supply. Mechanized reconnaissance patrols do not operate quietly or with maximum effectiveness at night. Reconnaissance units are capable of performing the following types of missions:

- (1) Searching within assigned zones or areas or along designated routes.
- (2) Covering an exposed flank or gap between units.
- (3) Gaining contact in meeting engagements.

- (4) Patrolling dismounted.
- (5) Manning observation posts.

b. Infantry Units.

- (1) Because of the infantry combat role of closing with the enemy, every infantry unit has opportunities to collect information by various means. Infantry fights for information or uses other means, such as scouting, patrolling, and observing from the ground and air; interrogating prisoners of war, civilians, and repatriates; and examining captured documents and matériel. With regard to the collection of information, an infantry unit has the following advantages:
 - (a) It maintains physical contact with the enemy.
 - (b) It operates under all weather conditions.
 - (c) It obtains detailed information of the enemy by fighting, observing, and listening.
 - (d) It operates efficiently at night.
- (2) The infantry's principal limitation is its restricted mobility because of foot movement. It cannot obtain as broad a picture of the enemy situation as can mounted reconnaissance units, armor, and air units. Suitable intelligence missions for an infantry unit are those that can be performed concurrently with its combat mission, such as determining the local enemy situation (to include location, strength, dispositions, identifications, attitudes, combat effectiveness, and local reserves) and the character-

istics of the area of operation to the immediate front.

(c) *Counterfire Units.* Counterfire platoons, infantry regiments, and counterfire squads, armored infantry battalions, locate enemy machine guns and mortars by sound-ranging methods. These methods permit locating targets that cannot be detected visually by reason of being masked by enemy defensive positions, ground forms, vegetation, darkness, smoke, haze, or fog.

d. *Tank Elements of Armored Units.*

- (1) Tank elements of armored units seldom operate dismounted and, therefore, are normally limited to observation from their tanks or vehicles in gathering information.

Tank elements have the following advantages for collecting information:

- (a) They travel at moderate speeds on roads and have cross-country mobility.
- (b) Their armor provides considerable protection against fire.
- (c) They have an excellent system of radio communication.
- (d) They are capable of rapid penetration of enemy areas.

- (2) Tank elements have the following limitations:

- (a) Their operations are limited by mine fields and other obstacles.
- (b) Their operations are limited by unfavorable weather, certain types of terrain, poor visibility, and darkness.

- (c) Continuous operation is dependent upon constant resupply of fuel, spare parts, and ammunition.
- (3) Collecting missions appropriate to tank elements are essentially similar to infantry collecting missions, although wider and deeper coverage can be expected in many cases. Dismounted patrolling may be conducted in stabilized situations when detailed information of the enemy or enemy-held terrain is desired.

e. Field Artillery Units. Field artillery is an organic component of all divisions. Artillery units have contact with the enemy in a visual sense; they maintain constant observation of the enemy and of enemy-held terrain. In carrying out its primary role of supporting the infantry by fire, the artillery locates and destroys enemy targets. The primary duty of the artillery intelligence system is to locate enemy targets and to keep accurate information on the position of front lines. Artillery intelligence officers obtain these data from forward observers, liaison officers with front-line infantry units, air observers in light aircraft organic to division artillery, countermortar radar sections of direct support battalions, survey and reconnaissance elements, shelling reports and shell fragment analysis, and ground observation posts. The artillery wire and radio communication system permits rapid signal communication. Unlike the infantry, however, artillery does not have the ability to obtain enemy identifications and other detailed information from physical contact with the enemy. Among the types of in-

formation which intelligence officers may expect to receive from the artillery are the location of enemy artillery, mortars, machine guns, antitank guns, anti-aircraft artillery, troop concentrations and movements, strong points, assembly areas, observation posts, command posts, and terrain information.

f. Antiaircraft Units. Antiaircraft units provide the intelligence officer with such information of enemy aerial activity as the number, type, and activity of enemy aircraft; friendly targets attacked; and number of enemy planes destroyed or damaged. All antiaircraft units are in the communication net of the antiaircraft artillery intelligence service (AAAIS), which operates an aircraft warning service throughout the army area. The subordinate antiaircraft intelligence officer can relay these attack warnings to the intelligence officer.

g. Countermortar Radar Sections, Division Artillery. The primary mission of these sections is to locate enemy mortars so that counterfire may neutralize or destroy them. A secondary mission is to detect enemy movements. Countermortar radar sections depend on radar to locate enemy mortars. There are several factors that limit the operating efficiency of a radar set, among which are adverse weather conditions (especially heavy rain), physical obstructions, and enemy countermeasures.

h. Engineer Units. Each division has an assigned engineer combat battalion and may obtain support from engineer units at higher echelons. Engineers engage primarily in duties requiring technical skill and special equipment. In the course of such duties, they obtain information on the transportation routes,

soil trafficability, topography and resources of the area of operations, and on enemy fortifications and installations. Engineer units furnish information and intelligence on the tactical effect of new engineer matériel in the hands of the enemy (or a novel use of some already known enemy equipment), and on aspects of terrain from an engineer point of view, particularly stream forecasts and hydrographic, trafficability, and terrain studies. They prepare technical terrain studies used in the preparation of terrain estimates. Special engineer units prepare terrain models and topographic maps and map supplements.

33. DESCRIPTION OF SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICES

a. The Army Security Agency. Communication intelligence, and communication security support at division is provided by communication reconnaissance units either attached to the division or available at higher headquarters (par. 17 and ch. 11).

b. Military Police Units. Military police units, by patrolling rear areas, controlling refugees and the civilian population, and handling prisoners of war, frequently obtain information of both intelligence and counterintelligence value.

c. Ordnance and Quartermaster Units. Ordnance and quartermaster units furnish intelligence and information regarding the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the enemy's ordnance and quartermaster matériel. The information collected by division ordnance and quartermaster units will probably

be hasty and incomplete. Detailed intelligence on enemy matériel will come from studies made by technical service intelligence detachments at higher echelons.

d. Signal Units. Signal units assist the intelligence officer by providing information and intelligence on enemy signal equipment. Photographers of signal units may be used for intelligence purposes.

e. Medical Units. Medical units furnish information and intelligence on medical and public health aspects of the enemy and of the area of operations. They may also obtain information and documents from wounded personnel, enemy as well as friendly.

f. Chemical Units. Chemical units furnish information of enemy chemical, radiological and biological activity to include the kind of agent used; location, size, and duration of concentration or contamination; effect of agents; chemical tactics; the presence of gas munitions or radiological or biological agents in captured enemy munitions dumps and other installations; and the appearance of any new or unusual enemy chemical equipment. They also assist in gas alerts.

g. Shelling Report Personnel.

- (1) Shelling report and crater analysis personnel determine the activity, location, caliber and method of employment of enemy artillery. Although shelling report teams are not provided in tables of organization and equipment, each artillery battalion and artillery headquarters usually maintains one or more of them. Shelling report teams and all other personnel of units have a con-

tinuing duty to submit reports of shelling in their area to their supporting artillery, no matter how meager their information may seem.

- (2) By analysis of shelling reports the artillery intelligence officer collects information on the disposition and activities of enemy artillery. He provides the division intelligence officer with such information. A study of the movement and grouping of the enemy artillery, of the areas which the enemy artillery has shelled, and of the enemy artillery activity, is of particular value in arriving at an estimate of enemy capabilities and at the relative probability of adoption of a particular course of action.

h. Tactical Air Force (ch. 8). A tactical air force normally operates with the army. Its information-collecting facilities are available to intelligence officers of divisions and lower echelons through intelligence channels. It can reach far behind the enemy front lines and by either photo or visual reconnaissance missions can obtain information otherwise not available. Air photo interpretation furnishes information regarding the enemy and the terrain. Visual reconnaissance missions provide information primarily on terrain and on transient targets.

i. Technical Service Intelligence Detachments (TSID).

- (1) These detachments are composed of representatives of the various technical services and furnish information concerning various types of enemy equipment. Detachments

may be attached to the appropriate special staff sections of corps and armies. In general, they are not attached to divisions because of the small area under division control. The division intelligence officer, however, will receive their reports through the respective technical services, and intelligence produced as a result of their activity through intelligence channels.

- (2) There is a difference between the work of technical service intelligence detachments and the information which all technical service personnel can offer. For example, an ordnance maintenance officer in a combat area may observe an abandoned enemy tank and give the local S-2 or G-2 information which will lead to the identification of a new enemy unit in the area. The same tank, when inspected by the ordnance technical service intelligence detachment, may then provide the theater intelligence officer with detailed data as to the characteristics of that particular tank model.

CHAPTER 5

PROCESSING INFORMATION

34. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROCESSING

a. Processing is the means by which information is transformed into intelligence. Processing includes recording, evaluation, and interpretation. After information has been collected, the intelligence officer will sort, group, and record it by subjects in order to facilitate comparison and study; he will evaluate it in order to determine its pertinence, credibility, and accuracy; and he will interpret it to determine its significance. Only then does the processed information become intelligence.

b. Proper recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information produces intelligence that is concise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready for immediate use. Such intelligence will convey not only facts but also the significance of those facts, together with all deductions drawn from their study in the light of other intelligence already at hand.

c. The time at which information is recorded depends upon its urgency; and the extent to which it is evaluated and interpreted depends upon the reliability of its source and the agency reporting it. For example, a flash warning of an air attack from a subordinate unit commander would be disseminated immediately because of its urgency and would require no evaluation or interpretation because of the

reliability of the reporting agency. Recording would be the final step. On the other hand, information obtained from an enemy deserter is recorded without delay and would be carefully evaluated and interpreted prior to its dissemination because of the doubtful reliability of its source. The more urgent the information, the more rapid is its processing. Even if the procedure is hasty, the reliability, meaning, and significance of the information is weighed as carefully as the urgency of the situation permits.

d. The intelligence officer is assisted in the process of recording, evaluation, and interpretation by the intelligence personnel organic to his unit, by attached intelligence specialist teams, and by other members of the unit staff.

35. RECORDING

a. Recording arranges information in a systematic manner to facilitate its being processed into intelligence. Incoming information is examined at once by the intelligence officer on duty for items of immediate tactical importance before any recording is done. On these items he takes necessary action promptly (par. 22*b*), after which the information is systematically arranged, sorted, grouped, and listed by subjects, so that items of the same kind may be kept together for convenience of comparison, study, and reporting. From the standpoint of combat intelligence, there are four general aids by means of which the mechanics of recording are accomplished—

- (1) Intelligence (or G-2) journal (par. 36).
- (2) Enemy situation map (par. 37).

- (3) G-2 work sheet (par. 38).
- (4) Intelligence files (par. 39).

b. The aids listed in *a* above are necessary in the preparation of intelligence reports and serve as convenient means of reference for the commander and for members of his staff. However, the intelligence officer of every unit should adapt his procedures to the needs of his unit. Simplification of procedures will be especially necessary at the battalion and regimental echelons. An efficient intelligence officer will not allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paper work. In all situations the maintenance of records is subordinate to the mission of assembling and interpreting information and producing and using intelligence. Action comes first; records are of secondary importance.

36. INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

a. The intelligence journal (or G-2 journal) is the daybook of the division intelligence section. The intelligence staff of battalions and regiments record their activities in the unit daily journal, maintained by the executive. The journal contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders, records of important conferences, and similar matters pertaining directly to the intelligence section. It is an official permanent record of a unit and the primary record of operations of the intelligence section of the headquarters. The journal is closed daily or at the end of a phase or period as directed. At division one copy is submitted to the chief of staff

for consolidation with the other journals of the headquarters. The journal, supported by the journal file, maps, overlays, and other pertinent documents, is used in preparing the unit command report. (FM 101-5 and AR 345-105.)

b. After examination by the intelligence officer on duty for any items of information of immediate tactical importance, and subsequent action, all incoming items of information are next recorded in the journal. The original entry is never altered, but may be supplemented by subsequent entries. If the item is received or issued in oral form, it should be summarized in written form and handled as a regular message. If the item is in documentary form, the entry may consist of a reference and brief synopsis of contents. (See fig. 5 for sample journal sheet.)

37. ENEMY SITUATION MAP

a. General. The enemy situation map is kept by the intelligence officer of each combat unit. Upon it is recorded graphically all available information of the enemy for reference and study. The situation map supplements, but does not take the place of, the work sheet.

b. Scale. The situation map should be of a scale appropriate to the size and mission of the unit. Generally, the smaller the unit, the larger the scale required because of the amount of detailed information which must be recorded. Higher headquarters should have on hand copies of all maps used by subordinate units, so that there will be no danger of reports or messages referring to places not shown on maps available at the higher headquarters. Each

major unit should prescribe the operation map for use in its own and next subordinate headquarters. This standardization will reduce chances for error. When reports refer to a map other than the prescribed operation map, the map used will be identified unless the grid reference system specified for the operation is used.

c. Scope. The map area should include the terrain in possession of our own troops as well as that held by the enemy. Information of the enemy that is of importance to the command is placed on the map by means of symbols or conventional signs. Care is taken to prevent the map from becoming too cluttered. The information posted will vary with the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, the more detailed will be the information recorded. The location of the command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; the boundaries between major subordinate units; the location of friendly reconnaissance units; and (when there is an appreciable distance between our lines and those of the enemy) the trace of our front line, constitute the minimum friendly information that should be shown on the enemy situation map. Division enemy situation maps should show the location of enemy units down to battalions. To be useful, the situation map must be current.

d. Cooperation With Operations Officer. All information concerning the enemy is furnished to the operations officer (G-3 or S-3). By mutual agreement between the intelligence officer and the operations officer, draftsmen of one section may enter pertinent information on the situation map of the other

CLASSIFICATION

G-2 Sec, 101st Inf Div
LANCASTER, SC
211200 Jun 19—
to
221200 Jun 19—

Time		Serial No.	Time dated	Incidents, messages, orders, etc.	Action taken
In	Out				
21			21	101st Recon—At (1020-1320)	M
1300		1	1245	moving S on Hwy 521.	
1420		2	1330	101st Recon—Brg at (1027-1292) destroyed 1315; creek 5 ft wide. Fordable.	MST
1525		3	1500	V Corps—Estimated inf regt moving NW on Hwy 341. Head of colm at KERSHAW.	MST
1620		4	1540	101st Recon—Document (div bdry) from pilot IX Corps 1530.	MST
	1630	5		V Corps—Document (div bdry) from pilot IX Corps 1530.	

CLASSIFICATION

Entries in the G-2 journal are made as follows:

Under the column headed "Time" . . . enter the actual time the message arrived at your section or departed from it, in the "In" and "Out" columns, respectively.

Under the column headed "Serial number" . . . enter the journal number of the message, numbering consecutively for each journal period.

Under the column headed "Time dated" . . . enter the time the message was dated or both the time and date of the message, if the date is other than for the existing journal period.

Figure 5. Example of journal sheet for division intelligence section.

Under the column headed "Incidents, messages, orders, etc." . . . enter and underline the agency from which the message was received or to which it was sent; then enter briefly the substance of the message in topic form. Use only one line of the journal if possible.

Under the column headed "Action taken" . . . enter the dissemination which was made of the information contained in the message. Use the symbols, M, S, and T: M (Map), posted on the situation map; S (Staff), disseminated to the commander and the appropriate staff members; T (Troops), disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent echelons. When pertinent, specific staff officers and specific units may be indicated.

Figure 5.—Continued

section. In order that the intelligence officer may estimate enemy capabilities that may affect our future plans, he keeps abreast of operational planning.

e. Timeliness. The situation map is kept constantly up to date, new sheets being used when necessary. A tracing or copy of the information on the map, showing the situation as known at the close of the period, may accompany the periodic intelligence report.

f. Joint Situation Maps. In some headquarters, particularly in those of battalions and regiments, a single situation map may be kept jointly for all staff sections under the supervision of a designated officer. At division it is advisable for the intelligence and operations sections to maintain separate situation maps in order not to interfere with each other and to keep the amount of detail on each map at a minimum.

g. Materials. The current situation is preferably posted on a transparent substance, such as tracing paper or acetate. This method preserves maps, and the tracing paper provides simplicity in transcription of map data. The transparent material is placed on top of the map and the desired information is traced or posted on the tracing paper. This is known as an "overlay." In rapidly moving situations, data may be posted on the map itself. In more stable situations, this is not the best procedure because of map shortage, waste, and because the map soon becomes cluttered with symbols. Where photographic facilities are available, prints of the situation map may accompany the periodic intelligence report (par. 33*d*).

h. Symbols (FM 21-30). The situation map or overlay should be kept as simple as possible. Authorized conventional signs, military symbols, and abbreviations are used. Where symbols are required other than those authorized, they may be improvised, provided they are readily recognizable; otherwise, it is better to make a written notation on the map itself. An alternative method of referring to items for which there are no symbols or which require some explanation is to note the journal entry number pertaining to the item on the margin of the map with an arrow pointing to the location of the item on the map.

i. Clarity. Neatness and clarity are essentials to a good situation map. All symbols and signs are posted clearly and accurately. Symbols should be sufficiently large to be seen from a reasonable distance, so as to allow several persons to study the

map at the same time. Symbols should be posted horizontally, that is, so that they may be read without turning the map or overlay. In some cases this is not possible; for example, the symbols for trenches, mine fields, tank traps, and barbed wire must conform to their actual position on the ground.

j. Colors. Enemy information is normally posted in red and friendly information in blue. When one color is used for both, enemy unit symbols are shown in double lines (FM 21-30). Symbols for mine fields, demolitions, road blocks, and other engineer obstacles, when installed by our own troops, are posted in green. Gassed areas are posted in yellow.




Figure 6. Method of indicating date and time a unit is reported.

k. Time.

- (1) The date and time a unit was reported or identified is posted below the symbol (fig. 6). This is very important when the information concerns a moving unit such as a column of troops. The indication of time has no reference to the time the information was posted.
- (2) Information is posted at the earliest practicable time after receipt (par. 34). Delay may cause incomplete or late dissemination. Delay may also lead to omission and conse-

quent inaccuracy in the intelligence estimate and periodic intelligence report.

l. Keeping Map Up To Date. Only current information should appear on the situation map. Before removing information from the map, however, make sure that it is of no further value, or, if it is of value for report purposes, that it has been properly recorded.

m. Posting Unconfirmed Information and Unknown Details. It is desirable to use a consistent method for posting unconfirmed information and unknown details. One method is to show unconfirmed information by question marks, and simply to omit posting symbols for any details that are unknown (fig. 7). The symbols shown in figure 7 would be posted in red (*j* above).

n. Enemy Order of Battle. An identification list kept at the top margin of the situation map shows which enemy units are facing our own. This list is known as an order of battle list or chart. Use of such a list may not be necessary if an order of battle section is available.

o. Crowding of Map. Every effort should be made to avoid crowding symbols on the situation map. When the situation map becomes too cluttered with symbols it should be revised, and identified units consolidated where possible. The use of a supplemental situation map of a different scale will be of value in static situations.

38. G-2 WORK SHEET

a. Purpose. The purpose of the work sheet is to facilitate systematic arrangement of information re-







Presence of unit unconfirmed.		?
Unit is known to be present, but size and type are unknown.		
Infantry unit confirmed, size unknown.		
Infantry battalion confirmed, identification unknown.		
Infantry battalion confirmed; reported (but not confirmed) to be element of 26th Inf Regt; identification of battalion unknown.		26?
2d Bn, 26th Inf Regt.	2 	26

Figure 7. Method of indicating unconfirmed information or unknown details.

ceived by the intelligence section, so that all items bearing on a particular subject will be grouped together for ready reference and comparison. In this respect, the work sheet differs from the journal, in which information is entered *chronologically*. The work sheet is an aid to the preparation of estimates,

summaries, and reports. It is a convenient memorandum for the intelligence officer, but is not a permanent document. It should be kept up to date—obsolete items being lined out or withdrawn. Whenever an intelligence officer has need for a personal memorandum to assist him in keeping abreast of a changing situation, the work sheet is a useful device.

b. Form. No specific form is prescribed for a work sheet. Regardless of form used, items of information are extracted from incoming messages and reports and are recorded on the proper page of the work sheet, so they may be subsequently studied. For convenience, the work sheet may consist of pages of a loose leaf notebook that are indexed along the side with the headings used in the periodic intelligence report (see fig. 8). All items (messages) bearing upon the same subject are entered on the same page of the work sheet. Some messages may relate to more than one subject and therefore provide entries for more than one work sheet page. In using the form, enter the serial number of the message (same number as entered in the journal), the time the activity occurred, the source of the information, and an extract of the message itself. An illustrative entry for the work sheet is as follows: "J-2, 091200 Apr, from 1st Engr C Bn: Bridge at YUTAN (21-46) bombed and destroyed. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." This item comes from journal entry number 2. The incident happened at 1200 on 9 April and the information was received from the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion. Many intelligence officers, in actual practice, find it advisable to underscore the more important elements of an entry.

CLASSIFICATION	
<p align="center">G - 2 WORK SHEET</p> <p>From: _____ hour and date</p> <p>To: _____ hour and date</p> <p>Headquarters: _____</p> <p>Place: _____</p> <p>NOTES:</p> <p>Numbers on tabs refer to paragraphs in periodic intelligence report. The classification will be stamped at the top and bottom of each page. A loose leaf notebook with tabbed separators may be used. As pages become obsolete they may be discarded.</p> <p align="center">CLASSIFICATION</p>	<p>1a. Forward areas.</p>
	<p>1b. Rear areas.</p>
	<p>1c. Defensive organization.</p>
	<p>1d. Administrative installations.</p>
	<p>2b. New enemy tactics and weapons or other materiel.</p>
	<p>2c (1) Administrative units.</p>
	<p>2c (2) Air forces.</p>
	<p>2c (3) Antiaircraft defenses.</p>
	<p>2c (4) Antitank units.</p>
	<p>2c (5) Armored units.</p>
	<p>2c (6) Artillery (including rockets).</p>
	<p>2c (7) Cavalry.</p>
	<p>2c (8) Chemical warfare.</p>
	<p>2c (9) Engineers.</p>
	<p>2c (10) Guided missiles.</p>
<p>2c (11) Infantry.</p>	
<p>2c (12) Reconnaissance.</p>	
<p>2c (13) Other elements.</p>	
<p>3. Other intelligence factors.</p>	
<p>4. Counter-intelligence.</p>	

Figure 8. Typical G-2 work sheet.

When one item of information confirms another, a notation of that fact should be made in both entries, either by noting the journal entry number or the page and paragraph of the work sheet.

39. INTELLIGENCE FILES

a. The journal file contains the original or a copy of all messages or documents that are entered in the intelligence journal. It supports the journal.

b. The information file is a suitably indexed and cross-referenced file of all information that may be of future value. It should include supplementary situation maps or overlays taken from the situation map. For instance, during a period of stabilization or inactivity, much information will be collected that is of no immediate interest, but which may become invaluable when an attack is ordered. If this information is published solely in periodic reports as it comes in, it may be disregarded and forgotten, and may not be available when needed. It should therefore be placed in a file, where it will be available for immediate check against new information. Such information will cover enemy order of battle information; defenses; condition of roads, railways, and bridges; location and contents of supply establishments; location of enemy reserves; and other similar items.

c. The order of battle files consist of unit history cards for recording enemy unit identifications, history, and other pertinent details. A unit history card is started when a new enemy unit is identified. As additional information is received, it is entered on appropriate cards. These cards will aid an intelli-

gence officer to determine what portion of an identified enemy unit is engaged, or may be engaged against his unit, and to estimate its combat efficiency from the approximate strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

-40. EVALUATION

Evaluation is the appraisal of an item of information in order to determine its pertinence, the credibility of the source or agency, and the accuracy of the information.

a. Pertinence of Information. Immediately after receipt by the intelligence section, information is examined in order to determine the degree in which it is relevant, and its possible value. This involves a consideration of the following:

- (1) Is it information of the enemy or of the characteristics of the area of operation?
- (2) Is it information needed immediately and, if so, by whom?
- (3) Is it information of future value?
- (4) Is it information of value to this unit or to lower, higher, or adjacent units?

b. Credibility of Source and Agency. The credibility or worthiness of belief of the source and collecting agency is also determined before the intelligence officer can evaluate the information. The following are some of the important points considered:

- (1) To what extent is the source accurate and reliable?

- (2) Has the collecting agency sufficient training, experience, and ability to report accurately the information in question?
- (3) Under conditions existing at the time (such as time and space, means employed, and visibility), could the information have been obtained?

c. Accuracy of Information. The accuracy or truth of the information itself must be determined separately from the credibility of the source and agency. This is determined by considering the following:

- (1) Is the purported fact or event *at all* possible?
- (2) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other information from a different source or agency?
- (3) In what respects does it agree or disagree with available information covering the same point, particularly information known to be correct?
- (4) If it is at variance with information from another source and agency, and the conflicting items cannot be reconciled, which information is more likely to be correct?

41. RATING THE SOURCE, AGENCY, AND THE INFORMATION

a. Credibility.

- (1) The credibility of the source and agency is rated by the intelligence officer according to the following standard system:

A—Completely reliable.

B—Usually reliable.

C—Fairly reliable.

D—Not usually reliable.

E—Unreliable.

F—Reliability cannot be judged.

- (2) An "A" rating for a source should be given only under the most unusual circumstances; when, for example, an informant is an intelligence officer of long experience and wide background. A rating of "B" indicates an informant of known integrity; "C," "D," and "E" ratings indicate a proportionately decreasing degree of reliability. An "F" rating is assigned when nothing is known concerning the background or reliability of the informant.

- (3) Ratings of agencies will generally fall in categories "A," "B," or "C."

b. Accuracy.

- (1) The accuracy of an item of information is indicated by the use of numerals, as follows:

1—Report confirmed by other sources.

2—Report probably true.

3—Report possibly true.

4—Report doubtfully true.

5—Improbable report.

6—Truth cannot be judged.

- (2) It is important to remember that the numerical ratings are independent and distinct from the lettered ratings. When these ratings are used together, the number "1" need not necessarily accompany the letter

“A;” number “2,” the letter “B;” and so on. An improbable report may come from a reliable source or agency; or a report which is probably true or confirmed by other information from a different source or agency may come from an unreliable source or agency. Furthermore, with regard to “1” *report confirmed by other sources*, it should be noted that the sources must be *independent*. For example, if a report by an enemy prisoner that his artillery battery is located at a certain point is confirmed by interpretation of an air photo of the point—*the prisoner and the air photo are independent sources*.

42. INTERPRETATION

a. General. Up to this point, the intelligence officer is concerned with assembling, cataloging, and evaluating information. He is now faced with the problem of analyzing the evaluated information to determine its significance with respect to information or intelligence already at hand. This process of critical analysis is known as interpretation.

b. Significance of Information.

- (1) Interpretation of evaluated information required determination, first, of its conformity or nonconformity with existing information, and second, of its effect upon the existing estimate of the situation. Pertinent considerations are—

- (a) What does this information mean in connection with what is already known?

- (b) Does it alter, confirm, refute, or add significance to information previously received?
- (c) Does it tend to confirm or refute the existing estimate of the enemy situation?
- (2) Correct interpretation leads to accurate conclusions concerning the enemy's capabilities and his probable courses of action.

c. Bearing on Current Intelligence Estimate. As each new item of information is processed, the interpretation placed upon it affects in some way the current intelligence estimate. The conclusions already drawn are altered or confirmed; new capabilities are determined, old ones are discarded; the relative probability of adoption of the enemy's courses of action become clearer. The estimate is continuously revised and kept up to date in the light of new intelligence.

CHAPTER 6

USE OF INTELLIGENCE

Section I. EMPLOYMENT BY G-2

43. INTRODUCTION

The ultimate *use* of intelligence is to assist the commander in making sound and timely decisions. It also assists the troops and the staff to execute their missions and to meet their responsibilities. In order for intelligence to be of use, it is given to the commander and to all others who need it, in the *form* that will furnish the greatest assistance and in *time* to serve their purposes. It is presented to the commander in the *intelligence estimate*. It is transmitted to lower, higher, and adjacent units for their possible use. This process is known as *dissemination*.

44. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

a. The commander makes his decision on the basis of his continuing estimate of the situation. The more complete and up to date the estimate, the more effective will be the selected course of action. The estimate of the situation must therefore embody significant conclusions from all available intelligence. The intelligence officer arrives at his conclusions and presents them to his commander in the *intelligence estimate*. In substance, the intelligence estimate brings together significant aspects of the area of op-

erations and of the enemy situation, presents the enemy's capabilities, analyzes them in relation to one another, and considers each enemy capability in relation to the friendly mission. With the intelligence estimate, the commander is able to balance these factors against his own possible courses of action and thereby to choose his own most favorable course of action. This is stated in his decision. Like the estimate of the situation, the intelligence estimate is a *continuing process*. As the factors with which it is concerned change, it is revised. Preparation of the intelligence estimate is a constant and basic responsibility of the intelligence officer.

b. An intelligence estimate will be given to the commander by the intelligence officer either upon the initiative of the intelligence officer (that is, when he deems that the situation so warrants) or when required by the commander. It may be comprehensive or fragmentary. Regardless of the manner of presentation, it should so far as practicable be based on a prescribed form. Such a form is desirable in that it furnishes a checklist which helps to prevent omission of important items.

45. FORM OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

a. The prescribed form (*b* below) summarizes characteristics of the area of operations, the enemy situation, and the enemy capabilities; analyzes them in relation to one another; and considers each enemy capability that can affect the friendly mission. Certain conclusions are drawn, *if justified*, concerning the relative probability of adoption of the enemy

capabilities. Finally, the effect of the enemy courses of action on the friendly mission is considered.

b. Following is the prescribed form of the intelligence estimate. (Appendix II is an example of an intelligence estimate.)

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing section and headquarters

Place

Date and time

CHARTS OR MAPS

1. MISSION. State the task and its purpose.

a. If mission is multiple, determine priorities.

b. If there are intermediate tasks, such tasks should be listed.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

a. *Considerations affecting the possible enemy courses of action and our mission.* Determine and analyze those factors which will influence choice by the enemy of a course of action as well as those which affect the capabilities of the enemy to act. Consider such of the following and other factors as are involved:

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(a) Weather (or climatic conditions) (annex, if applicable).

1. Statement of existing situation.

2. Tactical effects on enemy capabilities to act.

3. Tactical effects on mission of own command.

(b) Terrain (annex, if applicable).

(c) Hydrography (annex, if applicable).

(d) Politics (annex, if applicable).

(e) Economics (annex, if applicable).

(f) Sociology (annex, if applicable).

Note. Subheadings for any of the above, or any additional factors which are discussed, should be similar to those indicated under weather above.

(2) Enemy situation.

(a) Strength, including combat efficiency.

(b) Composition.

(c) Dispositions, including fire support.

(d) Recent and present significant activities (including enemy's knowledge of our situation).

(e) Status of supply.

(f) Reinforcements.

b. *Enemy capabilities.*

(1) Note all possible courses of action within the capabilities of the enemy which can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) Discussion and analysis of subparagraph 2b (1) to justify (when possible) the selection of relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

(3) Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

3. EFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OUR MISSION.

/s/ _____
G-2

CLASSIFICATION

46. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The following instructions explain the preparation of the intelligence estimate. In actual practice only those paragraphs will be included in an estimate for which the intelligence officer has the pertinent information and intelligence.

a. If the estimate is published for circulation *within* the headquarters, the heading shows "G-2 Section, ____ Div"; if the estimate is published for circulation outside the headquarters, the heading

drops the "G-2 Section" and shows only the unit designation, that is, "____ Div."

b. Paragraph 1 states the *mission* of the commander or unit.

c. Paragraph 2 presents the *situation* and the possible *enemy courses of action*.

(1) Paragraph 2a (1) analyzes pertinent *characteristics of the area of operations*. These characteristics may include weather, terrain, hydrography, politics, economics, sociology, and any other factors that may affect the friendly mission or the enemy capabilities. Discussion of each characteristic is arranged as follows—first, the existing situation with regard to the factor; second, the tactical effects of the factor on the enemy capabilities; and, third, the tactical effects of the factor on our mission. All of the characteristics named above may not be applicable in a particular situation, as at the lower echelons of command. For example, an infantry division G-2 would normally consider only *weather* and *terrain*. On the other hand, at theater all the characteristics named (and possibly others) would be considered. In some cases they might be elaborated on to such an extent that an annex would be required.

(2) Paragraph 2a (2) deals with the *enemy situation*. The enemy strength, composition, dispositions, significant activities, status of supply, and reinforcements are covered. Much of this is best shown on a

map, sketch, or overlay. The foregoing terms are defined as follows:

- (a) *"Strength, including combat efficiency."*
The numerical fighting strength available to the enemy in the particular operation concerned. The basic unit strengths considered may vary, depending on the level of command at which the estimate is made. Account must be taken of the current combat *effectiveness* (quality) of enemy units.
- (b) *"Composition of the enemy forces."* The structure or make-up of the force, such as the number of infantry battalions in a regiment and what types of units (such as infantry, motorized, armored, and airborne) are in an enemy division. This paragraph also includes intelligence on enemy order of battle.
- (c) *"Dispositions, including fire support."* The arrangement on the ground of the various units of the enemy force. An example might be, "The enemy has two infantry battalions, supported by one field artillery battalion, located on ridge A-B with one infantry battalion in local reserve as crossroads C."
- (d) *"Recent and present significant activities (including enemy's knowledge of our situation)."* This summarizes significant current enemy activities. Furthermore, if it is reasonable to believe that the enemy has specific knowledge of our situation and intentions, this should be noted. An ex-

ample would be the enemy's capture of certain of our personnel known to have been bearing a current operation order.

(e) "*Status of supply.*" Whether or not the enemy supply situation is such that it can support the enemy forces in the impending operation. An example is the status of food, fuel, and ammunition.

(f) "*Reinforcements.*" Combat units other than those locally available that could logically affect the accomplishment of our mission. (For meaning of "locally available," see paragraph 49c.)

(3) Paragraph 2b (1) lists the *enemy capabilities* that can affect the accomplishment of our mission. (See par. 47 for a detailed discussion of enemy capabilities.)

(4) (a) Having determined the enemy capabilities, the intelligence officer then analyzes each one in paragraph 2b (2) in order to justify, when possible, the selection of the *relative probability of adoption*. This justification usually must consist of definite information of enemy dispositions which favor one or more capabilities and militate against others. Under exceptional circumstances, even though the enemy dispositions may not favor any particular capability, a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine, recent performances, national psychology, and the character and mentality of the enemy commander may justify an indica-

tion of priority. The basis for indicating a priority must be clearly stated.

- (b) Selection of relative probability of adoption is based on interpretation of intelligence that indicates future enemy action. For example, if enemy troop movements toward the front lines are reported by reconnaissance, this might indicate that the enemy does not plan to withdraw, but rather is preparing to attack, or to strengthen his defense. The manner in which artillery is employed is another example of an indication of the future actions of the enemy. If the major part of the enemy's artillery is well forward, offensive action is indicated. If, on the other hand, the bulk of his artillery is echeloned in depth, defense or withdrawal is indicated. By analyzing such indications it is possible for the intelligence officer to determine the relative probability of adoption by the enemy of a particular course of action. Care must be taken that relative probability is stated *only when it can be justified by indications*. If there are no indications to justify the selection of a particular enemy course of action as the most probable of adoption, the intelligence officer should state that fact. The bases for determining the relative probability are sound indications and known facts, not guesswork.

- (5) The intelligence officer after thoroughly analyzing the capabilities, then lists the relative probability of their adoption in paragraph 2b (3).

d. In paragraph 3, the intelligence officer discusses the effect of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the friendly mission. An example would be—"If the enemy launches an attack against our north flank prior to our attack, we will have difficulty in reaching the high ground at PEACH-TREE."

e. If the estimate is published for circulation *within* the headquarters only, G-2 signs it and no authentication is required. If the estimate is published for circulation *outside* the headquarters, it is over the commander's name and G-2 must authenticate it.

47. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. *General.* Enemy capabilities are considered in the commander's estimate and are discussed in the intelligence estimate, the periodic intelligence report, and in the intelligence annex. Their most important application is the use made by the commander in his estimate of the situation.

b. *Definition.* Enemy capabilities are those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. Two requirements must be present: the enemy *must be physically capable* of adopting the particular course of action; if adopted, the course of action *must* affect the accomplishment of our mission.

c. *Meaning of "Affect."* It is readily understood that all possible enemy courses of action that might *interfere* with the accomplishment of our mission are of interest to the commander. Their consideration, in conjunction with other factors, assists greatly in making correct plans and decisions. However, in some instances, enemy courses of action that would actually *favor* the accomplishment of our mission become important. One of these may become dominant in a particular situation. Knowledge of a possible course of action that favors the accomplishment of our mission may prepare the commander to take advantage of a weakness developing in the enemy situation. This may enable him to save his men, time, and matériel. He may also be able to gain a more favorable position from which to continue action against the enemy. The intelligence officer is alert to situations in which favorable enemy capabilities may have an important bearing on the action. Enemy capabilities that favor the accomplishment of our mission must not be overlooked.

d. *Doctrine of Capabilities.* Commanders must be certain that they base their actions, dispositions, and plans upon *estimates of enemy capabilities rather than upon estimates of enemy's intentions*. An estimate of the enemy capabilities can be objectively formulated because it is based upon knowledge of enemy strength, dispositions, activities, organization, and means. But enemy intentions can seldom be determined. The enemy commander may change his mind frequently, or higher commanders may change his orders. Furthermore, the enemy may promulgate false orders and rumors, which in them-

selves would indicate an action different from that which he actually intends. The enemy may also take measures to give a false impression of his capabilities, but it will be more difficult to do this than to spread false information about his intentions.

e. Capability Work Sheet. The following is an extract of an enemy capability work sheet. It provides a means of recording the answers to the four questions discussed in paragraph 49 for any one capability. A form such as this is of value, at least until experience is gained, in that it facilitates simplicity and completeness of the formed statements.

ENEMY CAPABILITY WORK SHEET

What: _____

Where: _____

In what strength: _____

When: _____

48. STEPS IN THE CALCULATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The following steps will assist in the calculation of enemy capabilities:

a. From consideration of the mission, determine the general courses of action that will affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

b. Under the general courses of attack and defense, determine *particular* courses of action that are applicable to the situation. These may be dependent to some extent on the *areas of tactical significance*.

c. Determine where particular courses of action can be initiated (areas of tactical significance determined from weather, terrain, and enemy locations).

d. Enemy strength considered in particular courses of action under attack and defense includes only enemy troops locally available.

e. All other enemy units in or near our zone of action or opposite our sector of defense are listed in a reinforcement table (par. 49c). The time and place each unit can be committed may be included in the table.

f. The withdrawal capability states merely that the enemy can withdraw, usually beyond our objective, at any time.

49. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The statement of an enemy capability answers four questions in regard to each possible enemy course of action. These four questions are: *what? where? in what strength? and when?*

a. *What?* The *what* is a course of action that will interfere with or favor the accomplishment of our mission.

(1) Four broad courses of action are generally available to the enemy—to attack, to defend, to reinforce (in conjunction with attack or defense), or to withdraw. Figure 9 shows how these courses of action interfere with or favor the accomplishment of our various missions.

(2) General courses of action may be broken down into *particular* courses of action. For instance, an attack might be a penetration, an envelopment, or a piecemeal attack. The number of particular courses of action

Mission	Enemy action	Effect on mission
1. a. To attack to seize a terrain objective.	Attack.....	Interfere with.
	Defend.....	Interfere with.
	Reinforce.....	Interfere with.
	Withdraw.....	Favor.
	Attack.....	Interfere with.
	Defend.....	Interfere with.
	Reinforce.....	Interfere with.
	Withdraw.....	Interfere with.
b. To attack to destroy the enemy.	Attack.....	Interfere with.
	Defend.....	Interfere with.
	Reinforce.....	Interfere with.
	Withdraw.....	Interfere with.
2. To defend or withdraw.	Attack.....	Interfere with.
	Defend.....	Favor.
	Reinforce.....	Interfere with.
	Withdraw.....	Favor.

Figure 9. Enemy courses of action and their usual effect.

selected is dependent, to some extent, on the answers to the other three questions.

b. *Where?* The *where* designates the point or area of possible activity by the enemy. This is determined from three factors: the area of operations (including weather and terrain), enemy dispositions, and our own situation. Exceptions arise in the case of reinforcement or withdrawal. In reinforcement, the *where* is some logically chosen point which reserves must reach in order to reinforce the enemy or to affect our mission. In withdrawal, the *where* may be simply "beyond our unit objective."

- (1) *Weather and terrain.* Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may provide avenues of approach, logical corridors, or favorable routes of entry into our position from the front, flanks, or

rear. Likewise, crosscompartments may furnish strong defensive positions to the enemy. Certain terrain, possibly in conjunction with weather and its effects on terrain, may prohibit or curtail types of enemy action such as armored attack or motorized cross-country movement. If terrain subdivisions are made, then each subdivision, in conjunction with a specific course of action, becomes an *area of tactical significance*. If the terrain does not lend itself to subdivision, the entire area may be considered as one unit. There is no governing the selection of *these areas of tactical significance*. However, all potential areas of enemy action will be covered, and the number of areas of tactical significance selected must not be so great that the enemy capabilities become confusing.

- (2) *Enemy dispositions*. Known enemy dispositions may emphasize certain areas even though such emphasis may violate logical terrain subdivisions. The direction and point of an attack and the location of a defensive position might be indicated from enemy dispositions.
- (3) *Own dispositions*. Dispositions of our own and adjacent friendly units also have a bearing on selection of areas. Gaps in the line which provide danger spots may be present within our own unit or between our unit and an adjacent unit. Open flanks permit envelopment by the enemy. Secure

flanks deny this course of action to the enemy.

c. In what strength? The current enemy situation provides us with the present enemy strengths and dispositions. By using these data and ascertaining what enemy units can be moved to given points, the strength the enemy can employ in carrying out any particular course of action is determined. This calculation is made as follows:*

- (1) First, constitute the enemy organization. Logical assumptions may be necessary in order to decide which reserve units belong to the regimental reserves and which belong to the reserve of division and higher echelons.
- (2) Second, use enemy troops locally available to compute strengths for the attack and defense capabilities. "Locally available" applies to units in contact and the reserves of such units. A division G-2 considers reserves of enemy regiments as locally available; a regimental intelligence officer considers reserves of enemy battalions as locally available; and a battalion intelligence officer considers reserves of enemy companies as locally available.
- (3) Third, list all other enemy units (reserves and other units in or near the friendly zone of action or opposite the friendly sector of defense), their location, and the time each

*Experience with a *particular* enemy in the field will permit the development of various "rules of thumb" that may differ from the academic rules shown here.

was last reported, in a reinforcement table (see fig. 10). Calculate the data required to complete the reinforcement table by applying rules given in *d* below and in paragraph 50.

REINFORCEMENTS						
<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Time last reported</i>	<i>Point of reinforcement</i>	<i>Time (motor)</i>	<i>Time (on foot)</i>	<i>Remarks</i>

Figure 10. Suggested form for reinforcement table.

- (4) In computing the *in what strength* of an enemy course of action, the size of the enemy unit considered varies at different echelons. Divisions generally measure enemy strength by enemy battalions; regiments by companies; and battalions by platoons. Corps practice in this respect varies. In dealing with the divisions subordinate to the corps, the corps intelligence officer usually refers to enemy strengths in terms of *battalions*; whereas, in dealing with the army, he will usually refer to enemy strengths in terms of *divisions*.
- (5) Troops already committed to action in another zone or sector are not considered.
- (6) The estimate of enemy strength must be accurate, to assist the commander in arriving at his decision. When positive information of enemy casualties is available a close approximation of strength can be made. Serious depletion of enemy units may be reported to the commander either as

a percentage of normal (T/O & E) strength, or by translating the strengths into equivalent enemy units. For example, an enemy regiment only thirty per cent effective is roughly equivalent, in combat effectiveness, to one battalion. No attempt should be made to guess the enemy strength, if it is not known and cannot be estimated. A statement such as "with a force of *unknown size*" is preferable to that of "with three battalions" *if there is no basis for the latter assumption.*

- (7) Troops that may be employed to close with our own forces should be used as the basis for determining strength. Supporting arms, designated as such, should be included, however, in the statement of strength. The following is an example: "... with six battalions of infantry supported by four battalions of artillery."

d. When? The *when* of a particular course of action is derived from calculations of time and space with due regard for conditions of weather and light. As a result of time and space calculations, certain enemy courses of action may be eliminated from further consideration if the possible time of enemy action is too late to interfere with or favor the execution of our mission. These calculations are made in the same manner in which we compute time and space for our own units except that certain factors are not included in enemy time. When appropriate, a statement of the time required by the enemy to carry out, as well as to start, a particular course of

action, once he begins to move, should be included. This is especially pertinent when the enemy is defending, in order to give a true picture of the enemy's capabilities after we have penetrated or enveloped the flank of the enemy's position.

(1) The following methods are used in making time and space calculations:

- (a) Select some logical point which the enemy must reach in order to initiate a particular course of action.
- (b) Determine nearest enemy unit that can initiate the course of action, and its present location.
- (c) Compute the minimum time required to move from present location (from (b) to position determined in (a)).
- (d) Add time required to close sufficient portion of enemy unit to affect our mission.
- (e) Add the preceding times to the *time last reported*. This will give earliest time at which the enemy course of action can affect our mission.

(2) Factors considered in computations are—

- (a) Distance between enemy force and friendly positions.
- (b) Available routes of approach (consider more than one route if available to enemy).
- (c) Type of unit.
- (d) Rate of march of unit under most favorable conditions.
- (e) Closing time for column.

(3) Factors *not considered* in computations are—

- (a) *Entrucking or detrucking time.* When motor transportation is available, no additional time allowance is made for this operation because the enemy may be entrucked and ready to move at the time he is located and is capable of detrucking while his column is closing.
- (b) *Time required to issue extra ammunition.* This could have been accomplished prior to the start of movement.
- (c) *Time required for detailed reconnaissance.* This could have been accomplished in advance.
- (d) *Time required to issue orders to subordinate units.* This could have been completed prior to commencing operation.
- (e) *Time required for deployment.* The enemy can deploy as he approaches the line of departure.

50. RULES FOR CALCULATING ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Following are rules for calculating enemy capabilities:

- (1) Starting time and place are time and place unit was last reported.
- (2) Select logical point unit must reach to start a particular course of action.
- (3) March distance is distance from (1) to (2) above.

- (4) Arrival time is starting time plus march time plus closing time. This total time is rounded off to the nearest 5 minutes. In case of a withdrawal, closing time is not computed. In case of a piecemeal attack or defense, compute the arrival time of the nearest enemy unit that can *initiate* the action; closing time is not computed.
- (5) Compute foot marching time for reinforcements for all distances; compute motor marching time for distances greater than 5 miles only. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor marching time.
- (6) Consider a foot march of over 20 miles as a forced march; use forced march graph in FM 101-10.
- (7) Consider motor march of over 120 miles as a forced march. This *cannot* be continued indefinitely but must be adjusted to actual conditions.
- (8) At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) (FM 101-10), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is in the process of closing at BMNT, continue to close the column at the night rate of march.
- (9) At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) (FM 101-10), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is in the process of closing at EENT, continue to close the column at the day rate of march.

- (10) To move an enemy infantry battalion, move and close entire unit.
- (11) To move an enemy infantry regiment or combat team, move and close two infantry battalions (except when part of a division movement (12) below.)
- (12) To move an enemy infantry division, move and close two entire infantry regiments.
- (13) In determining the *when* of an enemy capability, consider that a unit of regimental size or larger is ready for coordinated action when two-thirds of the combat elements of the unit have closed.
- (14) In determining enemy time and space factors for a marching column (foot or motor), the head of the column is the point from which measurements are made.

b. Table I presents time lengths and rates of march for typical units. The figures in the table are a guide only. In actual operations, it will be necessary for the intelligence officer to make his own tables of march rates and time lengths based on experience with the particular enemy concerned. The figures used are the same as those used for computing time and space for our own units except that certain figures are not included in enemy time (par. 49*d* (3)).

51. AIR CAPABILITY

In addition to the enemy land capabilities, there must always be included in the list an air capability, if one exists.

a. In the case of division and corps, the data for this capability is taken from the army intelligence

Table I. Time Lengths and Rates of March for Typical Units

Unit	Time lengths (minutes)					
	Men on foot ¹				Motors	
	Cross-country		Roads		Night	Day
	Night 1 mph	Day 1½ mph	Night 2 mph	Day 2½ mph	Close column 75veh/mi 10 mph	Open column 20veh/mi 15 mph
Inf div.....	324	216	162	130	382	703
Inf regt.....	108	72	54	44	45	90
Inf bn.....	36	24	18	15	10	19
Tk bn.....					17	33
Arty bn.....					15	29
Armd div.....					396	791
Armd CC.....					69	139

¹ Figures are for column of twos.

estimate. For example, a division estimate might read—

* * * *

"2. . . .

* * * *

b. . . .

(1) . . .

* * * *

(. . .) The enemy can be expected to attack within
— Army area with as many as 150
fighter sorties and 75 bomber sorties daily."

* * * *

b. In the case of the field army and the army group, two statements with respect to the enemy air capability are made in the intelligence estimate. These

are—a statement of the enemy's air capability; and an estimate, after analysis, of his probable air activity within the area of responsibility of the field army or the army group.

- (1) The first of these statements covers what is almost always a remote possibility (the maximum air capability), but it must be stated. It is always possible for the enemy, within 1 day, to concentrate upon the area of one field army the total effort of all his aircraft which can reach that area. This normally requires consideration of all his aircraft within 1,000 miles, or even greater distances. For example—

* * * * *

"2. . . .

* * * * *

b. . . .

(1) . . .

* * * * *

(. . .) Enemy air capability. Based upon an estimated strength of 750 fighter and 250 bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack — Army area with a maximum of 1,250 fighter sorties and 400 bomber sorties daily."

* * * * *

- (2) The second of these statements is the conclusion drawn from an analysis by A-2 of the tactical air force, or the tactical air command, of the anticipated enemy offensive air activity within the area of responsibility of the field army or the army group.

Such a statement might be—

* * * * *

"2. . . .

* * * * *

b. . . .

(2) . . .

* * * * *

(. . .) Probable enemy air activity. The enemy can be expected to attack within — Army area with as many as 150 fighter sorties and 75 bomber sorties daily."

* * * * *

(3) The information contained in these two statements is furnished to G-2 of the field army by A-2 of the tactical air force, and to G-2 of the army group by A-2 of the tactical air command.

52. EXAMPLE OF STATEMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. General Situation. At 011900 July, the U. S. 1st Infantry Division captured Hill 100. At this time, an order was received from corps. Extract of order states—"Corps continues attack in zone at 020600 July. The 1st Infantry Division will attack in assigned zone, seize Hill 101, prepared to continue the advance to the north." Both flanks of 1st Infantry Division are secure.

b. Special Situation. Aggressor situation and other data, as known by the intelligence officer, are as follows:

(1) Aggressor situation at 011900 July. See sketch in figure 11.




Figure 11. Tactical situation.

- (2) Foot elements of combat team moving south, now at point just north of Hill 102, marching in column of twos.
- (3) Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the Army area with as many as 150 fighter sorties and 75 bomber sorties daily.
- (4) The 1st Infantry Division commander directs the intelligence officer to be prepared to present the enemy capabilities at 012000 July.
- (5) End of evening nautical twilight is 012130 July.

c. Determination of Enemy Capabilities.

- (1) The friendly mission is to attack in zone at 020600 July, seize Hill 101, and be prepared to continue advance to the north. The enemy can delay the accomplishment of this mission by attacking, by defending against attack, and by reinforcing the enemy troops now in contact. The enemy can favor the accomplishment of the friendly mission by withdrawing beyond the division objective prior to the attack.
- (2) Under attack, only one particular course of action is selected, that is, a frontal attack. Both flanks are secure and no other form of enemy ground attack appears feasible. On an enemy capability work sheet under *what*, *frontal attack* is entered. The *where* is *along our front*. The *in what strength*, considering forces locally available, is *three infantry battalions supported by one ar-*

tillery battalion. Combat team north of Hill 102 is probably in division reserve and will be treated under the reinforcement capability. The *when* of the attack capability is *now*. This capability appears below on the work sheet.

What: Frontal attack

Where: Along our front

In what strength: Three infantry battalions
supported by one ar-
tillery battalion

When: Now

Statement form: "The enemy can attack now along our front with three infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion."

- (3) Under defense, again only one particular course of enemy action is selected. That course of action is to defend on Hill 101. The *what* is to defend; the *where* is on Hill 101; the *in what strength* is three infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion; the *when* is now.

What: Defend

Where: On Hill 101

In what strength: Three infantry battalions
supported by one ar-
tillery battalion

When: Now

Statement form: "The enemy can defend now on Hill 101 with three infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion."

- (4) The next general course of action open to the enemy is his capability of reinforcing

his present units in contact. The *what* is to reinforce; the *where* is any logical point which the reinforcement must reach in order to reinforce the elements in contact. Road Junction 200 is selected. The *in what strength* is the combat team reported at 011900 July near Hill 102. The *when* involves enemy time and space computations and is determined as follows:

- (a) Point at which reinforcement becomes effective.—Road Junction 200.
- (b) Only the arrival of foot elements of infantry is *computed*, since it is customary in enemy time and space calculations to assume that all motorized and armored elements of the combat team can be in place to support foot elements by the time the foot elements are in position.
- (c) Only travel and closing time are computed.
- (d) Example:

Time last reported.....	1900
Travel time (4½ miles at 2½ mph).....	0148
Closing time (2 bn at 15 min each).....	0030

Arrival time.....	2118
-------------------	------

What: Reinforce

Where: Road Junction 200

In what strength: Regimental combat team

When: 2120

Statement form: "The enemy can reinforce the attack or defense of the regimental combat team now on Hill 101 with a second regimental combat team by 012120 July."

- (5) Withdrawal capability. Statement form: "The enemy can withdraw beyond the division objective any time prior to our attack."
- (6) Air capability. Statement form: "The enemy can be expected to attack within the Army area with as many as 150 fighter sorties and 75 bomber sorties daily."

Section II. DISSEMINATION

53. REQUIREMENTS FOR DISSEMINATION

a. One object in disseminating intelligence is to insure that the various intelligence staffs at different echelons of command have the same facts with regard to the enemy. This will insure that commanders at various echelons of command have the same general intelligence picture and will not be at variance with each other in planning their operations on the basis of intelligence received or produced.

b. In the dissemination of intelligence, there are two general problems—dissemination to lower and adjacent units, and dissemination to higher units and within the producing headquarters. Of these two problems, *dissemination to lower and adjacent units is the more difficult and the more critical.* This is because—

- (1) The requirement of *timeliness* is generally more critical because of the greater rapidity of change of the intelligence picture at the lower echelon.
- (2) A much greater amount of *detail* is required. This requirement of details complicates that of timeliness.

- (3) All pertinent intelligence produced at higher headquarters by specialized means at their disposal must be disseminated to lower echelons.
- (4) Intelligence for higher echelons is limited to a relatively few recipients, while that for lower echelons includes a much larger number.

54. CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION

The adequacy of intelligence dissemination may be judged in order of priority, by the following criteria:

a. Information and intelligence must be placed in the hands of the ultimate user in *time* to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation before the intelligence picture has changed.

b. Only *essential* intelligence that can be used by the unit concerned will be disseminated.

c. The *importance* and priority of the intelligence furnished will be carefully considered. The means selected for dissemination will provide a minimum of interference with other signal communication traffic.

d. The disseminated matter should be in such *form* that the recipients may readily locate details of interest to them.

55. METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

a. Conferences. The exchange of information between the various intelligence sections of higher,

lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent personal contacts (including telephone calls) or conferences between the staff officers concerned. Liaison officers should be used to the utmost. It is good practice for the intelligence officer at each echelon periodically to visit, send liaison officers, or to call by telephone or radio each subordinate intelligence officer. The frequency will vary with the intensity of activity and with the number of reports sent in by subordinate units.

b. Messages. When it is impossible for the intelligence officer to transmit important information in person or by telephone, special messages may be transmitted by airplane, motorcycle, or motor messenger; radio, telegraph, or other rapid means of signal communication. All messages must be clear, concise, and complete. Communication security measures accorded a message must be commensurate with the classification of its content and adequate for the protection of the sources and agencies which furnished the information for the message.

c. Intelligence Documents.

- (1) *Periodic intelligence report.* This document sums up the information that has been collected, evaluated, and interpreted during a given period. It is a convenient means for keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed of the enemy situation as determined by the unit preparing the report. It frequently contains important information that has been disseminated by means of special messages (par. 56 and app. III).

- (2) *Intelligence annex.* Paragraph 1 of this annex may contain a summary of the enemy situation, or it may refer to intelligence estimates, or to the latest periodic report. Paragraph 1a of the operation order may contain a brief summary of the enemy situation, however, if this intelligence is more than six to eight lines in length, it is preferable to place it in an intelligence annex (par. 75 and app. V).
- (3) *Intelligence estimate.* Preliminary estimates are designed to assist the commander in arriving at his concept of the operation. Detailed intelligence estimates are designed to reach conclusions on the details of plans and to assist the commander to make his decision. The entire estimate may be committed to writing, or the form may be used only as a checklist (par. 45 and app. II).
- (4) *Maps.* Maps are essential and valuable instruments of dissemination if they are accurate. They should be used in conjunction with air photos to ensure that data on them are up to date.
- (5) *Situation maps and overlays.* These documents depict in graphic form the location and disposition of enemy forces and installations. They lend themselves readily to rapid interpretation of intelligence, thereby saving much time. Special situation maps and overlays are used for dissemination whenever the enemy situation changes rapidly.

- (6) *Technical intelligence summaries.* These publications offer a complete résumé of intelligence on such subjects as enemy weapons, equipment, and technical methods. They are not intended for use by other than interested specialists because of the comprehensive scope of their contents.
- (7) *Tactical studies of the weather and terrain.* These studies furnish detailed information on weather and terrain in respect to climate and weather, drainage, relief, soil, vegetation, and lines of communication. The bulk of these studies may appear on maps or overlays. Weather information is usually disseminated to subordinate units by means of radio reports, messages, or bulletins (par. 116 and app. VI).
- (8) *Order of battle books and pamphlets.* The designations, identifications, strengths, and compositions of units as well as the personalities and histories of commanders, are contained in order of battle books and pamphlets (par. 122).
- (9) *Prisoner of war interrogation reports.* The information included in these reports must be carefully processed before being disseminated as intelligence. Prisoners are not considered a wholly reliable source, and all information must be checked against that obtained from other sources. However, once a true evaluation has been made, the intelligence is often of great value as the prisoner has actually operated in the situation he describes.

- (10) *Air photo interpretation reports.* These reports present and identify enemy activities and installations and are the most reliable source of current information of terrain under the enemy's control. Air photos have limited value until interpretation has been performed and reported (par. 113).
- (11) *Translations of captured documents.* When properly evaluated, captured documents furnish accurate and valuable information inasmuch as they are written by the enemy and provide definite enemy plans, orders, or results of operations.
- (12) *Special reports.* Particular enemy tactics and personalities are contained in special reports which are transmitted to using agencies by the most rapid means.
- (13) *Intelligence summary (ISUM).*
- (a) An intelligence summary is a compilation of intelligence. Its uses and contents depend upon the needs of the echelon prescribing submission. Prior to an operation or at other appropriate times higher echelons may publish an intelligence summary of one or more volumes which contains a detailed résumé of all available intelligence. In tactical units, intelligence summaries are used as brief consolidated reports of intelligence previously disseminated during a prescribed period.
- (b) No specific form for an intelligence summary is prescribed. Its organization

varies according to purpose and content. At lower echelons of command the intelligence summary contains a telegraphic condensation of the principal important items of intelligence that have resulted from information received and disseminated over a certain period. The summary does not take the place of regular and spot dissemination of information, but provides a means by which the unit intelligence officer can periodically review the information received and consolidate all items into a résumé for the period. Most intelligence summaries will include—

1. Issuing unit.
 2. Time and date of issue.
 3. Summary of enemy activity for the period.
 4. Location of mine fields and road blocks.
 5. New identifications.
 6. Enemy movements.
 7. Estimated number of vehicles destroyed.
 8. Weather and condition of ground.
 9. Estimate of the situation with deductions.
 10. Name of officer sending ISUM.
- (c) An example of an intelligence summary is—

“To VI Corps

100th Inf Div ISUM for period ending 030730 Jan 49.

Aggressor continued defensive attitude in division zone except for local attack with estimated 400 men, 5 medium type

tanks and no repeat no artillery support at 0515 in vicinity of X487850. Attack repulsed. Four tanks knocked out. Twelve prisoners taken identifying 1st Bn., 17th Aggressor Inf. Regt. Estimate purpose of attack to seize stronger defensive terrain in vicinity of hill 405. Two aggressor jet fighters bombed and strafed in vicinity of X592863 at 0800; one shot down. No identification. Patrol reports battery of 150's at X603292. Unconfirmed IPW reports state ammunition supply in front lines running low. Snow continues. Ground frozen hard and will support all types of vehicles. Enemy is capable of defending his present position including making local attacks to improve his defensive position or withdrawing to stronger position.

SMITH, G-2"

- (d) The period covered by the intelligence summary and the time of dissemination are prescribed by each higher headquarters for its next subordinate unit. Summaries are usually disseminated to lower units, the next higher headquarters, unit staff and commander, and to adjacent units.

56. PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

a. General.

- (1) The periodic intelligence report is a summary of the enemy situation, operations and capabilities, and of the weather and terrain.

It is prepared by intelligence sections of division and higher headquarters. Intelligence sections of units below the division usually have their intelligence summaries included in a situation report. The period of time to be covered by the report is either designated by the next higher headquarters or is specified by the unit commander in the absence of such instructions. Normally, the report is prepared and submitted daily for each preceding 24 hours. However, a longer period may be covered by the report, especially in higher headquarters.

- (2) If the report is for 24 hours, the period covered should be from 1800 one day to 1800 the following day, in preference to a 2400 to 2400 period. This period will insure timeliness in the dissemination and receipt of intelligence on enemy activities for that part of a day which is generally most active. Reports will be received at other units in time to compare them and to use intelligence they contain in planning operations for the following day. The 1800 to 1800 period avoids harassing the limited number of intelligence and liaison personnel, and messengers, in division and lower staffs. The 2400 to 2400 period interrupts the rest of staff officers and messengers during a normally quiet period. Dissemination of reports is generally too late to receive proper consideration in planning operations for the following day (par. 54).

- (3) Periodic intelligence reports are intended primarily for use during contact with the enemy. They also assist units not engaged, for they permit all commanders to keep in touch with the general situation of the enemy and with the local situation at points where the unit is likely to be engaged.

b. Importance. The periodic intelligence report is the primary means of disseminating military intelligence. Although intelligence contained in the summary will have been disseminated previously in the form of "spot reports," and in brief telephone or teletype summaries covering a shorter period of time, the periodic report is nevertheless unique in its completeness and scope. It contains a summation of these former reports, and presents as well the enemy activities and trends as viewed over the longer interval. In addition, it presents other data such as enemy capabilities, and intelligence to include order of battle, translation of captured documents, interrogation of prisoners of war reports, and similar miscellaneous items.

57. FORM OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

One form is used by all commands by merely deleting those parts which are not applicable for the using unit. However, in the discussion following the illustrative form, its use by ground combat units receives primary consideration. (Appendix III is an example of a periodic intelligence report.)

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing headquarters

Place of issue

Date and time

Periodic Intelligence Report No.

Period covered: (Date and time to date and time.)

Charts or maps:

(Omit paragraphs and subparagraphs not applicable)

1. **ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.** (Show on map or overlay when possible.) Give a brief résumé of the enemy situation including location, identification, strength, organization, disposition, and movement of enemy forces (including reserves), and installations for administrative support.
2. **ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.**
 - a. *Summary.* Give a brief résumé of the operations of enemy forces as a whole, stressing the *significance* of developments indicating the continuation of a particular course of action, or the adoption of a new course of action.
 - b. *New enemy tactics, and weapons or other matériel.*
 - c. *Operations of enemy component elements.*
 - (1) Administrative units.
 - (2) Air forces.
 - (3) Antiaircraft defenses.
 - (4) Antitank units.
 - (5) Armored units.
 - (6) Artillery (including rockets).
 - (7) Cavalry.
 - (8) Chemical warfare.
 - (9) Engineers.
 - (10) Guided missiles.
 - (11) Infantry.
 - (12) Reconnaissance.
 - (13) Other elements (list alphabetically as separate subparagraphs).

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. Estimated enemy losses (prisoners and casualties).*
- b. Enemy combat efficiency.*
- c. Morale.*
- d. Status of enemy administrative support.*
- e. Location and nature of enemy administrative installations.*
- f. Weather.*
- g. Terrain and defensive works.*
- h. Any pertinent intelligence factor not otherwise covered.*

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Brief résumé of counter-intelligence situation during the period.

- a. Espionage.*
- b. Sabotage.*
- c. Treason.*
- d. Sedition.*
- e. Subversion.*
- f. Disaffection.*
- g. Political.*
- h. Propaganda and rumors.*
- i. Miscellaneous.*

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

- a. Enumeration of all courses of action that the enemy is physically capable of adopting and which if adopted will affect the accomplishment of the mission of the command.*
- b. Discussion and analysis of subparagraph 5a.*
- c. Conclusions as to relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.*

Commander

Annexes

Distribution

Authentication

58. PREPARATION OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

a. *Paragraph 1.* This paragraph, since it mainly concerns identifications, strengths, organizations, dispositions, movements, and other enemy factors, is best indicated on an overprinted map, sketch map, or overlay. Other intelligence not suitable to that means of presentation should be written. The G-2 work sheet (fig. 8) is indexed to facilitate the preparation of a brief written résumé for paragraph 1, if such a résumé should be required or desired by the intelligence officer. Four convenient and logical subparagraphs for a résumé of the enemy situation are: forward area, rear area, defensive organization, and administrative installations.

- (1) The *forward area* paragraph contains a résumé of the enemy situation from the line of contact back to and including the positions of the enemy supporting artillery. It describes the front line, identifications of forward enemy units, list of their strengths, dispositions, flanks, boundaries, and caliber of artillery.
- (2) The paragraph on the *rear area* includes the enemy situation behind his supporting artillery. It is concerned mainly with the reserves of divisions and higher units, which can affect the operations. Consequently, intelligence of enemy units in this area should be presented as for units in the forward area. In considering enemy reserves, however, the intelligence officer should not men-

tion every known reserve along the entire front. The list should include only those enemy units, which, according to location and organization, are physically capable and can be reasonably expected to be employed against one's own unit. Judgment and experience are necessary to prepare this paragraph accurately.

- (3) Enemy *defensive organization* considers the enemy's organization of the ground for defensive purposes, and the location of obstacles, road blocks, mine fields, observation posts, command posts, and fortifications.
- (4) The last paragraph contains intelligence of the enemy *administrative installations* for support, to include their location, kind, scale of activity, and size.

b. Paragraph 2. Enemy Operations During Period, contains three parts and is of particular importance.

- (1) The first part, paragraph *a*, fulfills the need of a brief summary or thumbnail résumé of enemy operations, with special stress on how these operations indicate enemy courses of action. Preparation of this part should be withheld until the rest of the report has been completed. This paragraph is prepared for the convenience of commanders, staff officers, and others, who are interested in the over-all picture of the enemy's activities and what they indicate. It supplies the essence of the enemy operations during the period. Only

the main enemy operations are considered. The significance of these operations by the enemy is stressed to indicate the continuing of a current course of action or the adoption of new courses of action. Intelligence for this paragraph is obtained by analyzing the intelligence listed in the work sheet for the remaining two paragraphs. Only the highlights or critical items of intelligence are included, and then in condensed style. The importance of this paragraph justifies having it stand out in the report. Two means to accomplish this are: to indent the summary, or to indent and inclose it in a box.

- (2) The second part, paragraph 2*b*, consists of intelligence of new enemy tactics, weapons, and other matériel. Dissemination of this intelligence is essential in order that countermeasures can be developed and employed by our troops.
- (3) The last part, paragraph 2*c*, contains intelligence of operations of enemy component elements during the period of the report. While paragraph 2*a* contains the highlights or a summary of enemy activity, paragraph 2*c* includes a detailed and explicit account of that activity. This paragraph furnishes the broad intelligence coverage which is desired by the intelligence specialists. Armored, engineer, infantry, and other intelligence specialists can find detailed intelligence of a particular part of

the enemy operations during the period in this section. Again, only the more important items should be included. If the operations of a certain component are of no intelligence value during the period, then that part of the paragraph should be omitted. The decision to include a component in the report will be a matter for each individual writer to determine.

c. Paragraph 3. Other Intelligence Factors includes subheadings for enemy losses, combat efficiency, and morale. Additional paragraphs include status, location, and type of administrative installations. Other factors, including weather and terrain, are also listed in this paragraph. Changes to the already published terrain information as well as current weather conditions and forecasts are items included under these factors. If any of these features have been covered in other parts of the report, then they should not be included a second time.

d. Paragraph 4. Normally, the content of the paragraph on *Counterintelligence* is relatively limited in a division periodic intelligence report. However, in each successive higher headquarters, the details contained in this paragraph increase. The feature of considerable counterintelligence detail will be particularly applicable to a service unit periodic intelligence report originating in a communications zone headquarters. Regardless of the headquarters, details of espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, disaffection, and enemy propaganda are each listed when such information is available.

e. Paragraph 5. This paragraph and paragraph 2b of the intelligence estimate are identical. There are three parts to it. First, is a listing of the enemy capabilities. These can be determined only after a careful analysis has been made of all available intelligence. As in the estimate, only those capabilities which are considered of high priority or reasonable likelihood should be included. The two remaining parts of this paragraph are a discussion and analysis of the capabilities and their relative probability of adoption.

f. Annexes. Much pertinent intelligence, which is too detailed for inclusion in the main body of the report, can be included in annexes. A reader interested in more detail on a particular item—such as order of battle summaries, prisoner of war interrogation reports, intelligence of a technical nature, enemy document translations, long-range weather forecasts, and other specific intelligence subjects—finds amplification in the annexes on these special aspects. One caution in the preparation of annexes is that each one be carefully considered to ensure that the report does not become unreasonably bulky.

g. G-2 Work Sheet (par. 38 and fig. 8). An important aid to the intelligence officer in the preparation of the periodic intelligence report is the G-2 work sheet. The form of the work sheet provides a means of indexing and cataloging information for easy inclusion in the report. The arrangement of the pages of the work sheet follows the sequence of the paragraphs in the periodic intelligence report.

59. QUALITIES OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The four principal qualities which should characterize a periodic intelligence report are brevity, clarity, interest, and pertinence.

a. Brevity. An intelligence report should be brief but complete. In this respect, there are two aims (brevity and detail) to be satisfied by the periodic intelligence report, and these conflict. Brevity is needed for the commanders, staff officers, and others who require a brief summary of the enemy operations and the significance of these operations in relation to current and future probable courses of enemy action. This requirement can be met by paragraph 2*a* of the report. On the other hand, detail is needed by many other readers, who are keenly interested in the most complete information concerning various aspects of enemy activity. This is accomplished in paragraph 2*c* of the report.

b. Clarity. This may be obtained by stating the known intelligence and admitting the lack of desired information. Many intelligence officers, and other staff officers, write ambiguous and confusing statements to conceal a lack of information. Such a practice must be avoided. Furthermore, unconfirmed information must be so labeled. Unless such a policy is followed, other headquarters, using the information as a basis for plans, may become victims of a false enemy situation.

c. Interest. One way to make the report interesting is to consider the news appeal of the intelligence.

Some items not only are interesting, but occasionally entertaining as well. A second way to maintain interest is to eliminate abbreviations and unnecessary references to coordinates. Any reader who finds a mass of abbreviations or coordinates in the report, and who may not have a map immediately available, soon will lose interest in reading the report. Some coordinates are essential and are included; however, their constant repetition should be avoided. Abbreviations are seldom necessary. Another way to create interest is to make frequent use of illustrations. Sketches, overlays, maps, photos, and other forms of pictorial presentation add to the attractiveness and interest of the report. Division reproduction facilities are not as readily available as at higher echelons; nevertheless, a resourceful division G-2 can always find an expedient to vary the method of presenting his material and thus add to the interest of his report. Although the report should be interesting, it must also achieve a high professional standard. Interest is a desirable feature but not at the expense of quality.

d. Pertinence. Intelligence in the periodic report must be both relevant and timely. The scope of enemy activity to be included will vary with each headquarters, as small units will include considerably more detail of the enemy opposing them than will a higher headquarters.

60. DISSEMINATION OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Distribution of the periodic intelligence report includes, as a minimum, staff sections of the unit head-

quarters, headquarters of the next two higher and subordinate echelons, and the adjacent units. Further dissemination may be made as deemed necessary. At the division, such a distribution would include headquarters from battalions through army. Classification of the report, which is usually secret in combat, may limit further distribution to lower units.

CHAPTER 7

DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

61. SIGNIFICANCE OF DIRECTION

a. The intelligence officer is constantly revising his plans for collecting information. Items of information secured by the collection agencies will indicate new lines of investigation. Lack of success by one agency will necessitate new orders or requests for the desired information. New essential elements of information will require preparation of a new collection plan. *Direction* of the collection effort must be dynamic and continuing throughout an operation.

b. Direction consists of three successive procedures—

- (1) Determination of the essential elements of formation.
- (2) Preparation of a collection plan.
- (3) Issuance of orders and requests for information to the agencies concerned.

62. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential elements of information (EEI) comprise the specific information of an actual or potential enemy and of the terrain, hydrographic, and meteorological conditions which a commander needs in a particular situation in order to accomplish his mission. In effect, EEI are the commander's cur-

rent, high-priority intelligence requirements. They may also include requirements for information or intelligence based on requests from higher, lower, or adjacent units. EEI focus the attention and activities of all collecting agencies and intelligence personnel on specific information which is required at a particular time.

b. While the primary mission of all collecting agencies is to satisfy the requirements arising from the EEI, these agencies must also transmit all additional information that comes to their attention. This primarily concerns the basic order of battle, terrain, and other data which are necessary for the understanding and appreciation of information which comes in answer to EEI. Also, much information about the enemy must be collected for the primary purpose of aiding the collection effort itself. For instance, information about the enemy's vehicle numbering system must be collected and processed into intelligence which is then sent forward to the collecting agencies so that they may collect current order of battle information, based on specific application of the developed numbering system.

63. FORM AND CONTENT OF EEI

a. EEI are preferably stated in question form. The questions stimulate the thinking of all concerned and also indicate the inquiring attitude of the commander. They should be in clear, concise, simple language. Generally they refer to—

- (1) Enemy capabilities that can interfere with or favor our operations, elaborated upon as to details of time, place, and strength.

- (2) Enemy strength, composition, disposition, and reinforcement not covered by enemy capabilities.
- (3) Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles.
- (4) Meteorological conditions.
- (5) Information desired by higher, adjacent, or lower headquarters.

b. Of the factors that the commander considers in making his own estimate of the situation, those pertaining to the enemy, the weather, and the terrain are at the best changeable, and at the worst unknown. Having reached and announced his decision, therefore, the commander's knowledge of the latest situation and the enemy capabilities may be inadequate to provide a sound basis for the future employment of his unit. He must consider the possible enemy reaction to his contemplated course of action. He must consider the things that the enemy may do between the time the decision is announced and the time the course of action is to be executed. He must also consider the effects of weather and terrain on his plans. Finally, he must consider the directives or requests for information from higher or adjacent headquarters.

64. DESIGNATION OF EEI

a. *Responsibility.* The commander is responsible for the designation of the EEI. In designating the EEI, the commander is assisted by his staff, principally by his intelligence officer. The latter, in coop-

eration with other staff officers who are concerned, must be prepared at all times to recommend appropriate EEI, and to present the important considerations that govern their selection. The EEI are normally announced by the intelligence officer at staff conferences, after approval by the commander.

b. EEI from Higher Headquarters. The EEI for a given situation will not be the same at all echelons comprising an integrated unit such as a division. At each echelon, from the division to the battalion, the EEI will change in character at each lower echelon and as the combat situation changes. EEI announced by a higher headquarters, therefore, are not copied verbatim by a lower headquarters. However, they may be used as a checklist by the lower headquarters to ensure that no enemy capability is overlooked. In addition, the lower headquarters can determine what information is of particular importance to the higher headquarters. Some of the EEI may be the same, based upon similar capabilities of their respective opposing forces. EEI must be compatible with the missions of the lower unit, and within the physical capability of the unit to obtain answers to them. The capabilities of the enemy opposed to the lower unit may be different from those of the enemy opposing the higher unit. For example, the capabilities of the enemy opposing a division might be limited to "defense," "delay," or "withdrawal." On the front of a subordinate battalion, the enemy might not only have the capability of "attack" but might do so in order to cover the withdrawal of the larger force.

65. DETERMINATION OF EEI

a. Sound judgment, for which no rules can be substituted, is essential in determining EEI appropriate to a current mission and situation. The following will be useful as guides in determining EEI:

- (1) What enemy courses of action will most seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission or the operation of the plan?
- (2) What is the next major decision which can be foreseen at this time?
- (3) What information is required to prevent surprise of the command?
- (4) What information of the enemy, weather, or terrain is required in order to plan future maneuvers?
- (5) What information compatible with our mission has been requested by higher or adjacent units?

b. In determining the EEI pertaining to the enemy, no guess as to the enemy *intentions* is desired (par. 47 *d*). Instead, a systematic search is directed for facts that will disclose progressively the confirmation or elimination of adoption of enemy courses of action to which the inquiries relate.

66. DISSEMINATION OF THE EEI

The EEI are disseminated to the command in any or all of the following ways:

- a.* Paragraph 3*x* of the operation order.
- b.* Paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to the operation order (app. V).
- c.* Fragmentary form to units of the command.

d. Orally by the commander to members of his staff.

67. ANSWERS TO EEI

a. *Relative to the Enemy.* EEI concerning the enemy may be answered only after a careful check of evaluated and interpreted information against all possible courses of action open to the enemy. The intelligence officer endeavors to verify or disprove the hypothesis relative to each enemy capability. To do this he assembles all available facts possible concerning the enemy situation. By eliminating as many of these hypotheses as possible, in the light of ascertained facts, the intelligence officer narrows down the original courses of action open to the enemy to those courses of action that are still available to him. Changes in the situation may result in new capabilities, resulting in changes of the EEI. Unless the enemy has irrevocably committed himself, any attempted deduction as to his probable intentions is a guess that is likely to prove misleading and to result in faulty decisions. Commanders should not expect to require their intelligence officers to attempt such deductions.

b. *Relative to Weather and Terrain.* EEI relating to the weather and terrain may be answered as soon as sufficient credible information is available upon which to base a conclusion.

68. EXAMPLE OF EEI

a. Based on the situation given in the example in paragraph 52 and figure 11, the Commanding Gen-

eral, 1st Infantry Division, announced his decision to attack with two regiments. He further announced the EEI for the attack to be—

- (1) Will the enemy reinforce the unit now on Hill 101 before 0600 tomorrow? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the combat team on Hill 102.
- (2) Will the enemy attack us in our present positions prior to 0600 tomorrow? If so, when; with what troops?
- (3) Will the enemy continue to defend in his present positions? If so, how will he organize his defenses; with what troops?
- (4) Will the enemy withdraw beyond the division's objective prior to our attack?
- (5) What antitank obstacles or natural barriers to tank employment are there in the division zone, north to and including the division's objective?

b. After receiving the EEI the intelligence officer analyzes them; listing as *indications* items that will be needed to answer the questions asked or implied by the wording of the EEI.

69. INDICATIONS

a. *Definition.* Indications are those evidences of enemy activities, either positive or negative, that may point toward the adoption or rejection of a particular course of action by the enemy. The absence of positive indications in one direction may tend to strengthen those pointing in another.

b. Application. In their application to military intelligence, indications may reveal progressively the impending course of action of the enemy. Before the enemy can adopt a certain general course of action, certain preparations must be made by him. The maxim "coming events cast their shadows before" expresses the relationship of indications to the answers for the EEI. We seek the events that cast the "shadows" in order to determine what events will follow. The events we look for include the dispositions and actions of the enemy. We seek to determine how he and the terrain will appear, and what he will be doing if he adopts the course of action referred to by the particular EEI. In the collection plan, indications are arrived at by a detailed analysis of the EEI and include all details needed to obtain the information to answer the particular EEI under consideration.

c. Determination of Indications. The analysis of the EEI by the intelligence officer points to the specific items of information that will be clues to the answers for the EEI. These specific items of information are determined in the light of—

- (1) An understanding of the terrain and the use made of it by the opposing forces. This includes an appreciation of the enemy's probable knowledge of the terrain held by our own forces.
- (2) A thorough knowledge of the organization, equipment, and tactical and logistical methods of the enemy.
- (3) A knowledge of the personalities of commanders and the performance record or history of enemy units.

d. Guide to Determination of Indications. It is impracticable to prescribe a rigid set of indications that would be applicable for a given set of EEI—just as a standard set of EEI will not suffice for every tactical situation. However, examples of indications for EEI concerned with attack, defense, withdrawal, reinforcement, delaying action, local defeat and terrain are included in Appendix IV, Guide to Determination of Indications. In operations these must be modified according to knowledge gained of the enemy's actual tactical doctrine and procedures.

70. EXAMPLE OF INDICATIONS

a. Following are some indications for the first EEI in the example given in paragraph 68:

- (1) Movement south of the combat team now at Hill 102.
- (2) Increased traffic toward our position.
- (3) Identification of new units.
- (4) Increased aggressive patrolling.
- (5) Additional command posts and supply or evacuation installations.
- (6) Strengthening of defenses on Hill 101.

b. The EEI, and their analysis to determine appropriate indications, form the basis of the collection plan.

71. THE COLLECTION PLAN

a. After the EEI are announced, definite and precise orders or requests for obtaining the required in-

formation are given to the collecting agencies. To prevent omission or conflict, the intelligence officer prepares the collection plan; which consists first of an analysis of the EEI, and second of the collection scheme based on this analysis. It is usually made in chart form, and is available for reference to all personnel of the intelligence section. It is solely a work sheet and is not disseminated. A suggested form for the collection plan is shown in figure 12 ①.

b. The intelligence officer, during combat, may limit his collection plan to a mental analysis of the EEI and then a decision as to the assignment of collecting agencies to procure the information. He may also prepare fragmentary notes that may develop into an abbreviated collection plan. However, when time and other conditions permit, it is desirable to complete a detailed plan. In any event, the intelligence officer follows an orderly process of considering each fundamental factor (EEI), the indications, the orders or requests to the collecting agencies, and the time and place at which the information is to be reported. Thereby he avoids omission of details and prevents conflicts in the assignment of orders or requests to collecting agencies.

72. PREPARATION OF THE COLLECTION PLAN (fig. 12)

a. *Period Covered.* The collection plan is prepared to cover the period of operations required by the mission of the commander. It will be subsequently modified to conform to new decisions required by the development of the situation.

b. EEI (column 1). In this column are listed the EEI as announced for the projected operation or situation.

c. Indications (column 2). In this column the intelligence officer briefly records the analysis of the EEI, setting down as indications those items which answer the questions asked or implied by the wording of the EEI. These indications of possible enemy action will furnish the basis for definite reconnaissance missions. Certain EEI will require very little analysis by the intelligence officer in order to transform them into suitable reconnaissance missions. If the information to be obtained gives a direct answer to the inquiry contained in an EEI, analysis is unnecessary. For example, EEI relating to the existence of natural obstacles usually require no analysis other than a map study, supplemented by information from other sources, to determine whether or not the obstacles exist. Other EEI, however, are subjected to careful analysis in order to determine what indications will answer the inquiries contained therein.

d. Basis for Specific Orders or Requests (column 3). After analyzing the EEI and recording the indications corresponding to each, the intelligence officer next writes the basis for the specific orders to the collecting agencies and the requests to be made to higher, adjacent, or supporting units. The actual orders or requests are then prepared from notes contained in this column. Often two or more of these entries may be combined into one message or paragraph of an order to an agency. In order that he may give each agency specific instructions as to the

exact information to be secured and where it is to be sought, the intelligence officer makes a careful study of the situation map. Several agencies with differing characteristics and limitations may be employed in establishing *one* definite fact that bears on an EEI.

e. Agencies To Be Employed (column 4). In this column, the intelligence officer lists, in the spaces provided at the top, all agencies he may employ. He assigns them missions which will be stated in orders or requests, by checking the agency or agencies that have or can get this information. To employ the available collecting agencies properly in the search for information, it is essential that the intelligence officer be thoroughly familiar with their characteristics and that he cooperate closely with the operations officer. Care is taken to select the agencies best suited to get the information desired, as well as to prevent overloading an agency with missions. Whenever possible, more than one agency or source of information should be used in obtaining each item required. The agencies selected should be circled, as shown in figure 12.

f. Time and Place at Which Information Is To Be reported (column 5). From a knowledge of the plan of operations gained by close cooperation with the operations officer, the intelligence officer determines when and where necessary information must be reported in order to be of use to the commander. In determining the time at which information must be available, the intelligence officer is guided by the fact that information arriving too late is of no value, and information arriving in advance of its actual need is likely to be out of date and inaccurate at the

UNIT:

Period covered: From: -----

To: -----

(1) Essential elements of information	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Basis for specific orders	(4) Agencies to be employed <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-size: small;"> <div>List all agencies to be employed in the collection of information required</div> <div></div> </div>	(5) Place and time at which information is to be reported
List the EEI announced for the operation, situation, or mission spaced sufficiently to permit entry in column (2)	Record opposite respective EEI in column (1) those indications which will best provide an answer to the	Record in notes or fragmentary form the specific information sought to substantiate each indication. (See	Place an X under each agency that has or can get the information bearing on each indication. The agency (or agencies) finally selected as recipients of specific orders or requests for information will be	Place: Headquarters or staff section to which information is to be reported. Time: May be a specific time, periodically,

Unit: 1st Infantry Division.
Period covered: 011900 July to capture of Hill 101.

COLLECTION PLAN

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																
Essential elements of information	Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action	Agencies to be employed	Hour and destination of reports																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																
1. Will the enemy reinforce the unit now on Hill 101 before 0600 tomorrow? If so, when; where; and in what strength? Special attention to combat team on Hill 102.	a. Movement south of the combat team now at Hill 102.	(1) Report location, activity, and rate of movement of combat team last observed north of Hill 102 at— (coordinates).	<table><tr><td>1st 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	(3) Same as (2) on road approaching Hill 101 from the west.	(X)	(X)	(X)	(3) Same as (2).
c. Identification of new units.	(4) Report new identifications.	(X)	(X)	(X)	(4) Report as obtained. Negative 2400—and 0500—to division command post.
d. Increased aggressive patrolling.	(5) Report number, size, composition, routes, of enemy patrols encountered in your zone.	(X)	(X)	(X)	(5) Same as (4).
e. Additional command posts, supply or evacuation installations.	(6) Report locations of command posts, supply and evacuation installations vicinity Hill 101 and Hill 102.	(X)	(X)	(X)	(6) Same as (2) and as obtained.
f. Strengthening of defenses on Hill 101.	(7) Report entrenching, wiring or fortification of enemy positions on Hill 101.	(X)	(X)	(X)	(7) Same as (2).

NOTE.—Items circled in column (4) indicate the agencies finally selected as recipients of specific orders or requests for information.

③ Sample collection plan (extract).

Figure 12—Continued.

time projected operations are undertaken. In determining when information will be reported, the intelligence officer considers the time required to issue necessary orders to all echelons of command involved in the mission, the time required to execute the mission, and the time required to report its results.

73. EXAMPLE OF COLLECTION PLAN

a. Figure 12 ② is an example of a partial collection plan based on the situation, mission, and the first EEI and its indications given in the preceding examples (par. 52, 68, and 70). It is lacking in detail because of the schematic nature of the situation. It reveals some of the thought processes and other steps in preparing the collection plan.

b. Columns (3), (4), and (5) of the collection plan are the basis for the collection scheme, and furnish the data for specific orders and requests to collecting agencies.

74. ORDERS AND REQUESTS

a. General. In addition to his own requirements for information, a commander may receive reconnaissance missions or demands for specific information from higher headquarters as well as requests for information from lower and neighboring units. Positive action for securing this information is taken by the intelligence officer. He is authorized by his commander to issue orders for the collection of information to subordinate units of the command

(coordinating such directives with the operations officer), and to request specific items of information from neighboring and higher units.

b. Purpose. Orders and requests are necessary to obtain the desired results from the collection plan. They may or may not be repeated in the intelligence annex, depending on the time available.

c. Form. Orders or requests may be in the form of written messages, overlays, or marked maps.

- (1) *Message.* Figure 13 is an example of a message directing the collecting of information based on items (4) and (5), columns (3), (4), and (5), figure 12 ②.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY		
TIME FILED	MSG CEN NO.	HOW SENT
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)		
No.	DATE 1 July 19....	
To	CO 1st Inf	
AS OBTAINED, NEGATIVE DAILY AT 0500 AND 2400, STARTING 012400 JUL 19..., REPORT NUMBER, SIZE, COMPOSITION, ROUTES OF ENEMY PATROLS ENCOUNTERED YOUR ZONE; NEW IDENTIFICATIONS.		
CO 1st Inf Div <small>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER</small>		2000 <small>TIME SIGNED</small>
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR	SIGNATURE OF OFFICER	/s/ Smith, Lt Col <small>SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER</small>

Figure 13. Message directing collection of information.

- (2) *Overlay or marked map.* These are issued to amplify messages by indicating graphically the areas or localities to be reconnoitered.

d. Transmittal. Two methods of transmitting orders to subordinate units and agencies for the collection of information are through fragmentary orders and paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex to the operation order. In view of the infrequency of issue of the operation order as compared to the *continual* need for information, the most common method of issue is by fragmentary order. Requests for information to neighboring and higher units may be transmitted through personal contact, radio, telephone, teletype, or any other means that will insure prompt and adequate receipt of the necessary information. The means of transmission to be employed will be governed by the urgency of the situation and the security classification required.

- (1) *Fragmentary orders.* The basis for orders requesting specific information from the various collecting agencies is found in column (3) of the collection plan, figure 12. Maps, sketches, or overlays having brief instructions written on them may accompany orders or may themselves be the orders.
- (2) *Intelligence annex.* The intelligence annex is a means of disseminating intelligence and of issuing intelligence instructions to a command for an impending operation. It may or may not confirm the orders and requests for information that have been made in fragmentary form, depending on whether

or not the orders or requests are obsolete by the time the annex is issued. As indicated earlier, paragraph 3 of the annex is the formal means of implementing the collection plan. Annexes are normally prepared for all operations. They are indispensable in operations preceded by long periods of planning.

75. FORM OF INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

a. Following is the form for the intelligence annex. (See app. V for example of an intelligence annex.)

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date and time

Annex — (Intelligence) to Operation Order —

CHARTS OR MAPS

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. Refer to overlay (or map) and latest intelligence summary (or documents) showing the enemy situation.
2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. Each essential element of information will appear under a separate lettered paragraph in the intelligence annex.
3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.
 - a. *Orders to subordinate and attached units.* A separate numbered paragraph covering detailed instructions for each unit from which a report to this headquarters is required.
 - b. *Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.* A separate numbered paragraph pertaining to each unit, not organic or attached, from which information is requested.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATÉRIEL.

- a. Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, inhabitants, and other persons.*
- b. Captured documents.*
- c. Captured matériel.*

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. List maps and photographs, vertical and oblique, that will be supplied, with number of each class to each unit; instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

(Commander)

Appendixes.

Distribution.

Authentication.

CLASSIFICATION

The form of an intelligence plan is the same as that of an intelligence annex, with the addition of an eighth paragraph as follows:

8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES.

- a. Instructions for agencies assigned to the command.*
- b. Instructions and recommendations for agencies supporting the command.*
- c. Recommendations for other agencies.*

A ninth paragraph, titled "MISCELLANEOUS," may be added if necessary. Its use should be avoided by lower echelons. At army or higher levels it may be required in order to include such matters as training, intelligence funds, and other subjects that cannot be appropriately discussed under other paragraphs.

76. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

a. Heading. The number for the operation order and the number for the intelligence annex are assigned by the operations officer (G-3).

b. Summary of Enemy Situation. If reference is not made to an overlay or the latest intelligence reports, a brief summary of enemy information should be given. It must be pertinent to the operation covered by the operation order, and include the location, identification, strength, organization, disposition, and movements of enemy forces, including reserves, installations for administrative support, and capabilities.

c. Essential Elements of Information.

- (1) This paragraph is included primarily to focus the attention of lower unit commanders and others who receive the annex on the items of information with which the commander is primarily concerned. Units and agencies receiving the annex extract any EEI that pertain to their missions and that they are physically capable of answering. Lower units add these EEI to their own for incorporation into their orders.
- (2) In the event publication of the intelligence annex is deferred, or is omitted entirely, the EEI should appear in paragraph 3x of the operation order. EEI are not published in both places except when the commander desires that certain ones be emphasized.

d. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions. If any particular paragraph of the intelligence annex

can be called most important, it is this paragraph. Current orders and requests for information are confirmed, and the collection plan formally implemented. In this paragraph the commander directs his subordinate commanders to gather the specific information required to answer the EEI. Here, too, the commander requests the same type of vital information desired from higher, adjacent, and cooperating units. In both paragraphs 3*a* and 3*b*, the units are listed in the same sequence as they appear in the operation order.

e. Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Matériel. (Ch. 9.) This paragraph is partly a matter of standing operating procedure. However, changes required by a particular situation must be added.

- (1) Paragraph 4*a* contains instructions, including special provisions, for segregating and handling enemy personnel, refugees, and repatriates, that will insure their maximum exploitation as sources of information. Special types of information required from prisoners may be included. Preparation of the subparagraph is coordinated with G-1 and G-4.
- (2) Paragraph 4*b* contains instructions for handling and processing captured documents from the time of their acquisition to their receipt by specified intelligence personnel. Special instructions for forwarding documents or search for a special type document may be included.

- (3) Paragraph 4c designates items or types of enemy matériel required for examination and includes specific instructions for processing and disposition. Specific types of matériel desired may be listed. Preparation of this paragraph is coordinated with G-4 and pertinent technical services.

f. Maps and Photographs (ch. 9).

- (1) G-2 must consolidate the requests and requirements for both maps and air photos. Map distribution is somewhat standardized and prescribed in a table such as that found in FM 101-10. Theaters of operation will prepare similar tables to suit their needs based on experience. Current availability of maps may curtail issue. Air photo distribution requires a great deal of planning because of the many factors that must be considered.
- (2) Preparation of paragraph 5 is coordinated with G-3.

g. Counterintelligence. This paragraph is largely covered by standing operating procedure. Many special operational instructions having counterintelligence aspects will be listed in the operation order or in other annexes. Examples are restrictions on artillery registration (which appear in the artillery annex) and radio silence (which appears in the signal annex). These items also may be included in the counterintelligence paragraph of the intelligence annex.

h. Reports and Distribution. Any or all of the following items may be covered in this paragraph:

- (1) Period to be covered by routine reports, and distribution.
- (2) Routine and special reports required from subordinate units.
- (3) Distribution of routine and special reports from higher headquarters.
- (4) Periodic or special conferences of intelligence officers.
- (5) Distribution of special intelligence studies, such as defense overprints, air photo intelligence reports, and order of battle overlays.
- (6) Special intelligence liaison when indicated.

i. Appendixes.

- (1) The number and type of appendixes will be determined by the echelon and by the type of the projected operation. Appendixes will contain material of limited interest, or which involves considerable detail. Higher headquarters—theater and army—will generally employ more appendixes than divisions because of the volume of detailed instructions and the number of subordinate agencies and commands involved. Material covered in great detail in an appendix is covered only by a few general statements in the appropriate paragraph of the annex and by a reference to the appendix.
- (2) Appendixes that may be included are—
 - (a) Enemy situation, which may be a map, overlay, summary, or combination there-

of whenever a current estimate, summary, or periodic intelligence report has not been published separately.

- (b) Combat intelligence plan, which includes EEI and reconnaissance and observation missions. This appendix is used when detail and volume is too great for inclusion in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the annex.
- (c) Air reconnaissance plan, including both visual and photo missions and procedures for submitting requests.
- (d) Weather and terrain studies, disseminated by higher headquarters or prepared by G-2, assisted by the engineer officer.
- (e) Map and photo plan, covering the distribution of maps and air photos.
- (f) Tide, moon, and sun tables.
- (g) Counterintelligence plan, when instructions are too detailed for complete coverage in paragraph 6.
- (h) Special theater studies.
- (i) Intelligence administrative plan, which may cover reports, funds, special intelligence, liaison, and other administrative details.

j. Distribution. The annex is not always distributed with the operation order, although it usually has the same distribution. It may accompany the operation order, or it may be issued before or after the operation order.

k. Authentication. Since the annex is published over the name of the commander, the G-2 of the issuing unit personally signs his last name.

77. COMPLETING THE CYCLE

The issuance of orders and requests to collecting agencies rounds out the operational cycle of combat intelligence, and collection of information begins anew. The intelligence effort is guided by the mission of the command. When a new or an additional mission is announced, the intelligence officer must be prepared to present an intelligence estimate in the light of this mission. The resultant EEI will give new impetus to the cycle by redirection of the collection effort. Thus the cycle functions continuously.

PART THREE
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 8
RECONNAISSANCE

**Section I. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE**

78. GENERAL

a. Reconnaissance is directed effort in the field to gather information of the enemy, terrain, or resources, which is undertaken by an appropriate element of the Armed Forces.

- (1) Distant reconnaissance is the exploration of objectives that lie outside immediate striking range of a force, but about which detailed information is essential for military planning. Distant reconnaissance is usually performed by armored reconnaissance units. Such units must be balanced combat forces capable of operating on an extensive front and beyond the supporting range of other ground combat units. It is especially desirable to supplement their operations with air reconnaissance.
- (2) Close reconnaissance supplements distant

reconnaissance by exploring regions near at hand. It may be conducted by infantry, artillery, engineer, and armored units. Close reconnaissance by infantry is constant and intensive when the opposing forces are in contact and especially during combat. Patrols are used to the maximum extent.

- (3) Battle reconnaissance is made during or immediately before battle, when in close contact with the enemy. Battle reconnaissance includes reconnaissance by fire and reconnaissance in force.

- (a) Reconnaissance by fire is a method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or by returning the fire.

- (b) Reconnaissance in force is an attack by a considerable force of troops used to discover and test the enemy's position and strength. Troops engaged in a reconnaissance in force usually make a local attack with a limited objective.

b. During operations, reconnaissance is one of the primary means of obtaining information vital to the intelligence effort. Superiority of reconnaissance may prove the deciding factor in an obscure situation by providing the commander information necessary to make a sound decision.

c. The techniques of reconnaissance employed by the several branches are described in their respective field manuals.

79. RESPONSIBILITY

Reconnaissance to gain information for tactical operations is a function of command. The commander must initiate and maintain constant reconnaissance. Staff responsibility for planning and assigning reconnaissance missions and for the training and supervision of reconnaissance units and personnel rests with the intelligence officer. In carrying out his responsibilities the intelligence officer must closely coordinate security measures relative to reconnaissance units, orders to patrols, and training of reconnaissance units and personnel with the operations officer.

80. PRINCIPLES

Basic principles of reconnaissance that apply to all branches are—

a. Gain Contact as Soon as Possible and Maintain It Throughout the Operation. Information on the location, strength, and movement of enemy troop units must be gained at the earliest practicable moment. Contact with the enemy, once gained, must be continuously maintained. The nearer the approach to the enemy, the more intensive is the reconnaissance. Ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain contact with the enemy and, by working through gaps and around the flanks and the rear, endeavor to ascertain the strength, movements, composition, and dispositions of the enemy's main force, and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Army aircraft may be employed to supplement and complement the execution of reconnaissance by ground units

with due regard to the vulnerability of these aircraft to enemy action.

b. Report All Items of Information, Regardless of Whether They Are Negative or Seemingly Unimportant. Much information has significance that may not be readily apparent at the time of its collection or to the individual collecting it. All items must be reported. It is important to receive negative information in order to know what the enemy is *not* doing, or where he is *not*, at any given time. This aids in determining enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. Small bits of seemingly irrelevant or unimportant information may be the key to the entire picture in a higher headquarters. No information should be overlooked or cast aside.

c. Move Freely About the Terrain; Fix on the Enemy. It is impossible to maintain contact with a moving enemy by staying in one place; nor can the maximum information be obtained if reconnaissance is confined to canalized routes (roads, valleys, and ridge lines). Reconnaissance agencies must move about the country, keeping pace with the activity of the enemy. They must fix on the enemy, not on their own troops.

d. Fight Only When Forcing the Enemy to Reveal His Position, or When the Mission Requires It. It is costly both in time and force for a reconnaissance agency to engage in combat. Combat should be resorted to only when necessary to save the reconnaissance force from annihilation or capture, or when the mission requires that the enemy be forced to reveal his disposition through combat. Normally reconnaissance should be by stealth and observation of

the enemy and should be conducted without his knowledge. Patrols that engage in useless combat delay the return of information to their commanders and often reveal their own disposition or intentions of the larger unit commander.

e. Report Information in Time to be of Value. The most valuable information may be utterly worthless if received too late. To execute an operation plan requires a certain minimum of time. The reconnaissance agency must return the information to the commander in time for him to make his decision. There may appear to be conflict between this principle and that of reconnaissance by stealth, or that of avoiding combat with the enemy. However, the principle of time is paramount.

81. AGENCIES

The following reconnaissance agencies are generally available for reconnaissance missions:

- a.* Armored reconnaissance units (regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons (par. 32)).
- b.* Patrols (all arms, any size unit).

- (1) A patrol is a detachment sent out from a larger unit for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out some harassing, destructive, mopping-up, or security mission.
- (2) There are two general types of patrols, as determined by their assigned missions—reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols.
 - (*a*) Reconnaissance patrols are patrols sent out to obtain information, to maintain

contact with the enemy, to capture prisoners for questioning, or to observe a particular area.

- (b) Combat patrols may be required to fight to accomplish or to help accomplish the assigned mission. Combat patrols secure information as a secondary mission.

c. Light aviation (FM 20-100).

82. MISSIONS

The intelligence officer must prepare suitable missions to agencies in order to obtain desired information. Missions are usually derived from the collection plan (par. 71). In determining missions the following should be borne in mind:

a. Missions must be assigned according to the capabilities and limitations of the agency employed. Obvious as this precept may seem, it is often violated.

b. Missions must be specific, leaving no doubt as to the type of information desired. The assignment of a vague reconnaissance mission will result in vague and unsatisfactory information. Broad generalizations such as "report strength and disposition of the enemy" should be avoided. Furthermore, the specific *time* that the information is desired should be included.

c. In assigning reconnaissance missions it is quite likely that more than one mission may be assigned to any one agency at a given time. In this case, there must be a definite priority assigned to these missions. This priority is determined by the importance of the information requested and the time

it is desired. By indicating priorities, the intelligence officer assures proper attention to the most important missions.

d. In order to avoid needless duplication of effort, conflicting reconnaissance, and the possibility of combat between friendly units (particularly at night), all reconnaissance missions are coordinated through the intelligence officer. This does not present many difficulties, inasmuch as there should be an over-all reconnaissance scheme and close liaison between the intelligence officers at various echelons.

e. In preparing and assigning reconnaissance missions, the bulk of agencies should be assigned to the most vital tasks. Rather than spreading available agencies thinly over a wide area or series of missions, the most critical mission should be selected and concentrated upon until it is satisfactorily completed. This does not imply that all other missions should be neglected for a single task. However, reasonable concentration of a majority of agencies on the important missions will achieve better results in a shorter time, without prejudicing necessary coverage. It is also good practice to reserve a few agencies, if possible, for pushing reconnaissance on new missions.

83. COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

a. General. Counterreconnaissance is a preventive action intended to protect friendly troops from enemy reconnaissance. It consists of measures taken to screen a command from hostile observation.

b. Forms. Counterreconnaissance may take either of two forms—

- (1) *The defensive screen.* This action is protective and is intended to prevent enemy reconnaissance from entering certain areas. It is essentially passive, being established behind natural obstacles with limited avenues of approach, thus canalizing any reconnaissance effort of the enemy.
- (2) *The offensive screen.* This type of counter-reconnaissance *meets* the enemy's reconnaissance and destroys it. The offensive screen may be moving or stationary in accordance with the activities of the forces being screened.

c. *Principles.* Counterreconnaissance is based on different principles than reconnaissance. They are—

- (1) Destroy or neutralize hostile reconnaissance elements by combat.
- (2) Counterreconnaissance forces fix on the *friendly* forces being screened, rather than on the enemy.
- (3) The screening force is echeloned in depth. This permits mutual support and prevents any deep penetration by enemy reconnaissance into the area being screened.

d. *Relationship to Reconnaissance.*

- (1) Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance complement one another and cannot be readily separated. Good reconnaissance assures, simultaneously, a certain amount of security. On the other hand, the activity of a counterreconnaissance force provides a certain amount of reconnaissance.

- (2) When units are assigned simultaneously to the mission of reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, the order must state explicitly which has precedence. In forces of sufficient size, a part of the force may be assigned each task.

Section II. AIR RECONNAISSANCE

84. MISSION

The mission of reconnaissance aviation is to gather and process information for the air force to which it is assigned, and for the Army, Navy, or joint forces with which the parent air force is cooperating.

85. AIR-GROUND COOPERATION

a. Army forces and tactical air commands in a theater are employed in joint operations as components of an air-ground team. Close relationship is essential to the successful accomplishment of their separate and common missions. To this end, parallel echelons of command cooperate in planning and executing joint operations. Cooperation extends through all echelons of air and army command; joint planning and command decisions are normally limited to army group-tactical air command and army-tactical air force echelons.

b. Exchange of enemy information between air force and army units is of vital importance to each in accomplishing its operational mission.

c. The air force is capable of furnishing army units with reports of visual air reconnaissance and with air photos.

- (1) Visual reconnaissance can effectively search an area or a route either by means of a planned mission or by radio instructions while airborne. A valuable feature of visual reconnaissance is its ability to adjust long-range artillery fire.
- (2) Air photos furnish detailed information of the enemy and the terrain and a means of studying a given area over a considerable period of time to ascertain changes in enemy installations.

d. Army units are capable of furnishing information that will assist air force units in best employing air effort. Such information includes enemy air, antiaircraft artillery, guided missile, and radar installations; production facilities; and other target information.

86. AIR-GROUND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

a. Air-ground intelligence cooperation is largely governed by the air-ground operations system (FM 31-35).

b. The army intelligence system for air-ground intelligence cooperation includes four echelons-division, corps, army, and army group. Discussion in this manual is limited to the first three echelons.

- (1) At corps and army, air-ground intelligence functions are performed by a G-2 Air.
- (2) At division, the chief of the air photo interpretation detachment, or other individual designated by G-2, acts as G-2 Air. In addition to supervising the air photo inter-

pretation detachment, the acting G-2 Air, under supervision of G-2 and in coordination with other staff sections to insure fulfillment of their needs, prepares and forwards the division's requirements for aerial reconnaissance to corps. Priority is indicated in requests to insure coverage of the most essential items in the event air force units cannot fulfill all requests. G-2 Air also assists in dissemination of air reconnaissance information. In turn, corps G-2 Air considers requests from divisions for visual and photo reconnaissance with those of other corps units, and then transmits a consolidated request to army.

c. The principal air intelligence agency serving a tactical air force is the tactical reconnaissance wing, whose reconnaissance unit is the tactical reconnaissance group. The group normally consists of three day-reconnaissance squadrons, one night-reconnaissance squadron, and a reconnaissance technical squadron.

- (1) The day-reconnaissance squadrons fly both visual reconnaissance missions and day photo missions.
- (2) The night-reconnaissance squadron flies only night photo missions.
- (3) The reconnaissance technical squadron develops the negatives and makes prints of all photos obtained by the reconnaissance squadrons. It also studies air photos of enemy air installations to assist in determining air order of battle, and studies and re-

ports upon other air force targets, some of which may be of interest to army troops.

87. AIR-GROUND PROCEDURES FOR AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

Figure 14 demonstrates the step-by-step procedure involved in requesting and executing a visual reconnaissance mission and an air photo mission under routine conditions and under emergency conditions. Time intervals shown between each step in routine missions are reasonable and may be expected to be met under operating conditions in combat. Time intervals shown under the emergency procedure are optimum figures and are based on the assumption that the request will be assigned top priority by division, corps, army, and the tactical air force.

ROUTINE PROCEDURE FOR ALL TYPE MISSIONS

1.¹

2. DIVISION. G-2—

- a. Consolidates all requests from regiments, division artillery, and division staff.
- b. Arranges missions in order of priority and assigns priorities to requests.
- c. Forwards division requests to corps (about 1700).

3. CORPS. G-2 Air—

- a. Consolidates requests from divisions, corps artillery, and corps staff.
- b. Arranges missions in order of priority and assigns priorities to requests.
- c. Forwards corps requests to Army (about 1800).

4. ARMY. G-2 Air—

- a. Consolidates requests from corps and Army staff.
- b. Arranges missions in order of priority and assigns priorities to requests.
- c. Presents Army requests during a planning conference with A-2, tactical air force (TAF), and reconnaissance officer TAF, (about 2000).

5. TAF. Reconnaissance officer—

- a. Prepares TAF reconnaissance plan.
- b. Prepares reconnaissance paragraph of the TAF operation order.

6. ARMY. G-2 Air forwards (about 2200)—

- a. To ground liaison officers (GLOs) at reconnaissance wing:
 - (1) Information from which they prepare to help brief reconnaissance pilots.
 - (2) Information of any changes in the operating schedule of the G-2 air net and reconnaissance broadcast.²
- b. To photo reproduction unit.
 - (1) Priority lists for interpretation of photos to be taken on approved photo missions.
 - (2) Distribution data for photos and photo interpretation reports.

7. TAF. A-3—

- Forwards TAF operation order, copy of which goes to reconnaissance wing, which contains any necessary modifications of current reconnaissance plan (about 2200).

①

Figure 14. Air-ground intelligence procedures—air reconnaissance missions.

¹ Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

² The reconnaissance broadcast is a periodic broadcast over the G-2 air net. Army, corps, and divisions listen to the broadcast at the prescribed times and record the information disseminated.

**EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR ALL TYPE MISSIONS
(PROCEDURES ASSUME NO AIRCRAFT ARE AIR-
BORNE IN VICINITY OF RECONNAISSANCE TARGET)**

1. Regiment.—
Telephones emergency request to division (1030).
2. DIVISION. G-2—
Approves and forwards request to *Army* via G-3 *Air* net (1040).
3. Corps.—
Monitors net; indicates approval by silence.
4. ARMY. G-2 *Air*—
 - a. Receives request and assigns it first priority and presents request to TAF reconnaissance officer (1045).
 - b. Alerts GLOs at reconnaissance wing to be prepared to brief for mission (1050).
5. TAF. Reconnaissance officer—
 - a. Approves request; assigns it first priority.
 - b. Orders reconnaissance wing to execute mission (1055).
6. ¹

7. ¹

②

Figure 14.—Continued.

¹ Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS ONLY

8. GLOs—
Assist in briefing pilots (0700).
9. During mission, pilots radio important information to tactical air control center (TACC). Army, corps, and division monitor transmissions by means of reconnaissance intercept facility (0730-0930).
10. Pilots return from mission (0940).
11. GLOs—
 - a. Assist in interrogation of pilots.
 - b. Forward any pertinent information to army, corps, and division via reconnaissance broadcast, telephone or teletypewriter (1010).

PHOTO MISSIONS ONLY

8. GLOs—
Assist in briefing pilot (0700).
9. (Photo missions may also report information by means of tactical air observation net.) (0730-1030).
10. Pilot returns from mission (1100).
11. GLOs—
 - a. Assist in interrogation of pilot (1105).
 - b. Forward any pertinent information (rare in a photo mission) to army, corps, and division via reconnaissance broadcast, telephone, or teletypewriter (1115).

12.¹

13. Recon Tech Sq—
 - a. Develops film (1145).
 - b. Makes three prints from each negative (1230).
 - c. Delivers negatives, two prints and sortie plot to photo reproduction unit (1235).
14. Photo Reproduction Unit—
 - a. Makes first phase or immediate interpretation of photos (1300).
 - b. Prepares additional prints required (1400).

①

Figure 14.—Continued.

¹ Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS ONLY

8. GLOs—
Assist in briefing pilots (1105).
9. During the mission, pilots radio important information to TACC. Army, corps, and division monitor transmissions by means of reconnaissance intercept facility (1130-1215).
10. Pilots return from mission (1225).
11. GLOs—
 - a. Assist in interrogation of pilots (1230).
 - b. Forward any pertinent information to army, corps, and division via reconnaissance broadcast, telephone, or teletypewriter (1245).
12. ¹
13. ¹
14. ¹

PHOTO MISSIONS ONLY

8. GLOs—
Assist in briefing pilot (1105).
9. (Photo missions may also report information to TACC by tactical air observation net.) (1130-1230).
10. Pilot returns from mission (1240).
11. GLOs—
 - a. Assist in interrogation of pilot (1245).
 - b. Forward any pertinent information (rare in a photo mission) to army, corps, and division via reconnaissance broadcast, telephone, or teletypewriter (1250).
12. Photo Reproduction Unit—
Sends interpreter to recon tech sq to make immediate interpretation on negatives or wet prints (1230).
13. Recon Tech Sq—
 - a. Develops film (1325).
 - b. Makes three prints from each negative (1330).
 - c. Delivers negatives and two prints and sortie plot to photo reproduction unit (1400).
14. Photo Reproduction Unit—
Makes immediate interpretation of negatives or wet prints, see item 12 (1415).

②

Figure 14—Continued.

¹ Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

15. GLOs or Photo Reproduction Unit—

Forwards pertinent results of photo interpretation to army, corps, and division via reconnaissance broadcast, telephone, for teletypewriter (1305).

16.¹

17. Photo Reproduction Unit—

- a. Prepares annotated photos and written reports (1330).
- b. Arranges for reproduction of annotated photos in quantity required (1430).
- c. Arranges for delivery of annotated prints and written reports to requesting division, and to such other units as are specified in item 6b. Deliveries are made by Army aircraft or motor vehicle.

①

Figure 14—Continued

¹ Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

15. ¹

15. GLOs or Photo Reproduction Unit—

Forwards results of interpretation to army, corps, and division via reconnaissance broadcast, telephone or teletypewriter (1420).

16. DIVISION. G-2—

Forwards information to the requesting regiment by telephone or by other means (1250).

16. DIVISION. G-2—

Forwards information to requesting regiment by telephone or by other means (1425).

17. Photo Reproduction Unit—

a. Prepares annotated photos and written reports (1430).

b. Arranges for reproduction of annotated photos in quantity required (1500).

c. Arranges for delivery of annotated prints and written reports to requesting division and to such other units as are designated by army G-2 Air. Deliveries are made by Army aircraft or motor vehicle.

②

Figure 14—Continued

¹ Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

88. IMPORTANCE OF AIR RECONNAISSANCE

a. One of the most important and least evident means by which tactical air support influences the success of army operations is air reconnaissance. Without reliable air reconnaissance beyond the limits of visual ground observation, a commander fights blind except for patrol reports and reports of prisoners of war, enemy deserters, refugees, and agents.

b. The results of air reconnaissance come to units below the field army from a multitude of agencies. They come direct from visual air reconnaissance aircraft by interception of the reconnaissance radio frequency. The air photo interpretation unit and the ground liaison officer at the reconnaissance wing transmit information via the reconnaissance radio broadcast. The air photo interpretation unit provides detailed terrain and defense studies, together with annotated photos and mosaics or overprinted maps. Army, corps, and division G-2's transmit information obtained by the tactical air force in the form of periodic intelligence reports, intelligence annexes to operation orders, and special messages.

89. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION

a. Tactical reconnaissance aviation gathers information by visual reconnaissance missions and air photo missions.

b. Visual and photo air reconnaissance are complementary. Together they provide current information of enemy activity and enemy defenses from the line of contact to areas deep in the enemy rear. The importance of such detailed information of enemy

activities and defenses must not be overlooked by any army unit commander in war.

c. The coordination of the operation of tactical reconnaissance aviation to serve the needs of both air and ground forces is described in FM 31-35.

90. RECONNAISSANCE TARGETS

a. Targets for reconnaissance aviation are classified by the air force as fixed, transient, and fleeting.

- (1) Any structure or object which is not subject to movement is a fixed target. Photo missions are usually employed in preference to visual reconnaissance missions in gathering information about fixed targets.
- (2) Transient targets are installations or structures temporarily used by the enemy. This type of target includes military camps, bivouacs, supply installations, ammunition dumps, and pontoon bridges.
- (3) Fleeting targets are objects that move and include concentrations of troops, vehicles of all kinds, watercraft, and aircraft.

b. Visual reconnaissance missions are usually employed in preference to photo missions in gathering information about transient and fleeting targets. A careful analysis or examination of the type of information required about the target will give an indication of the type mission to employ in gathering the required information. Instances in which both types of missions are employed against the same target to gather the same information will be rare.

91. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

a. Visual reconnaissance missions are flown by teams of two fully armed, fighter type aircraft which carry limited camera equipment. The pilot of one of the planes is the visual observer, while the other plane serves as fighter escort. Visual reconnaissance missions avoid combat, and use their armament only in self-defense. The information is gathered on a visual reconnaissance mission primarily by visual observation. The camera equipment is used to supplement the pilot's observations by recording doubtful or unidentifiable objects for further study by photo interpreters, or to make limited vertical or oblique strips of such items as short lengths of road. Photographing any sizable area for detailed study is not a normal assignment for a visual reconnaissance mission. The principal services that an army receives from visual reconnaissance missions are current visual information about fleeting targets and visual adjustment of artillery fire.

b. There are four general types of visual reconnaissance missions: area search, road search, route reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment.

- (1) *Area search* is used in flat or rolling terrain which is not heavily wooded, or in any terrain where troops may travel cross-country with reasonable ease. Under such circumstances the reconnaissance mission must examine all of the assigned zone, not just the communications lines.
- (2) *Road search* is used in zones where cross-country movement of troops would be seri-

ously hindered by terrain. In such zones the reconnaissance mission goes over and over the communications lines without attempting to make any particular examination of the rest of the zone.

- (3) *Route reconnaissance* missions cover roads, railroads, and waterways in and beyond the zones where regular search is used. They are carried out on a town-to-town or point-to-point basis along a specified route rather than being restricted to a specific zone.
 - (4) *Artillery adjustment* missions are used to adjust the fire of medium, long-range, and very long-range artillery when the targets cannot be observed from the ground or from an army aircraft.
- c. (1) An artillery adjustment mission of short duration may be combined with a route reconnaissance mission when the artillery adjustment has been completed.
- (2) Missions assigned to search zones may conduct route reconnaissance en route to and from their zones.
 - (3) Other than these two, it is not normal to assign more than one type search to one mission.

92. REQUESTS FOR VISUAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Normally, requests for visual air reconnaissance will include the following minimum information:

- a. Areas, routes, or targets to be covered.
- b. Time the coverage is desired.

c. Significance of desired information (justification for request).

d. Specific information desired.

e. Indicate that the forward air controller will be in a position to notify the fire direction center when the reconnaissance aircraft is approaching the front lines, so that, if necessary, the artillery may cease firing.

f. Ordinates of ground fires in the area to be searched.

93. LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF VISUAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Visual air reconnaissance must necessarily concern itself with securing information about localized targets. Its most effective operation is in the location of transient targets.

a. The limiting factor in the *quantity* of information secured by visual means is that it must be obtained by that part of the pilot's mind which is not occupied in flying a high-performance single-place airplane.

b. The limiting factor in the *quality* of information secured by visual means is the difficulty in making accurate observations of targets while passing over or near them at a five or more mile-a-minute speed.

c. An additional difficulty, not often considered, is that of orientation and location, since the pilot is restricted to the use of a relatively small-scale map.

d. The justifying factor which overcomes these limitations is the rapidity with which information

about transient or fleeting targets may be relayed to friendly units capable of attacking such targets before they cease to exist because of deployment or departure.

e. When visual air reconnaissance units supplement their visual observations with cameras these limiting factors diminish. The detailed accuracy of their information increases—but the time required to process and disseminate such information also increases sharply.

94. AIR PHOTO MISSIONS

a. *Day Photo Missions.*

- (1) Day photo missions are usually flown by a single fighter-type aircraft from which the armament has been removed in order to accommodate the camera equipment. These aircraft must depend on speed, maneuver, and altitude for protection from hostile aircraft and antiaircraft artillery. Photo missions are flown at high altitudes—in excess of 20,000 feet when cloud conditions permit.
- (2) Dicing missions are exceptions to the altitudes mentioned above. In a dicing mission a photo plane takes low-altitude vertical and oblique photos of a highly defended area, such as a beach or a front-line area. Dicing coverage is used only when large-scale vertical photography will not produce the required information. In this type mission the battle damage and the casualty rates are very high. Dicing missions are

- exceptional missions and are used only when the required information is urgent.
- (3) Gathering information by visual observation is not a normal part of a day photo mission.

b. Night Photo Missions.

- (1) Night photo missions are flown by single light-bomber type aircraft which have been fitted with camera equipment and a source of illumination, currently the flash bomb and the flash projectile. The area which can be covered by night photo missions is quite small when compared to day photo coverage, but the night photo plane can be positioned over its target quite accurately by electronic means and it can obtain information about enemy night activity not possible by other means.
- (2) Gathering information by visual observation on a night photo mission is impractical.

95. REQUESTS FOR AIR PHOTO COVERAGE

Requests for air photo coverage from division and lower echelons will be made through intelligence channels and will include the distribution required, methods of reporting information, priority, and date and time deadline. Such requests should specify—

a. Area of objective to be covered (state coordinates or indicate by map overlay).

b. Approximate scale. For obliques, state approximate direction, altitude, and type—high or low, and specify the foreground line.

c. Purposes for which photos are intended (any pertinent details which will materially aid in the satisfactory accomplishment of the mission).

d. Number of prints desired. (Requirements must be reproduced by the Engineer photo reproduction unit.)

e. Priority relative to other requests of the organization.

f. Deadline of date and time of delivery (latest time the photos or information will be of value).

g. Point of delivery.

96. LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY

a. Limiting factors in the use of aerial photography are—

- (1) Time lapse between exposure of film and dissemination of information (normally 4 to 12 hours).
- (2) Weather.
- (3) Light.
- (4) Enemy defenses.
- (5) Jungle or heavily wooded terrain.
- (6) Scale errors caused by the inability of the camera to portray objects in their true geometric relationship to each other.

b. Aerial photography permits preparation and dissemination of detailed analyses of enemy installations in broad areas.

- (1) Its outstanding characteristic is its ability to subject such areas to day-by-day or week-by-week comparative analyses. Such anal-

yses are prepared by air photo interpreters who can make detailed examinations of each unit of an enemy installation.

- (2) A scarcely less outstanding characteristic is its ability to furnish current information concerning enemy terrain. This information, supplemented by information from other sources, provides the best means to make accurate, comprehensive terrain estimates.

CHAPTER 9

EXPLOITATION OF SOURCES

Section I. PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND CAPTURED MATÉRIEL

97. GENERAL

This section is a general discussion of the intelligence aspects of prisoners of war and other personnel who have recently been under enemy control; enemy documents; and captured equipment. For detailed procedures and techniques on these subjects, refer to FM 30-15.

98. PRISONERS OF WAR

a. Value of Prisoners of War. Prisoners of war divulge information, advertently or inadvertently, through interrogation. They frequently carry personal or official documents which, either alone or when compared with other known data, reveal new information or confirm that which is already on hand. The condition of their clothing and equipment, and their very demeanor may often throw some new light on the enemy picture. Prisoners may have a more or less intimate knowledge of the enemy situation and capabilities—they are, after all, elements of the enemy armed forces.

b. Training and Prisoners of War. There is a direct relationship between the training given a unit

in the handling of prisoners of war and the quality and quantity of information obtained from them. The commander must insure that adequate training in this subject is given all personnel. Training emphasizes the necessity for the taking of prisoners, it includes the proper methods for handling and examining prisoners of war, and it shows the individual soldier how correct handling of prisoners is of direct benefit to him. In addition to its value in the production of intelligence, such training has a counterintelligence value. In case of capture, the trained soldier will know his rights under the Geneva Convention and will have a better appreciation of the need for withholding information from the enemy.

c. Techniques of Handling Prisoners of War.

The value of prisoners of war as a source of information may be greatly reduced if they are improperly handled. The techniques of segregation, search, evacuation, and interrogation discussed in FM 30-15, should be applied whenever possible in handling prisoners.

99. ESCAPERS, EVADERS, AND REFUGEES

a. Intelligence officers should not overlook the intelligence value of civilians, repatriates, escapers, and evaders. Our own or allied military personnel who have evaded or escaped capture, as well as repatriated civilians of our own or allied countries, frequently have information of value to our forces. They are usually not only willing, but also eager, to divulge it.

b. Until their identity is proved, escapers, evaders, and friendly civilians must be segregated and unob-

trusively guarded to prevent information falling into hands of planted enemy agents. They are processed as outlined in FM 30-15.

100. ENEMY DOCUMENTS

a. General. An enemy document may be any form of recorded information relative to enemy armies or countries. Enemy documents are both personal (letters, pay cards, diaries, and pictures) found on prisoners or enemy dead, and official (maps, orders, manuals, records, official photographs, and similar items).

b. Value as Sources of Information. When examined systematically by competent personnel, enemy documents may provide necessary information. As sources of information, enemy documents have one unique feature—they are prepared by the enemy for *his own information and guidance* and are, therefore, just as clear, concise, and accurate as he can make them. He does not intend that we will ever see them. In effect, then, when we get an enemy document, the enemy voluntarily tells us all he knows about the particular subject the document covers; he will tell it again and again in the same way as often as we wish to study the subject.

c. Processing. The flow of enemy documents is through *command channels* from the original finder to battalion and then through *intelligence channels* from battalion to their final destination. Below division, documents are delayed for only a minimum of time for processing and quick inspection for information of immediate tactical value to the unit then in possession.

d. Training. Troops can be trained in the processing of enemy documents and thus assist the intelligence officer in his duties. Training may be accomplished by including in unit training the search for enemy documents, recognition of documents, and how to get them into the proper channels. The intelligence officer coordinates with the operations officer so that time will be provided for this instruction in training programs. Interest in this training among troops may be increased by using exhibits of various types of enemy documents, by demonstrations on the proper and improper handling of captured documents, and by instruction in the value to the command of such documents, both in military operations and by reducing casualties in combat. Troops can be made to realize their value by use of simple slogans, such as, "*Everything new goes to G-2.*" Personal visits by the intelligence officer, his assistants, and intelligence specialists to various units to give part of the documents training will emphasize its importance to troops.

e. Souvenirs. Troops may be induced to turn in documents if unit commanders are authorized to return certain material as souvenirs to them after it has been determined to be of no military value. A successful practice is to maintain a supply of known valueless documents to be issued as souvenirs on-the-spot in exchange for documents turned in by troops. Individuals wishing to regain possession of specific items turned in, should be permitted to tag them with their name and unit.

101. CAPTURED MATÉRIEL

a. General. The weapons and equipment of an enemy are important to us, although this may not be immediately apparent to combat units. Prisoners talk as soon as they are captured, documents can be translated by interpreters who are readily available, but captured matériel must be studied by experts before we can learn much, although immediate examination of captured enemy matériel may often be of value in determining enemy order of battle information.

b. Objectives. There are four major objectives possible from the proper handling of captured enemy matériel:

- (1) Prompt development of effective counter-weapons and countertactics.
- (2) Prompt exploitation of new ideas for our own benefit.
- (3) Early deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war.
- (4) Use by our forces of enemy matériel, to include the provision of literature and other aids to assist in troop training.

c. Responsibilities With Respect to Captured Matériel. FM 30-15 discusses the responsibilities of individuals and agencies with respect to captured matériel. The role of technical service intelligence detachments (TSID) is of particular importance (par. 33). These detachments collect and study enemy matériel for their respective technical services and prepare reports evaluating its components, use, effectiveness, and when applicable, instructions to troops in its handling, use, and maintenance. These

reports are disseminated through technical service channels of the responsible technical service. The intelligence officer is responsible for disseminating information used to produce intelligence, and producing and disseminating intelligence on enemy matériel. Dissemination is through intelligence channels.

Section II. MAPS (FM 101-10)

102. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The intelligence officers of divisions and lower units prepare plans and policies and exercise staff supervision over all activities concerning military maps.

b. The division engineer is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps, under the general staff supervision of the division G-2. He submits requisitions for maps to the corps engineer.

c. The intelligence officer of units below division is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps. He submits requisitions for maps to the division engineer.

103. MILITARY MAPS

The term *military maps* refers to all maps (other than aeronautical and hydrographic charts) used for military purposes. Military maps are classified generally according to the military use for which the map is best suited. This classification depends largely upon the scale, which is indicative of the accuracy and is a criterion as to the amount of detail

shown upon the map. Certain general classifications are also commonly used to indicate the extent of geographic information given, as well as the manner in which it is portrayed.

a. Military Classification.

(1) *By scale.*

(a) *Small scale*: 1:600,000 and smaller.

(b) *Medium scale*: larger than 1:600,000, but smaller than 1:75,000.

(c) *Large scale*: 1:75,000 and larger.

(2) *By use or description.*

(a) *General*: maps smaller than 1:1,000,000—utilized for general planning purposes.

(b) *Strategic*: 1:1,000,000—utilized for strategic planning purposes.

(c) *Strategic-tactical*: 1:250,000 (1:500,000 alternate)—for use when other scales are unsuitable or unavailable.

(d) *Road*: 1:250,000—for tactical and administrative troop movements.

(e) *Tactical*: 1:50,000 (1:100,000 alternate)—for tactical and administrative purposes.

(f) *Artillery*: 1:25,000—for artillery fire control.

(g) *Photomap*: 1:25,000 (1:12,500 alternate)—for tactical and administrative purposes.

(h) *Town plan*: 1:12,500.

b. General Classification.

(1) *Topographic map*. A map which presents relief or the vertical position of features in measurable form as well as their horizontal

position. An embossed map is a standard topographic map printed upon a plastic base, and deformed to produce the vertical dimensions, as indicated by the contour lines, at an exaggerated scale.

- (2) *Planimetric map.* A map presenting only the horizontal position of features.
- (3) *Photomap.* A term used generally to denote reproduction of an air photo or mosaics on which additional data such as place, names, grid lines, and marginal data have been placed. When suitable maps for military purposes do not exist, the vertical air photo in its various forms must be regarded as a useful and acceptable provisional map. When suitable maps are available, the air photo is used to supplement the information on the map. When at sufficient scale, the air photo furnishes much detail lacking on even the best topographic map. However, images on air photos appear not in accordance with their military value but in accordance with their light-reflecting qualities. A contact print of a photo is more legible than a lithographic copy of the same photo.

104. REQUIREMENTS

a. General. Timely planning is necessary to insure that sufficient quantities of suitable maps are available to units, at the time and place needed. The basic factors which govern such planning are—

- (1) The area of map coverage.

- (2) The map scales required.
- (3) Initial allowances.
- (4) Replacement requirements.

b. Area of Map Coverage. Area coverage is the number of sheets of the same scale required to include the piece of terrain being considered. The extent of the area of present and projected operations provides the basis for the map coverage required. In general, an actively engaged unit needs map coverage of an area wider than that included within its tactical boundaries. This overlap is required for planning, tactical security, and coordination with adjacent units. The number of map sheets at each scale is determined by use of a map index. An outline of the area of which coverage is required is marked on the index. The included sheets are then counted and listed by appropriate identification symbol. In determining area coverage, the G-2 coordinates with the G-3, the engineer, and other staff officers and agencies.

c. Map Scales Required. The map scales required are determined according to the needs of the users. These needs are influenced by such factors as the type of unit, character of the terrain, the type of operations, the extent of the opposition encountered, and the speed of movement. Small-scale maps are used for general planning and strategic studies of higher commanders. Large-scale maps are intended for the technical and tactical needs of the infantry, and other appropriate users. Maps covering the area of present and proposed operations are, in accordance with availability and economy, of as large scale as necessary to provide the detail of information re-

quired. Coverage outside the area of immediate interest is of smaller scale.

d. Initial Allowances.

- (1) Initial allowances prescribe the number of copies of map sheets, by type or scale, which can be requisitioned by each organization without further approval. Initial allowances must furnish units and individuals with a sufficient number of copies of map sheets to provide adequate coverage at each scale required. Difficulties of production and distribution, as well as the weights involved, necessitate economy in map issue. Various factors such as the strength, composition, and functions of a unit are combined with experience data to determine the quantities of maps to be allowed the unit in tables of initial allowances. The allowances prescribed in FM 101-10 are based on experience of World War II and are to be considered as a guide only.
- (2) Tables for determining map requirements and discussions of the subject frequently employ the terms "sheet" and "copy." The term *sheet* is used to describe a map of given scale which covers a given area of ground. It is a single piece of paper. The term *copy* designates any exact counterpart or facsimile of a sheet. Physically—as an imprinted piece of paper—a sheet and a copy are identical. The difference is a matter of word usage. As used in connection with map requirements, the term *sheet* conveys

the idea of an area of terrain cartographically depicted on a piece of paper. The term *copies* connotes quantity.

- (3) The actual determination of initial map requirements can be illustrated by the procedure employed by a division in calculating the needs of all its subordinate units. The job is done by G-2, G-3, and the division engineer. G-3 outlines the operational plan. G-2 and G-3 decide on the types and scales of the maps to be used. The engineer advises on the availability of maps, including types and scales. In accordance with the plan for future tactical operations, G-2 marks the projected boundaries of the division and its subordinate units and the over-all area for which coverage is desired. This area will extend forward of the present lines to include objectives of the current operation. Allowance must be made for the time necessary for procurement and distribution. G-2 will also inform the engineer of other factors involved in the scheme of maneuver which are pertinent to map requirements.
- (4) With the information obtained from G-2 and the data contained in experience tables, the engineer is now ready to calculate map requirements for all units of the division and division headquarters. The procedure is as follows:
 - (a) Lay out the projected division area for which coverage is desired on the map index of the scale being considered.

- (b) In the division area outlined on the map index, indicate the tentative battalion and regimental boundaries. Project these boundaries sufficiently forward to cover the entire area for which map coverage is desired at each scale.
 - (c) List the identifications of the sheets required to cover the area included within the boundaries of each echelon of command from battalion to division inclusive.
 - (d) From the experience tables, determine the number of copies of each sheet required at each echelon.
 - (e) List the total number of copies of each map sheet required. These are planning figures for initial issue.
- (5) In the above illustration, it was assumed that the division was calculating its own initial allowances. In most situations initial allowances for a division will be determined at army echelon. However, the same procedure is followed to determine exact distribution within the unit.

e. Replacement Requirements. Replacement requirements are calculated by applying a percentage factor to the number of copies required for initial issue. The sum of the initial requirement, plus the replacement requirement for each sheet, represents the total number of copies of each sheet which army must be prepared to distribute. For replacement percentage factors, see FM 101-10.

105. DISTRIBUTION

a.

- (1) The distribution of maps must fit the operational plan. Therefore, only the particular map sheets which cover the area of interest are of any immediate use to troops. Changes in tactical plans may not affect other supplies, but they do have an immediate effect on map requirements. The distribution system must respond instantaneously to such changes if the required maps are to be provided in time. This sensitivity to the tactical situation demands close staff supervision of map supply.
- (2) Premature issue of maps not of immediate interest is wasted effort because the maps will probably be lost or discarded; they may be voided by a change in operational plan; and once issued, they can seldom be withdrawn for reissue to another unit.
- (3) In a mobile situation, detailed issue to individuals and small units is difficult to achieve. The bulk of maps needed to cover any substantial area makes it impractical to supply a unit with maps for any prolonged period of mobile operations.
- (4) Logistical limitations prevent maintaining excessive reserves of maps. Hence, map distribution must be carefully controlled to prevent waste.

b. Maps are valuable sources of information concerning the area of operations; *they are intelligence*

documents. From the distribution standpoint, they must be considered as intelligence documents rather than as items of supply and must be handled separately by an independent system set up exclusively for this purpose. Corps, primarily a tactical headquarters, is an integral part of the system. Divisions requisition and draw their maps from corps and not directly from army, as in the case of other supply items.

c. The intelligence annex to the operation order provides a written means of indicating the maps to be used during an operation. In paragraph 5 of the annex the intelligence officer lists the maps which will be supplied, with the number of each classification or scale to each unit, including instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution (App. V).

Section III. AIR PHOTOS

106. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The intelligence officer of divisions and lower units prepares plans and policies and supervises all activities concerning air photos at his echelon. In addition, he is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of air photos.

b. The division intelligence officer submits requests for air photos to the corps G-2 Air.

c. The intelligence officers of units below division submit requests for air photos to the division G-2.

d. The division engineer may be called upon by G-2 for assistance in the storage and distribution of air photos when large quantities are handled.

107. TYPES OF AIR PHOTOS

a. An air photo is a photograph taken from an aircraft.

b. The following are types of air photos:

- (1) *Vertical photo*. An air photo made with a camera the optical axis of which is approximately vertical to the earth's surface, or the film of which is as nearly horizontal as is practicable. It has inherent, but relatively small, errors of scale and azimuth resulting from tip and tilt, variations in relief, and optical distortions.
- (2) *Composite*. An air photo made with a camera having one principal lens and two or more surrounding and oblique lenses. The several resulting photos are corrected or rectified in printing so as to permit assembly as verticals with the same scale.
- (3) *Oblique photo*. An airphoto taken with the camera axis intentionally directed between the horizontal and the vertical.
 - (a) A high oblique includes the horizon.
 - (b) A low oblique does not include the horizon.
- (4) *Stereopair*. Two air photos to which a portion of the total area projected thereon is common. Examination of such pairs with a stereoscope gives an exaggerated third-dimensional view of the terrain which is included in the area of overlay of both photos.
- (5) *Wide-angle photo*. An air photo taken

with a camera which has a wide-angle lens that will photograph a cone of approximately 90° .

- (6) *Vectographs*. Two especially printed overlapping air photos that give the illusion of the third dimension when viewed with polaroid spectacles.
- (7) *Anaglyphs*. Similar to vectographs, but viewed with red and green spectacles.

108. AIR PHOTO COVERAGE

The term air photo coverage denotes ground area represented on air photos, photomaps and mosaics. Three types of air photo coverage are basic cover, intelligence photography, and mapping photography.

a. Basic cover consists of aerial photography of a given area obtained for mapping and/or general intelligence requirements. In the latter use it is compared with later pictures to facilitate identification of changes. It is distributed in quantity to subordinate ground and air units to furnish general information of terrain in a particular area. The photos may be of noncurrent date but should be capable of stereoscopic study. Basic cover extends from the line of contact to a depth of 100 miles or more into enemy-held territory. For greatest effectiveness it should be at scale 1:12,500 or larger. It is used as a map supplement to provide information on terrain and on fixed enemy installations. The tactical air force is charged with the production of the negatives, which are turned over to the engineer air photo reproduction unit for quantity reproduction and distribution of prints.

b. Intelligence photography consists of air photos of current date which are interpreted by trained personnel to obtain intelligence of enemy installations and terrain under enemy control. The photos are ordinarily furnished in limited quantity and must be capable of stereoscopic study. Intelligence photography is divided into front-line cover and cover of areas deep in enemy territory. Either of these may be supplemented by obliques.

(1) Front-line cover consists of current vertical stereopairs of an army area, extending from the line of contact to a depth of 15-20 miles into enemy-held territory. For maximum effectiveness its scale should be 1:10,000 or larger. The depth to which front-line cover is flown is usually determined by the maximum range of friendly artillery, or the location of selected objectives during an offensive operation. It is flown daily as weather permits or as requested by the army. The tactical air force is charged with the production of the negatives, which are turned over to the army for interpretation, quantity reproduction, and distribution.

(2) Cover of areas deep in enemy-held territory is a normal daily requirement of an army. Its scale varies with the individual need, and is specified by army G-2 Air in each instance.

c. Mapping photography is aerial photography suitable for mapping. It is usually taken at much smaller scales than any of the above (1:35,000 to

1:60,000), and cannot successfully be used to supplant any of them.

d. Extensive basic cover and mapping photography ordinarily cannot be obtained during operations. In addition to abortive reconnaissance missions due to enemy action, weather conditions are usually favorable only a small portion of the time.

109. MOSAICS

A mosaic is an assembly of two or more overlapping air photos. A picture of a larger area than could be recorded on one photo is thus presented. There are three types of mosaics: controlled, uncontrolled, and strip.

a. A controlled mosaic is laid on ground control to provide an accurate representation of distances and directions. It can be made quite accurate if sufficient control data exists, but its preparation is slow and tedious.

b. An uncontrolled mosaic is made without the check of scale or position which would be given by a framework of control points. In comparison with a controlled mosaic its preparation is quite rapid, but it is much less accurate.

c. A strip mosaic consists of one strip of air photos taken on a single flight. Depending on the time and the amount of control available, it may be controlled or uncontrolled.

110. PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Air photos are often used as map substitutes or supplements to provide detailed information on ter-

rain and enemy defenses. They are especially useful when sufficient maps of proper accuracy and scale are not available. In planning for procurement of air photos, a distinction must be made between daily intelligence photography and basic cover (par. 108). Basic cover must be planned for well in advance, otherwise, it will never be provided to front-line troops. It must also be realized that under ideal conditions adequate quantities of aerial photographs may be made available. However, under extreme adverse operational conditions the quantity furnished will be in proportion to the success of the air reconnaissance missions.

b. The following is an example of basic cover required by a division in combat with two regiments abreast and one in reserve (fig. 15). In this example, each front-line regiment has two battalions abreast and one in reserve. An infantry regiment needs six sets of cover of the regimental zone. From two regimental sets, each front-line battalion gets two sets of photos of its own front. From these photos all patrols can be conveniently briefed. Only the reserve battalion of the regiment receives photos of the entire regimental front. The reserve battalion requires two sets of cover of the regimental sector in order that it may be prepared for action in any locality within the regimental zone of action. Two regimental sets are retained by each front-line regimental headquarters. One of these is usually reserved for regimental support weapons. Companies and platoons have limited facilities for taking care of photos; thus full sets should not go below battalions. Just as the reserve battalion needs sets




Figure 15. Distribution of basic cover (schematic).

of the entire regimental zone, the reserve regiment in the division needs cover of the entire division zone. It is desirable that this regiment be issued six divisional sets. Each artillery battalion, including the antiaircraft artillery battalion, plus division artillery headquarters, needs a full set of the division cover, since artillery fires cover the entire division front. The engineer battalion, tank battalion, and the reconnaissance company, need at least one set each. Thus the division needs a minimum of 23 divisional sets. Such an allowance, however, will not give the division G-2 any reserve photos to replace losses and to equip units sent into areas for which they have no photo cover. Nor will it fur-

nish overlap of adjacent zones or sectors. When availability permits, such overlap should be provided. A recapitulation of the preceding figures follows:

	<i>Regimental sets</i>	<i>Division sets</i>
Division headquarters_____		2
1st Infantry_____	6	} = *6
2d Infantry_____	6	
3d Infantry (reserve)_____		6
Division artillery_____		6
Reconnaissance company_____		1
Engineer combat battalion_____		1
Tank battalion_____		1
Total_____		23

*A front-line regiment has half a division set.

c. Photo reproduction units with the army should be capable of reproducing approximately 25,000 photoprints per day of intelligence photography. Coverage of an army front normally requires 3,000 prints; thus, approximately 8 prints of each photo can be made daily. Obviously, army is definitely limited in its intelligence photography to corps, and it follows logically that corps is limited in its intelligence photography to divisions. The division will usually receive only one copy of intelligence photography of the division front. When its intelligence value has diminished, intelligence photography may be used to supplement basic cover of divisional units.

d. Actually, the division G-2 does not arrange for distribution beyond regiment and separate battalions, but he must understand the needs and problems of battalions and companies in order to arrive at the

most equitable and efficient distribution of photos within the division.

e. Information and instructions on air photos are published in the same manner as for maps (par. 105).

Section IV. AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION

111. GENERAL

a. Interpretation of air photos assists in determining the identity and physical characteristics of features of terrain, works of man, and the nature and extent of land, sea, or air activity, including information on the installations, strengths, dispositions, and activities of the enemy.

b. Detailed photo interpretation is accomplished by air photo interpreters who study stereopairs and report on all installations and activities seen. Air photo interpreters are able to interpret "indications" and discernible features associated with activities that in themselves may be hidden.

c. Interpretation of air photos taken at daily, weekly, or monthly intervals makes it possible to keep accurately abreast of all activity at airdromes, ports, factories, communication lines, defense positions, and other enemy installations. This "repetitive" or "routine" comparative cover is the basis of intelligence produced from air photo interpretation.

d. Air photo interpretation is accomplished by the following processing units:

- (1) Reconnaissance technical squadrons (par. 86).
- (2) Air photo interpreter units.

112. AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION OPERATIONS

a. The air photo interpreters assigned to division headquarters work as a part of the G-2 section (fig. 2). They are responsible for the following:

- (1) Detailed interpretation of all air photos of the unit area.
- (2) Disseminating air photo interpretation reports on enemy installations and activities.
- (3) Preparing uncontrolled mosaics for use by the division.
- (4) Briefing patrols and furnishing annotated air photos of areas of reconnaissance.
- (5) Furnishing reports and annotated air photos to the engineer on bridge and road conditions and fording sites.
- (6) Verifying and evaluating information obtained from other sources.

b. The air photo interpreters assigned to the headquarters of division artillery work as part of the S-2 section. Their primary responsibility is the location of artillery targets.

113. AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION REPORTS

a. *Form.* Air photo interpretation reports are issued in a variety of forms, ranging from an oral summary on the telephone giving location of an enemy position, to a complete series of volumes detailing the entire defense, communications, and terrain situation of a theater of operations. All reports are issued in the form most easy to use. Detailed writing is kept to a minimum, and annotated

air photos, mosaics, overprinted maps, or overlays are used wherever possible.

b. Classes. Reports are divided into two classes:

- (1) *Immediate reports* are made immediately after film is developed, sometimes from the negative itself or from wet prints. They are disseminated at high priority, and generally concern enemy artillery positions, new bivouac areas, movements of reserves, new defenses, damage assessment, and similar information of immediate tactical importance.
- (2) *Detailed reports* are generally based on comparative studies of photography repeated over a period of time.

c. Use of Reports. The principal uses of air photo interpretation reports are—

(1) *Prior to operations:*

- (a) Map compilation.
- (b) Map correction.
- (c) Studies of beaches.
- (d) Terrain studies.
- (e) Communications studies.
- (f) Detailed enemy defense studies.
- (g) Operational planning.
- (h) Briefing assault troops.

(2) *During operations:*

- (a) Interpretation of front-line cover.
- (b) Briefing patrols.
- (c) Information for counterbattery purposes.
- (d) Studies of enemy positions and strong points.
- (e) Terrain studies and estimates.

- (f) Information for trafficability maps.
- (g) Studies of enemy mine fields, bivouac areas, command posts, and similar installations.
- (h) Information of fords and streams.
- (i) Information of enemy supply movement.
- (j) Information relative to tactical deployment of our own forces (lines of departure, assembly areas, avenues of approach, and defiladed areas).

Section V. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

114. GENERAL

a. Importance. An analysis of the effect of all of the conditions of weather and terrain upon our own forces and upon the enemy constitutes the basis for estimates made by the commander and the staff. The answer sought is the best utilization of the weather and terrain by our own forces in order to increase our chances for success, and in order to assist in the deduction of the likely capabilities of the enemy.

b. Definitions.

- (1) *Weather.* Weather, as differentiated from climate, is the day-to-day changes in atmospheric conditions. Climate refers to the average conditions encountered in extended periods.
- (2) *Terrain.* From a military viewpoint, terrain is an area of ground considered as to its extent and natural features in relation to its use for a particular operation.

- (3) *Tactical study of weather and terrain.* An analysis of the area of probable military operations to determine the effect of the weather and terrain on the courses of action open to opposing forces in the area.

115. INFLUENCE OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. Weather.

- (1) The effect of weather on military operations is becoming felt to an increasing degree. The primary factors to be considered are precipitation, fog or ground haze, temperature, wind, cloud conditions, phases of the moon, and the dawn and twilight cycles of the sun.
- (2) Weather affects terrain by changing the trafficability of the soil and the condition of streams.
- (3) Weather affects operations by influencing visibility insofar as dust, fog, rain, snow, and light and darkness are concerned.
- (4) A commander's plan of action must be based on evaluation of the advantageous features of the weather.

b. Terrain.

- (1) The character of the area or region of military operations often has a decisive influence upon the course of operations. The more important factors to be considered in evaluating terrain include not only natural features, such as ridges, streams, bodies of water, beaches, woods, and open spaces, but also such man-made features as roads,

bridges, airfields, docks, railways, dams, and towns. The effect of weather on terrain, particularly as it changes the capability of the soil to support cross-country movement, often has a decided influence on military operations.

- (2) Ground forms, such as a succession of ridges and valleys, influence military operations by aiding or hampering the movement of military forces. An advance parallel to the ridges and valleys is easier than movement across successive ridges.
- (3) The salient features of a commander's plan of action are usually determined so as to take full advantage of favorable terrain features.

116. PREPARATION OF TACTICAL STUDIES OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. Responsibility. The intelligence officer is charged with primary staff responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and insuring timely completion and dissemination of tactical studies of weather and terrain. These studies are based on technical data assembled by the intelligence section, assisted by the engineer and other technical experts. Evaluation and interpretation of weather and terrain factors and their effects vary from the point of view of different users. Consequently, preparation of tactical studies of weather and terrain is participated in by each staff section concerned, and the completed study represents the joint effort of the staff. Such studies

should always be directed towards fulfilling the needs of the commander and other users in making decisions and executing the mission of the command.

b. Form. A form for the preparation of a tactical study of the weather and terrain is shown in appendix VI.

117. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

a. Weather. Weather information is obtained from the Air Weather Service through intelligence channels. The intelligence officer obtains, interprets, and disseminates this information. The Air Weather Service provides the following information:

- (1) Short, medium, and long range forecasts (par. 29).
- (2) Current weather information: information of the current weather at any specified point or area.
- (3) Climatological studies: climate information for any area.
- (4) Special information or forecasts, including—
 - (a) Chemical forecast.
 - (b) Ballistic data.
 - (c) Surf and swell forecasts.
 - (d) Time, tide, and light data.
- (5) In conjunction with the engineers the weather service prepares stream level and soil trafficability forecasts.

b. Terrain.

- (1) *Maps and air photos.* Maps and air photos, supplemented when practicable by ground

and air reconnaissance, form the basis for studying terrain. In many cases maps marked in special ways simplify this study. Occasionally a series of special maps or overlays, on each of which is emphasized a separate item of military importance, such as roads, streams, or relief, is necessary. Oblique, stereoscopic, colored, and infrared photographs are helpful in studying terrain and man-made changes to the terrain. Enlarged town and city plans showing locations of prominent buildings, names of streets, and other features are essential for studies prior to operations against a town or city.

- (2) *Terrain models.* Terrain models of the area selected for detailed study, generally for special operations such as amphibious or airborne operations and the attack of fortified areas, may be prepared. These are particularly helpful in operational and logistical planning, and operational briefing of troops.
- (3) *Hydrographic charts.* A study of hydrographic charts is essential in amphibious operations or in the defense of beaches and shore lines.
- (4) *Special maps.* In mountain and winter operations, special maps prepared from all available data, showing snow depths to be expected on the ground, are valuable for making logistical and tactical plans. Maps showing timbered areas will also be of value.

(5) *Reconnaissance and trafficability reports.*

A thorough study of available reconnaissance reports is essential to proper evaluation of terrain prior to any operation. Trafficability reports concerning ground conditions which affect the movement of tanks are considered when contemplating any mechanized action.

Section VI. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

118. GENERAL

a. Enemy order of battle is the manner in which the enemy has organized and disposed his military forces. Intelligence on order of battle includes data on the strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization, identity, tactical doctrines and methods, combat efficiency, and movement of enemy forces, together with records of performance of identified units and with personnel data on the commanders.

b. In the production of military intelligence in peace or in war, every country and possible theater of operations is studied by the Department of the Army. These studies include order of battle factors as well as many others. One result of such studies is the compilation of order of battle books which are available during time of war to units and to intelligence officers at all echelons.

c. Order of battle books is the basis from which order of battle personnel start in the development of their own order of battle files (par. 39), at the outset of operations. Order of battle files are the foundation of current intelligence on enemy order of

battle during military operations. If not constantly kept up to date, order of battle files will rapidly lose their value. Since these files are used by field collecting agencies, such as PW interrogators, as well as by intelligence officers in the production of intelligence, it is extremely important that a wide exchange of order of battle information be made in order that all units and all echelons will benefit as new information is obtained. This exchange is made through the medium of order of battle reports.

119. SOURCES OF ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION

The sources of order of battle information vary, particularly in importance, with the echelon under consideration. Some of the more important sources are prisoners of war, captured documents and matériel, intercepted communications, enemy press and radio broadcasts, civilians, refugees, and escapers. As with any other information, order of battle data procured from any of these sources is evaluated and interpreted and, where necessary, substantiated by other means.

120. IMPORTANCE OF ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION

Since the study of order of battle is to determine what enemy forces exist, their strength, and how they are organized and disposed, a large portion of the *intelligence estimate* is directly based thereon. The capabilities of the enemy to affect the accomplishment of our mission can only be properly stated when based on recent order of battle data. Since the commander requires intelligence of the enemy,

the weather, and the terrain in order to make a decision, the direct importance of order of battle information to the commander is apparent.

121. PRINCIPAL FACTORS IN ORDER OF BATTLE

a. Strength. There are three principal measures of strength: personnel, number of units, and armament.

- (1) *Personnel strength* should be broken down in every possible way: by branch of service, by rank and grade, by method of recruitment, by nationality (if the army in question contains more than one nationality), and by degree of training.
- (2) The *number* of units should be stated by type and echelon: higher headquarters (army groups, armies, corps); divisions (distinguishing by types); and separate brigades, regiments, battalions, and smaller units.
- (3) Strength in *armament* consists of a tabulation of all the principal types of weapons: heavy, medium, and light tanks; artillery pieces of various calibers; mortars; machine guns; and rifles. Strength figures are required at all echelons. The strength of the entire enemy army in personnel, units, and armament is as much a part of order of battle information as is the strength in one small area.

b. Unit Identification.

- (1) Knowledge of the exact designation of every unit in the enemy army being studied is the

goal of order of battle work. Systems of nomenclature and numbering are all-important. A knowledge of **the** common (or vernacular) designations of units and types of organizations will often reveal much regarding the structure of the army and the missions of special units. For example, the system of numbering used for any given type of unit often reflects the mobilization plan. There frequently is a standard relationship between the numbering of divisions and that of their component regiments. Besides their regular numbers and type designations, units in many armies have special names; these may indicate the home station, provincial origin, former commander, or any other attribute. Examples are the Gross-deutschland Division (German), the Moscow Division (Soviet), and the Folgore Division (Italian).

- (2) Lacking knowledge of the specific numbers and type designations of units, other means may be used to identify them. These include Army post office numbers, code names, unit insignia, and even the names of their commander or their home stations. A complete order of battle of an army could be drawn up on the basis of these partial identifications. Frequently, knowledge of these attributes will prove invaluable in establishing the regular designation of units, since reports may refer only to the name of the commander of the unit.

c. Command Structure. Besides identifying and locating the units which compose a given military force, the command relationships which exist among them should be determined. For any one unit, this study includes the next higher unit to which it is subordinate, as well as the various lower units which are subordinate to it. A distinction is made between organic and attached units at each echelon. Knowledge of the command structure is indispensable to determining the capabilities of the force for offensive or defensive action.

d. Disposition. The disposition of military forces in any area includes the exact location of the headquarters of each identified unit and the deployment of all of its troops. If the exact location cannot be determined, the general location should be stated. At times the location of an unidentified unit of a given type can be learned, while on other occasions, a unit may be identified in the area under scrutiny but its location within that area may be unknown. Implied in the statement of headquarters location and deployment of troops is the matter of boundaries. Enemy boundaries rarely coincide with our own, and knowledge of the location of enemy boundaries assists considerably in formulating operation plans. Lacking captured documents which actually show the boundaries, knowledge of their location can best be determined from interrogation of prisoners. The identification of the unit from which captured and the place of capture, in conjunction with a study of the map will often suggest probable boundaries. In addition, a close examination of enemy movements and groupings,

and of his command structure and tactical doctrine, will aid materially in the determination of enemy boundaries.

e. Military Personalities. Closely linked with the preceding order of battle subjects is the study of military personalities. This study cannot be divorced from the study of identification, location, and command structure of units. The study of commanders, including those of subordinate units, is one of the best means of establishing unit identifications. Everything possible should be learned about each individual: his full name, variants, and aliases; present rank and position; place and date of birth; provincial or class origin; education and military schooling; family, political, and other affiliations; military ability; special aptitudes; character, and past career. Knowledge of the personality of a commander will aid materially in estimating the capabilities of his command.

f. Unit History. It is not enough to know the spot location, present commander, and current composition of an identified unit. Its entire history—from the time, place, and circumstances of its activation through all its subsequent movements, changes in command, and changes in composition and subordination—will be found necessary in order of battle work. Such data will not only have a bearing on the tradition, morale, and combat effectiveness of the unit, but may prove invaluable in establishing present unit identifications. During the past war, for example, German prisoners of war sometimes refused to give the identification of their units but would talk freely about their past campaigns and

commanders. Accurate unit histories then made it possible to establish the identification without difficulty.

122. TRAINING IN ORDER OF BATTLE

a. During time of peace, effective training in order of battle techniques and practices is difficult to achieve. To alleviate this deficiency a fictitious enemy called "Aggressor" has been developed by the Department of the Army. In preparation of Aggressor, effort has been made to inject as much realism as possible. In doing this, an imaginary country with fictitious historical background has been developed. Four field manuals describing Aggressor and his armed forces have been published:

- (1) FM 30-101, The Maneuver Enemy.
- (2) FM 30-102, Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.
- (3) FM 30-103, Aggressor Army Order of Battle.
- (4) FM 30-104, Aggressor Army Representation Operations and Equipment.

b. FM 30-103 is, in effect, an order of battle book. The forms used in the manual for tabulation of data may be followed by intelligence personnel to prepare their order of battle files.

CHAPTER 10

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

123. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy intelligence services are presumed to be at least as efficient as our own. They will use all the methods employed by us for obtaining information. Intelligence services do not usually acquire vital information by obtaining one all-revealing fact, but principally as the result of correlating small, and possibly individually insignificant, items of information.

b. The information most likely to be sought by enemy intelligence includes the following:

- (1) The capabilities and limitations, intentions, plans, and employment of our forces.
- (2) The composition, strength, dispositions, armament, equipment, training, and morale of our forces.
- (3) Our logistical and administrative systems; sources and availability of supplies; vulnerable points in our production, transportation, and storage systems; and lines of communication.
- (4) Developments in tactical doctrine, armament, matériel, and equipment.

- (5) Casualties in men and matériel. Results of enemy activities, whether favorable or unfavorable.
- (6) The organization, functions, scope of responsibility, personalities, operational patterns, sources, methods, and results achieved by our intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
- (7) Progress and objectives of our scientific and technical research.
- (8) Civilian morale.
- (9) Biographic data concerning our commanders and other important individuals.

c. Among the more important sources, methods, and agencies from which the enemy may derive information in the field are—

- (1) Observation and reconnaissance, land, sea, and air.
- (2) Prisoners of war and refugees.
- (3) Communication intelligence.
- (4) Documents.
- (5) Press and radio (television) communiques, news photographs, and published surmises by editorial writers and columnists.
- (6) Careless talk.
- (7) Secret agents.
- (8) Travelers.

124. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Purpose. Counterintelligence consists of those measures, either passive or active, designed to conceal from the enemy our intentions and activities,

and to neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities. Surprise, one of the most important of the principles of war, may be derived from the efficiency of a well-organized and soundly operated counterintelligence system, and from the effectiveness of the counterintelligence measures employed.

b. Scope. Counterintelligence includes, but is not confined to, the measures and activities employed in the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage. Counterintelligence is necessary in peace and war.

c. Control. Centralization of control is the essence of efficient counterintelligence. Counterintelligence activities are normally conducted under the staff supervision of the unit AC of S, G-2. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments attached to tactical echelons are under command of the commander of the unit to which attached and will carry out such security duties as he may direct (SR 380-310-1).

d. Responsibility. Counterintelligence activities are not the exclusive concern of unit intelligence officers and intelligence specialists, but are participated in, to a considerable extent, by all members of the military service. The full cooperation of all personnel is an essential requirement to the successful neutralization of enemy and unfriendly intelligence organizations.

125. SIMILARITIES TO INTELLIGENCE

a. Counterintelligence, like intelligence, depends in large measure upon numerous and diversified

agencies and methods for the collection of information. Many of these agencies are the same as those employed for intelligence purposes.

b. Another comparison between counterintelligence and intelligence is the interest of the two in enemy order of battle. Although the degree of interest is mutual, their approach to the subject is made from two distinctly different points of view. Intelligence is concerned with the manner in which the enemy has organized and disposed his *military* forces for the conduct of *military* operations. Counterintelligence is concerned with the organization, strength, doctrine, techniques, efficiency, and capabilities of all enemy and unfriendly *intelligence*, *counterintelligence*, and *subversive* services and agencies.

c. An additional similarity is found in the great dependence which is placed upon tactical and service troops by both counterintelligence and intelligence. Tactical and service units are employed in collecting information regarding the enemy for intelligence purposes, and in the simultaneous enforcement of security measures in order to satisfy counterintelligence requirements.

126. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHANNELS

a. Normally, counterintelligence information and reports are transmitted through G-2 channels following the chain of command except where special directives indicate different procedures. In all cases where the time element is vital, direct communication between counterintelligence units and detachments is authorized. Such communication

will be reported promptly to the G-2 of the command or technical service concerned.

b. Periodic intelligence reports usually contain a section devoted to counterintelligence matters. All counterintelligence directives are issued in the name of the commander and are distributed through either command or G-2 channels, depending upon the nature of the directive.

127. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DUTIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

a. The intelligence officer, in cooperation with other staff officers, is responsible to the commander for the formulation of counterintelligence plans and policies in consonance with those of higher headquarters, and for staff supervision of the execution of such plans and policies by units and agencies within the command. At division and higher headquarters specially qualified personnel will be assigned to assist the intelligence officer in this function.

b. The duties of the intelligence officer with respect to counterintelligence usually include—

- (1) The planning and execution, through intelligence and other military and civil agencies, of all active and passive measures designed to preserve secrecy and to neutralize or destroy the effectiveness of hostile intelligence.
- (2) The planning, in coordination with other staff sections, of methods and procedures for deceiving the enemy; and the conduct of

counterintelligence phases of such operations.

- (3) Assistance in the conduct of counterpropaganda activities.
- (4) The coordination with counterintelligence agencies in the conduct of such investigations as may be necessary. The investigations are conducted by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, and in some instances by other military or civil investigative agencies. They include background investigations of military and civilian personnel, citizens, and aliens to determine their reliability as to security, and complaint investigations when sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, subversion, or disaffection are suspected.
- (5) The imposition of such military and civil censorship restrictions as circumstances may require.

128. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS PERSONNEL

(T/O & E 30-500)

a. Division.

- (1) Military personnel engaged exclusively on counterintelligence duties at division are selected, thoroughly screened, and technically trained commissioned and enlisted personnel organized into detachments of varying size. These detachments are attached to divisions for the execution of counterespionage, countersabotage, and

countersubversive missions. The commanding officer of a CIC detachment is responsible for the planning, supervision, direction, and control of the investigative activities of his detachment personnel, basing his action on the counterintelligence mission of the command (SR 380-310-1). Each detachment is provided with organic transportation and technical equipment.

- (2) A division will normally have attached one administrative and headquarters detachment and one operations detachment (fig. 2).
- (3) No Counterintelligence staff officer is assigned to a division staff; therefore, the counterintelligence staff duties at divisions may be performed by the senior CIC detachment officer.
- (4) CIC detachments may be made administratively self-sufficient by the addition thereto of mess and motor maintenance personnel also provided for in T/O & E 30-500.
- (5) Detachments are numerically designated, for example "470th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment," in order issued by The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, at the time of activation.

b. Uniform and Credentials.

- (1) Uniform regulations for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are issued by the Department of the Army or theater headquarters. Considerable latitude in dress is normally given to Counter Intelligence

Corps detachments because of the nature of their duties, however, personnel of tactical Counter Intelligence Corps detachments normally wear the uniform prescribed for combat troops.

- (2) Appropriate credentials are issued to Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. Such credentials are honored whenever presented, and authorize the bearer to accomplish his official duties without interference from military police and similar authorities. Normally, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel with tactical detachments will wear the military uniform with metal United States insignia and without insignia of rank.

129. COLLECTING AGENCIES

It has been pointed out in paragraph 125 that many of the same collecting agencies are used in the intelligence and counterintelligence processes. Of those which serve in the dual capacity, the following are listed to indicate their usefulness to an intelligence officer in accomplishing his counterintelligence missions.

a. Interrogators. Prisoners often provide excellent sources of information concerning the extent of the enemy's knowledge regarding our true situation and capabilities, together with indications as to the manner in which such information was obtained. Some prisoners can furnish information, from time to time, on enemy intelligence personnel whose char-

acteristics and whereabouts are of interest to counterintelligence.

b. Interpreters and Translators. When counterintelligence specialists lack the appropriate linguistic abilities with which to obtain information from inhabitants of the area of operations, the interpreter detachment can provide valuable assistance. Translators are of value in making preliminary translations of enemy intelligence documents and other papers which have been captured or otherwise acquired.

c. Air Photo Interpreters. Air photo interpreters are used extensively in accurately locating counterintelligence targets in enemy-held territory. Such installations as spy schools, sabotage supply points, intelligence communications centers, and related targets can be effectively bombed from the air through information obtained from captured secret agents and verified by air photos.

d. Army Security Agency (ASA). The communication intelligence and communication security functions performed by communication reconnaissance field units of higher headquarters and the communication reconnaissance liaison team at division assist counterintelligence. Such duties as the security monitoring of friendly radio and wire communications, locating clandestine transmitters, and intercepting enemy intelligence communications are among the major contributions which they make toward the counterintelligence effort.

e. Antiaircraft Units. The air warning service operated by the antiaircraft artillery provides radar and related surveillance against enemy aircraft

which may be the means by which secret agents and equipment are introduced into areas under our control.

f. Military Police Units. Military police units and personnel of the Criminal Investigation Division often acquire information of considerable counter-intelligence value.

g. Technical Service Intelligence Detachments (TSID). Certain of these detachments provide advice regarding the characteristics and capabilities of enemy sabotage devices, signal communication equipment, and similiar technical matters.

h. Air Weather Service. Weather forecasts assist in determining those periods when time, light, and weather will best serve the interests of enemy clandestine operations, especially the movement by air, land, or sea, of spies and saboteurs.

130. RELATIONS WITH MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Of necessity a considerable number of security measures will apply directly to the civil population. The security control of the civil population is a command responsibility normally exercised through the agencies of military government-civil affairs which operate in close coordination with Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. In general, all regulations are issued by military government authorities in the form of proclamations, laws, ordinances, and other enactments which are enforced by military and civil police and other agencies. Wherever practicable, military government detachments will serve as the channel for counterintelligence dealings with the

civil population. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel may deal directly with civilians if circumstances so dictate and provided their procedures conform with Military Government policies. In any case, a close relationship must always be maintained between counterintelligence detachments and military government detachments. A fundamental counterintelligence principle which must never be ignored is that *the security of military interests will take full priority over the welfare and convenience of the civil population in zones of military operations.*

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

131. TYPES OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

a. In a theater of operations, the theater commander issues counterintelligence directives for all subordinate echelons of command. Such directives also form the basis upon which the operational employment of counterintelligence detachments is determined. The specific duties and responsibilities of counterintelligence detachments will not be precisely the same in all theaters, or closely parallel in any two. In general, however, all theater counterintelligence operations fall normally within five general categories:

- (1) Military security.
- (2) Civil security.
- (3) Port, frontier, and travel security.
- (4) Censorship.
- (5) Special operations.

b. Many of the specific functions listed under each type of operation in the following paragraphs will seldom be encountered at division or lower unit echelons. However, division and lower unit intelligence officers should be familiar with all types of counterintelligence operations should they be required to implement them from time to time.

132. MILITARY SECURITY

Military security is protection that results from measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. It includes those counterintelligence measures within or directly pertaining to the armed forces and to specific military operations. Examples are—

- a.* Secrecy discipline.
- b.* Special safeguarding of classified military information and equipment.
- c.* Communication security.
- d.* Security of troop movements.
- e.* Security control of accredited correspondents.
- f.* Special handling of evaders and escapers.
- g.* Base and unit censorship.
- h.* Countersubversion within the armed forces.
- i.* Countersabotage.
- j.* Concealment.
- k.* Counterreconnaissance.
- l.* Counterintelligence control of prohibited areas.
- m.* Special handling of prisoners of war.
- n.* Security control of friendly secret agents.

o. Security control of all relations with resistance groups operating in enemy territory.

p. Tactical measures, as required, in combat areas.

133. CIVIL SECURITY

Civil security encompasses those counterintelligence measures affecting the nonmilitary nationals of belligerent and nonbelligerent states permanently or temporarily residing under command jurisdiction. Such measures include the following:

a. Systematic registration of civilians including neutrals and enemy aliens.

b. Control of circulation.

c. Curfew.

d. Censorship.

e. Suspect political groups.

f. Security screening of labor.

g. Passes and permits.

h. Radio and wire communication monitoring.

i. Security control of immigration.

j. International commerce, especially controls over trade with neutral states.

k. Neutral diplomatic and consular officials and staffs.

l. Security responsibilities of special police agencies.

m. Counterintelligence functions of civilian defense agencies.

n. Restricted areas.

o. Interrogation and detention centers.

p. Refugees and displaced persons.

q. Counterpropaganda, civil population.

r. Shop safety and protection.

134. PORT, FRONTIER, AND TRAVEL SECURITY

Port, frontier, and travel security consists of the special application of military and civil security measures to the counterintelligence control of airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, coast lines, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of a theater of operations. Examples are—

- a.* Security control of seaports.
- b.* Security control of airports.
- c.* Establishment of frontier crossing points.
- d.* Jurisdictional responsibilities of Army, Navy, Air, and civil authorities.
- e.* Security control of merchant seamen and crews of commercial aircraft.
- f.* Coast line and land-frontier patrols.
- g.* Military travel permit system.
- h.* Security screening and control of frontaliers (legal daily frontier crossers).
- i.* Landing, shore-leave, and fishing permits.
- j.* Countersabotage in yards, docks, and port installations and equipment.

135. CENSORSHIP

Censorship is surveillance over communications, such as correspondence, telegrams, news dispatches, motion pictures, and radio broadcasts to prevent information of military value from reaching the enemy. It is accomplished by the systematic channelization and technical examination of all communications, other than official matter. Byproducts of censorship operations will be the detection of illicit hostile

activities and the collection of information for intelligence purposes (FM 30-28, TM 30-235, and TM 30-236).

136. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations include the specialized employment of active counterintelligence techniques and procedures in the conduct of secret operations against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities. Examples of these operations are—

- a.* Radar surveillance against parachutists and other clandestine landings.
- b.* Communication intelligence and communication security monitoring operations.
- c.* Intelligence security.
- d.* Compilation and appropriate dissemination of counterintelligence target data.
- e.* Deployment and operation of special counterintelligence units.
- f.* Operation of special interrogation centers for processing captured enemy agents.
- g.* Deceptive measures and offensive counterintelligence operations as required.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES

137. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The formulation of an estimate of enemy intelligence capabilities is a primary and continuing responsibility of the senior counterintelligence officer at all echelons. To serve its purpose the estimate must be based on a broad and thorough knowledge

of the organization, training, equipment, doctrine, techniques, order of battle, and deployment of all enemy overt and covert intelligence services and agencies; and a critical analysis of our own deficiencies in the field of counterintelligence. The counterintelligence estimate is a thorough examination of the *enemy* intelligence measures which will affect the accomplishment of our mission. This will reveal deficiencies which must be corrected, and measures to be taken to prevent the success of the enemy intelligence effort. The regular form for the intelligence estimate (par. 45), with slight modifications, is suitable for the counterintelligence estimate. In formulating paragraph 2 of the estimate, consideration is given to enemy intelligence and subversive capabilities in the order listed:

a. Collection of Information.

(1) *Overt methods.*

- (a) Reconnaissance, ground and air, including photo.
- (b) Communication intelligence.
- (c) Prisoners of war, deserters, and refugees.
- (d) Captured documents, including maps, orders, and letters.
- (e) Interception of radio and television broadcasts.
- (f) Interrogation of captured secret agents.

(2) *Covert methods.* Espionage, all types.

b. Sabotage.

- (1) Military.
- (2) Political.
- (3) Economic and industrial.

c. Guerilla Warfare.

(1) Semimilitary operations.

(2) Minor armed uprisings.

d. Underground.

(1) Political and refugee.

(2) Escape and evasion.

(3) Criminal.

e. Assassination and Abduction.

(1) Military and political leaders.

(2) Personnel performing critical duties.

f. Unfriendly Nations. Miscellaneous activities.

g. Analysis of our own and allied counterintelligence deficiencies.

138. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK SHEET

Upon completion of the counterintelligence estimate, the necessary counterintelligence measures and operations—according to category—are set forth in the manner prescribed in the counterintelligence work sheet (see fig. 16). When the work sheet is completed the counterintelligence plan is ready to be drafted. The work sheet is not disseminated.

139. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

The counterintelligence plan is prepared as an appendix of the intelligence annex to the operation order. Its contents are as detailed as the situation demands. Standing operating procedure is not repeated in the plan, except for emphasis. When a counterintelligence plan is not published, counterintelligence instructions are included in paragraph 6 of the intelligence annex.

(1) References (pertinent orders, annexes, map and overlay references, standing operating procedure, and similar material)			(5) Agencies responsible for execution of counterintelligence measures							(6) Instructions regarding entries in columns (4) and (5), and notes for future action
(2) Phases or periods of the operation	(3) Classes of counterintelligence activities involved	(4) Counterintelligence measures to be adopted	Enter in each subcolumn							
			the designation of the	staff section, separate	headquarters, or unit	concerned with carry-	ing out the measures	shown in column (4).		
Enter the phase or period for which a counterintelligence plan is prepared;	List the classes of counterintelligence activities engaged in, such as military	Describe the measures to be employed within the class or classes of counter-	Enter in each subcolumn an (X) opposite the measure to be adopted in column (4) and under the agency or							Enter detailed comments on the methods to be employed, or any other pertinent data

e. g., D-20 to D-5.	security, or civil security.	intelligence activity listed in column (3). Lists of typical measures are given in paragraphs 132 to 136 inclusive.	agencies selected to execute the measure.	pertaining to the entries in columns (4) and (5).
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Figure 16. Suggested form for counterintelligence work sheet.

140. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

Generally, certain counterintelligence measures within military units, except those falling within the category of special operations, may be reduced to standing operating procedure (SOP) and will not normally be repeated in operation orders or other publications.

CHAPTER 11

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY

Section I. INTRODUCTION

141. THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

a. Communication intelligence and communication security functions are performed by Army Security Agency (ASA) personnel organized into a communication reconnaissance group to support each army. Assigned to the group are communication reconnaissance battalions (each consisting of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, communication reconnaissance company, security, and a communication reconnaissance company, intelligence) normally attached to Corps (T/O & E 32-500).

b. Normally, at division, Army Security Agency support consists of a communication reconnaissance liaison team, part of the headquarters and headquarters detachment, communication reconnaissance battalion at Corps (par. 17). The team may be augmented when necessary by assigning or attaching appropriate teams from communication reconnaissance units at higher headquarters.

c. With the exception of communication reconnaissance liaison teams, communication intelligence and communication security units are not ordinarily attached or assigned at echelons lower than corps.

However, monitoring, direction-finder, and intercept teams from corps Army Security Agency units may habitually operate well forward in the division area. Results of their operations are available to divisions and lower units through the communication reconnaissance liaison team at division. Communication intelligence produced by communication reconnaissance units for consumption at division level will be disseminated through special intelligence channels to the division G-2.

142. FUNCTIONS OF COMMUNICATION RECONNAISSANCE UNITS

a. Liaison units perform communication intelligence security planning and coordination within a command.

b. Communication intelligence units produce communication intelligence by interception, position finding, and analysis of enemy radio and wire signal communication.

c. Communication security units monitor friendly communication systems, from the security standpoint. They prepare reports on the degree of security practiced by the various communication centers and nets of friendly units within an assigned area and make recommendations for improvement of communication security.

d. The communication reconnaissance liaison team at division assists the G-2 by performing such of the following duties as are applicable:

- (1) Participating in the preparation of intelligence and counterintelligence plans by—

- (a) Anticipating communication security requirements and making appropriate recommendations.
 - (b) Advising G-2 on the capabilities and limitations of communication reconnaissance units under specific conditions and requesting missions that insure their employment to maximum advantage for the division.
- (2) Supervising the operations of such communication reconnaissance teams with which it may be augmented and insuring that they accomplish their assigned missions and operate in close technical coordination with similar units at the next higher echelon.
 - (3) Interpreting regulations and advising G-2 and the division signal officer on the application of principles pertaining to communication security.
 - (4) Providing technical assistance to the division signal officer in the preparation of those parts of the signal operations instructions which relate to communication security.
 - (5) Visiting communication centers periodically to inspect their communication security practices.
 - (6) Making specific recommendations for the improvement of communication security throughout the command based on the findings of communication security units and communication center inspectors.

143. DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

a. The division G-2 includes the communication intelligence and communication security requirements of the division in his intelligence and counter-intelligence plans. To the communication reconnaissance units attached or assigned to the division he prescribes missions which are in keeping with their special capabilities. The communication reconnaissance liaison detachment must, at all times, know the current tactical situation, and be supplied with all collateral information that may be of assistance in the conduct of operations. G-2 evaluates the information furnished by the communication reconnaissance units serving his headquarters and available from higher headquarters, along with information collected by other agencies. Communication intelligence is used in accordance with specific instructions issued by higher echelons.

b. Division and lower unit intelligence officers employ the data collected by communication security units to maintain and improve the security of their organizations, particularly signal communications, and to estimate the amount and type of information that may have fallen into enemy hands as a result of the insecure use of signal communications. The intelligence officer's evaluation of the probable effect of a serious breach of communication security may cause the commander to change his course of action.

Section II. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

144. GENERAL

a. Communication intelligence is derived from the study of intercepted enemy communications. Specifically, it includes a study of—

- (1) Intercepted electrical communications (and associated procedure transmissions), together with captured written communications to which communication security measures have been applied.
- (2) Visual and sound signals.
- (3) Enemy cryptologic material, including documents.
- (4) Reports of interrogations of prisoners of war on the above subjects.

b. Communication intelligence techniques of primary interest to the intelligence officers of divisions and lower units are interception, radio position-finding, and traffic analysis.

145. INTERCEPTION

Interception is the foundation of the communication intelligence effort. The practicability of interception varies with the means of communication employed by the enemy. In modern tactical operations, control is exercised by the commander primarily through electrical means of signal communication and these are the means that are most vulnerable to interception. Of the electrical means of signal communication, radio is by far the most

prolific source of communication intelligence. Wire communication is of secondary importance.

a. Radio. Intercepted material falls into three general classes:

- (1) Plain text messages the majority of which contain only unclassified information. Sometimes through error, or because of the pressure of a tactical situation, the enemy transmits classified information in the clear. When such information is intercepted, it is translated and forwarded to the intelligence officer in the shortest practicable time because it ordinarily requires immediate action to be of value.
- (2) Crypto-communications, which must be cryptanalyzed and translated before their full value can be realized.
- (3) Communication procedural transmissions, which are valuable in the production of intelligence by traffic analysis.

b. Wire. While relatively less vulnerable than radio, enemy wire communication is susceptible to communication intelligence measures. With some types of wire lines, physical tapping may not be necessary because interception can be accomplished by electric induction. Regardless of enemy safeguards, wire lines of normal length are potential sources of information.

146. RADIO POSITION FINDING

Radio position finding enables the approximate location of enemy military headquarters to be deter-

mined by establishing the positions of the radio transmitters which serve them. In moving tactical situations the data obtained by radio position finding is particularly valuable in keeping enemy order of battle up to date. Position finding is most effectively performed in close coordination with interception and traffic analysis.

147. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

Traffic analysis is employed to reconstruct enemy communication networks. This information in turn provides extensive order of battle information because communication networks are based on command channels. Detailed information on the fundamentals of traffic analysis is contained in TM 32-250.

148. CATEGORIES OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

There are two major categories into which most communication intelligence falls:

a. Technical. Information relating to the communication security procedures and material employed by the enemy comprises the technical category. Usually it is not of direct interest to the combat intelligence officer.

b. Nontechnical. The nontechnical category is comprised of information relating to enemy tactics and strategy which his communication security measures have been invented to protect. This information is of direct interest to the combat intelligence officer and includes data on—

- (1) The organization of enemy communication networks.

- (2) The geographical locations of enemy radio transmitters.
- (3) The organization, equipment, strength, identity, and disposition of enemy forces.
- (4) Enemy orders, reports, and plans.
- (5) Movements of enemy units and personnel.
- (6) Indications of impending action and other information of tactical and strategic value.

Section III. COMMUNICATION SECURITY

149. GENERAL

a. Communication security is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny to unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from communications. In general, the primary means used will be that which combines the greatest facility and speed of installation and operation with the required secrecy and dependability. Since all agencies and means are subject to enemy interception, protective measures must be taken to keep the information gained by the enemy to a minimum.

b. The components of communication security are cryptosecurity, transmission security, and physical security.

150. CRYPTOSECURITY

a. General. Cryptosecurity results from the provision of technically sound cryptographic systems and their proper use. Authorized codes and ciphers, when properly used, are adequate to provide security

against enemy intelligence. AR 380-5 sets forth the basic rules governing the use of cryptographic systems. In addition, each code or cipher system is accompanied by instructions which apply specifically to that system. No person will attempt to use any cryptographic system until he is thoroughly familiar with both the general and the specific instructions.

b. Cryptograms. A cryptogram is the encrypted version of the literal plain text of a communication. The resulting communication is written in unintelligible text or in language which conveys a hidden meaning. The information contained in a cryptogram, and not the cryptographic text itself, is assigned a security classification. Therefore, once a message has been encrypted, there should be no plain-language indication on the face of the message of its security classification.

e. Use of Cryptograms.

- (1) All classified messages which are to be transmitted by electrical means or by other means where danger of enemy or unauthorized interception exists will be encrypted, except in the following situations in which it may be most expedient to transmit messages in the clear:

- (a) *Tactical operations.* When classified information, if intercepted by the enemy, cannot be acted upon in time to influence the situation, and time cannot be spared for encrypting, the commanding officer or his authorized representative may order the transmission of a message in plain language. Such written messages will be

marked "send in clear" over the signature of the commander or his authorized representatives.

- (b) *Small units.* Commanders of units smaller than a division may authorize the normal transmission in clear text of messages which are to be acted upon immediately in rapidly moving situations.
- (2) TOP SECRET messages will never, under any circumstances, be transmitted by electrical means in the clear.

d. Messages To Be Encrypted. Special care should be taken to see that messages which are to be encrypted are kept brief and clear. Unnecessary length taxes encrypting personnel and facilities, results in delays, increases probability of errors in transmission and encrypting, and increases the ability of the enemy to solve the message.

- (1) Messages will be shortened by the deletion of unnecessary words.
- (2) The message writer will spell out, either in full or abbreviated form, punctuation marks to be included in the message. Numbers will be spelled out in full.
- (3) Authorized abbreviations should be used whenever practicable (SR 320-50-1).
- (4) Addresses and signatures within classified messages will be reduced to a minimum.

151. TRANSMISSION SECURITY

Transmission security results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and traffic analysis.

a. Radio. Radio is the quickest means of establishing communication and, with certain tactical units, the only practicable means. It is, however, the least secure because radio is more vulnerable to enemy interception than any other means of transmission. The mere fact that a radio station is on the air is a source of information to the enemy. The extensive use of intercept stations and direction-finders enables the enemy to record virtually all important transmissions that are made and to locate the positions of the radio stations concerned. This gives him an opportunity to follow troop movements and to learn the identity, strength, plan, or tactical disposition of a military force. It must be presumed that *enemy interception takes place every time a transmitter is placed in operation.*

- (1) *Training.* The fact that radio is the least secure of the means used for transmitting messages makes it necessary that every operator receive a thorough course in radio procedure as part of his training for the operation of Army radios.
- (2) *Discipline.* Radio transmission security embodies the maintenance of circuit discipline and the suppression of all superfluous transmissions. Lack of discipline, improper training, as well as negligence, inaccuracy, and laxity, are responsible for the violations which constitute the dangers to security.

b. Wire. A wire system includes all means of communication utilizing wire lines, such as telephone, telegraph, and teletypewriter. Standardiza-

tion in installation, maintenance, and operation of wire systems is necessary to insure efficient and reliable wire communication.

- (1) *Land-line interception.* All known methods of electrical communication are liable to interception. Wire communication, however, offers greater security than radio and should, if practicable, be used in preference to radio when security is the major factor in the transmission of a classified message. Despite its greater security, messages transmitted by wire can be intercepted by physical and inductive tapping. Physical taps can be detected, but interception by induction can completely escape detection.
- (2) *Cable interception.* Underwater cable is less vulnerable to interception than land lines, and such interception requires even greater technical knowledge and equipment. In most cases, the interception of cable messages requires the use of ships at sea; and success is reduced because of the hazards of weather and the danger of detection by air and naval patrols.

c. Authentication. If all messages could be handed personally to the addressee by the originator, there would be no need for authentication. In the absence of personal identification, however, some reliable system of authentication is necessary

- (1) *Types of authentication.* The two principal types of authentication are message authentication and station authentication.

The term "station authentication" includes both radio net and telephone authentication.

- (2) *Message authentications.* Telephone system users, communication center personnel, and station (radio, visual, or wire) operating personnel are the personnel directly concerned with authentication. When a communication center is involved, a clerk at the originating headquarters authenticates outgoing messages. At the receiving headquarters the authentication is checked by the receiving clerk. When a communication center is not involved in the transmission of a message, the originator authenticates the message and the addressee checks the authentication.
- (3) *Station authentication.* Station authentication is performed by the operators except in the case of telephone conversations, where both the calling and called parties exchange authentication directly before proceeding.
- (4) *When to authenticate.* The commanding officer is responsible for authentication, and determines when it will be used within his unit. Authentication is particularly important when—
 - (a) Instructions are issued to open or close a radio or wire system.
 - (b) A radio net is opened.
 - (c) A station reports into a radio net.
 - (d) Messages are transmitted in the clear.
 - (e) An extremely important message is transmitted.

- (f) Instructions contained in communications appear to rescind, change, or conflict with previous orders.
- (g) Instructions are issued to change radio frequencies and when initial station contact is made after such change.
- (h) Radio traffic is transmitted to silent stations.
- (i) Enemy activity is suspected in a radio or wire system.
- (j) Radio silence is directed or lifted.
- (5) *Misleading messages.* Misleading messages may be originated by the enemy for transmission by radio and other means of communication, and authentication should be required for any message that arouses suspicion.
- (6) *Training.* Authentication involves only a negligible delay when personnel are well trained for its use. For that reason and in order to impress personnel with the importance of authentication, messages and operating conditions simulating contingencies listed above should be introduced as soon as practicable after the beginning of the unit training period.

d. Friendly Traffic Analysis. Traffic analysis is performed on friendly radio communications to determine how much intelligence can be gleaned by the enemy from a study of the volume and direction of our traffic flow, and from the external characteristics of messages such as calls, precedences, and group counts. Over a given circuit it can be as-

sumed that the enemy records and interprets the number of messages handled. Friendly traffic analysis shows how important military activities are revealed by unusual traffic patterns, and it furnishes the data necessary for instituting an effective program of countermeasures. It is not the aim of a traffic security program to distribute message traffic in such a manner that there is an artificially uniform flow of traffic. It is desirable, however, that message traffic on a given circuit follow an established pattern, avoiding deviations in volume and direction which might inform the enemy of impending tactical operations.

152. PHYSICAL SECURITY

a. Physical security results from all measures necessary to safeguard classified communication equipment and material from access thereto by unauthorized persons.

b. From production to destruction classified communication documents and material must be safeguarded from physical compromise which can occur in two ways: by outright loss and by exposure to examination by the enemy or by other unauthorized persons.

c. Under ordinary conditions physical loss is prevented by the observance of established requirements for the transmission, handling, storage, and routine disposition of classified matter. Detailed regulations for the distributing and accounting of registered cryptomaterial are contained in TM 32-225. When capture is imminent, physical compromise of classified communication material ordi-

narily can be prevented by the prompt and thorough execution of emergency destruction plans which have been prepared well in advance of the occasion and regularly rehearsed by the personnel who are in charge of the material.

153. COMMUNICATION SECURITY PERSONNEL

a. Cryptographic Security Officer. A cryptographic security officer will be designated at each headquarters using cryptographic systems. In general, he supervises compliance with procedures necessary for the physical and cryptographic security of documents and devices, and acts as custodian for such documents and devices.

b. Cryptographic Personnel. Personnel who handle classified cryptographic matter must be thoroughly trustworthy. They must be well trained and efficient, and aware of the dangers to security of carelessness, negligence, and loose talk. Cryptographic personnel report every violation observed in incoming traffic to the cryptographic security officer, who in turn reports it to the office of record for the cryptographic system used. When reporting such violations, personnel should have it impressed upon them that they are not "turning someone in." Violation reports are not designed to be punitive; they are intended to correct bad habits and to clarify instructions. Since the rules and instructions pertaining to the subject of cryptographic security are complicated, personnel violating security endanger communication in a way that is difficult to amend. Proper correction is effected only through full cooperation of all personnel concerned.

CHAPTER 12

TRAINING AND STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

Section I. TRAINING

154. PURPOSE

The purpose of intelligence training is to insure efficient performance of intelligence duties by every officer and enlisted man.

155. SCOPE

Intelligence specialist training in all echelons of command will include appropriate instruction in the collection, recording, evaluation, and interpretation of information of the enemy and the terrain; in the dissemination and use of combat intelligence; in assisting the commander to direct the intelligence effort; and in counterintelligence. However, training in intelligence will not be restricted to personnel assigned to the intelligence sections of various headquarters. Appropriate instruction in this subject will be given to all officers and enlisted men because all military personnel have combat intelligence responsibilities. Personnel assigned to intelligence duties will be given additional and more thorough instruction appropriate to their assignment.

156. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The Commander. Intelligence is produced for the commander, and he should understand his need for intelligence. Training in this field is his responsibility. He will insure that all officers and enlisted men have an understanding of their intelligence duties. In battalions and larger organizations, he is assisted in carrying out this responsibility by an intelligence officer.

b. The Intelligence Officer

- (1) The responsibility of the intelligence officer for the training of his section must be emphasized. If his own section thoroughly understands the practical application of intelligence techniques and theories and is imbued with a spirit of cooperation, he will have laid a sound foundation for efficient intelligence operations within the unit. He will have gained not only the respect of the lower intelligence sections, but also a desire by them to acquire and furnish him with all possible information of the enemy.
- (2) The intelligence officer in coordination with the operations officer is also responsible for supervising the training of intelligence sections of all subordinate echelons. He prepares the intelligence training program, conducts intelligence schools, makes staff visits, observes intelligence training, conducts tests, and assists the lower units in obtaining training aids and instructors who are specialists in certain fields.

c. Relationship With the Operations Officer. Close cooperation and coordination must exist between the intelligence and operations officers in the training phase just as in the operational phase. The operations officer is charged with the staff responsibility for all training, but it is the intelligence officer who prepares the intelligence part of the unit training program and who supervises its execution. He informs the operations officer of the amount of time needed for intelligence training and of requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors; then in collaboration they work out the details. The close relationship between the intelligence and operations officers in accomplishing the training mission does not end with the publication of the formal training program. If the intelligence officer understands the entire training program and is earnestly cooperating with the operations officer, he can provide much intelligence training that is not specifically reflected in the training program. Such training is conducted concurrently with other types of training (par. 160). If properly planned and executed, it will enhance the value of the other training. Its success will largely depend upon the imagination and ingenuity of the intelligence officer. A few of the many ways in which this sort of training can be carried out are—

- (1) To prepare and submit route sketches and reports of observations in connection with road marches.
- (2) To submit messages concerning the "enemy" during squad, platoon, and other combat exercises.

- (3) To have terrain studies prepared for the operations officer in order to assist him in his preparation of terrain exercises.
- (4) To act as the "enemy" in field exercises, and to report on what was observed.

157. CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL TO BE TRAINED

Although all personnel receive training in intelligence, for the purpose of scheduling and conducting training it is convenient to divide them into three groups:

- a.* Intelligence section personnel.
- b.* Reconnaissance units and special information services.
- c.* All other personnel.

158. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE SECTION PERSONNEL

a. The training program for intelligence section personnel will include the following subjects:

- (1) Intelligence agencies (their organization, functions, capabilities, and limitations).
- (2) Description of sources.
- (3) Methods of collection and transmission of information.
- (4) Recording and filing information, to include preparing overlays and posting situation maps.
- (5) Examination of personnel, documents, and captured matériel.
- (6) In war, the enemy armed forces; in peace, the maneuver enemy (pars. 122 and 163).

- (7) Counterintelligence and security measures.
- (8) Theory and practice of observation.
- (9) Military sketching, map reading, and air photo reading.

b. In addition, officers and selected enlisted personnel will be trained in such subjects as the following to the extent required by their duties:

- (1) Evaluation of information.
- (2) Interpretation of information.
- (3) Estimate of the enemy situation.
- (4) Determination of enemy capabilities.
- (5) Dissemination of information and intelligence.
- (6) Capabilities and limitations of ground and air reconnaissance and air photo interpretation.
- (7) Terrain evaluation.
- (8) Order of battle analysis.
- (9) Intelligence specialist teams (their organization, functions, capabilities, and limitations).
- (10) Intelligence and counterintelligence planning.
- (11) Intelligence standing operating procedure.

159. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING OF RECONNAISSANCE UNITS AND SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICES

The reconnaissance battalion and company, the intelligence and reconnaissance platoons of the infantry regiments, the reconnaissance section of engineer combat battalions, the artillery reconnaissance

agencies, and the reconnaissance platoon of the tank and armored infantry battalions, as well as special information services (par. 33), must be given specialized training in their appropriate duties. These duties are covered in detail in appropriate field manuals.

160. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING OF ALL OTHER PERSONNEL

a. Each soldier is a potential information collecting agent and therefore must be trained in collecting and reporting information. He should be able to report on such things as enemy attitude, defensive or offensive; fire received; obstacles, natural and artificial; and terrain, including cover, concealment, and trafficability. Reports are limited only by the inability of the soldier to *see*, *think*, and *remember*. The combat front-line soldier is the foundation of information collecting. Since our military personnel are a potential source of information to the enemy, instruction must also be given in counterintelligence and defense against enemy propaganda.

b. All officers and enlisted men in a division receive training in the following:

(1) *Intelligence subjects.*

- (a) Scope and purpose of combat intelligence.
- (b) Secrecy discipline.
- (c) Defense against enemy propaganda.
- (d) Collecting and reporting information.

- (e) Observation.
 - (f) Handling prisoners of war, enemy deserters, civilians, escapers and evaders, and captured documents.
 - (g) Safeguarding of captured supplies and equipment.
 - (h) Use of countersigns.
 - (i) Shelling reports.
 - (j) Enemy identifications (uniforms, mechanized vehicles, and aircraft).
 - (k) Use of enemy weapons.
 - (l) Counterintelligence.
 - (m) Characteristics of the enemy armed forces.
- (2) *Related subjects.*
- (a) Message writing. This includes training in the objective reporting of facts, rather than subjective reporting of the individual's interpretation of facts.
 - (b) Map and air photo reading, and use of the compass.
 - (c) United States Army organization.
 - (d) Camouflage.

161. METHODS OF INSTRUCTION

a. The methods of instruction prescribed by FM 21-5, Military Training, are applicable to intelligence training. The principles of preparation, explanation, demonstration, application, examination, and discussion may be followed throughout.

b. Specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralized instruction.

c. When the division is assembled as a unit or its various elements are in close proximity to each other, a division intelligence school should be established by the division intelligence officer. This school will include instruction for all officers and selected non-commissioned officers of the division assigned to intelligence duties. It will include subjects listed in paragraph 158.

d. Subsequent to the division school, subordinate units of the division should conduct intelligence schools. The objective of these schools is to train the regularly assigned intelligence personnel and selected men from battalions and companies. These schools are conducted by the intelligence officers of the various units with the assistance and under the supervision of the division intelligence officer. Students in the division school should instruct in the lower unit schools. The course is practical as well as theoretical. Tests for proficiency include a practical demonstration of ability to perform the various duties of the intelligence section.

e. A system of schools within the division enables the intelligence officer to establish standard practices throughout the command. It also promotes understanding, confidence, and cooperation between all intelligence officers of the command.

f. Training is not concluded with the completion of the divisional and subordinate intelligence schools, but continues and is perfected by repetition. During periods of relief from active operations, opportunity should be taken to correct deficiencies and complete the training of replacements.

162. CREATING INTELLIGENCE CONSCIOUSNESS

a. In order to instill in every soldier and officer an appreciation for his intelligence obligations, the intelligence officer will create and maintain intelligence consciousness throughout the organization. The manner in which this is accomplished depends to a large degree on the imagination and initiative of unit intelligence officers.

b. Intelligence training should be included in all types of field exercises and maneuvers, from squad problems to exercises involving the largest commands. A squad, in an exercise in which it is learning to maneuver, should find some "enemy" upon which it is expected to report accurately. Marches may have their monotony broken by sudden "attacks" or "enemy fire." "Documents" and "prisoners" may become an interesting and instructive part of field problems. Practically all troop training should involve some "enemy" activity upon which it is necessary to report. Not only will the prompt and accurate reporting of information become habitual with the troops, but zest will also be added to their training and they will become better fighting men.

163. MANEUVERS

a. The employment of aggressor forces in tactical exercises will permit realistic training in every aspect of combat intelligence, from the collection of information by reconnaissance units and other agencies to such specialized procedures as order of battle

(par. 122), interpretation of air photos, and exploitation of documents and prisoners of war. Further, it will help in making commanders, their staffs, and the troops always conscious of the enemy as a real and vital force to be reckoned with in every tactical plan and operation (FM 30-101, FM 30-102, FM 30-103, and FM 30-104).

b. Intelligence measures that may be employed in maneuvers include tactical (visual) and photographic air reconnaissance; ground reconnaissance (both by day and night) by combat elements; ground observation; surveillance of our own signal communications and the interception of "enemy" communications; supervision in all units of measures for the safeguarding of military information; use of camouflage and camouflage discipline; restrictions on the use of lights; identification of aircraft; preparation and distribution of air photos as supplements to maps; policies regarding maps to be used and map allowances; and the requisition and distribution of maps.

Section II. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

164. GENERAL

a. The purpose of standing operating procedure (SOP) is to reduce the number and length of orders that are issued. It establishes a regular procedure to be followed unless situations arise that call for specific orders or instructions. No fixed form for an intelligence SOP can be prescribed. Its content and scope will vary with the echelon of command, with the theater of operations, with the training

and experience of the unit, and with the enemy. In any event, certain salient points should be covered.

b. The intelligence officer is responsible for two SOPs: a general intelligence SOP for the command (which becomes the intelligence paragraph of the division SOP), and an SOP for his own section. The outline forms presented in the following paragraphs are suitable for a division.

165. OUTLINE FORM FOR INTELLIGENCE PARAGRAPH, DIVISION SOP

INTELLIGENCE

a. Reconnaissance and observation.

- (1) Air.
- (2) Ground.
 - (a) Patrols.
 - (b) Observation posts.
- (3) Radar units.
- (4) Engineers.
- (5) Air warning.
- (6) Information to be reported at once.
- (7) Combat propaganda.

b. Measures for handling personnel, documents, and matériel.

- (1) *Prisoners of war.*
 - (a) Initial interrogation.
 - (b) Searching.
 - (c) Segregation.
 - (d) Selected prisoners of war.
 - (e) Interrogation by prisoner of war specialists.
 - (f) Suspect civilians.
 - (g) Security of command posts.
- (2) *Documents.*
 - (a) Instructions to troops on necessity of turning in documents.
 - (b) Marking of documents.

b. Measures for handling personnel, documents, and matériel—Continued

(2) *Documents—Continued*

(c) Document searches.

(d) Responsibility of unit intelligence officers.

(e) Documents found on prisoners of war.

(3) *Matériel.*

(a) Particular items desired.

(b) Guarding and reporting.

(c) Souvenirs.

c. Maps and air photos.

(1) Requests for air photos.

(2) Requests for maps and other intelligence aids.

(3) Basis of map distribution.

(4) Distribution of air photos.

(5) Disposition of maps, air photos, and other intelligence aids upon relief of unit.

d. Counterintelligence.

(1) Security of information.

(2) Radio and radar silence.

(3) Communication security monitoring.

(4) Censorship.

(5) Compromise of countersign, parole, codes, or other classified matter.

(6) Camouflage, dispersion, and light discipline.

(7) Escapers and evaders.

e. Reports and distribution.

(1) Special reports.

(2) Routine reports.

(3) Spot reports.

(4) Contents of reports.

(5) Negative reports.

(6) Division reports to subordinate units.

(7) Reports from higher headquarters.

166. OUTLINE FORM FOR SOP, DIVISION G-2 SECTION

G-2 Section
(Headquarters)
(Date)

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE, G-2 SECTION

1. ORGANIZATION.
2. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES.
3. SHIFTS.
4. DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.
5. COLLECTION PLAN.
6. MISSIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS.
7. REQUESTS TO HIGHER AND ADJACENT HEAD-QUARTERS.
8. RECORDS AND FILES.
 - a. *Situation map.*
 - b. *Journal.*
 - c. *Work sheet.*
 - d. *Files.*
9. PRODUCTION.
 - a. *Summaries.*
 - b. *Estimates.*
 - c. *Terrain studies.*
 - d. *Annexes.*
10. DISSEMINATION.
 - a. *Own headquarters.*
 - b. *Subordinate units.*
 - c. *Adjacent units.*
 - d. *Higher headquarters.*
11. LIAISON.
12. PLANS.
13. WAR ROOM.
14. COMMAND POST MOVEMENT.
15. HEADQUARTERS AND G-2 SECTION SECURITY.
 - a. *Signal communication and communication security.*
 - b. *Security of information.*
 - c. *Visitors.*
 - d. *Security checks.*

16. MAPS, AIR PHOTOS, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS.
 - a. *Procurement.*
 - b. *Allocation.*
 - c. *Distribution and disposition.*
17. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS.
18. REPORTS.
 - a. *Spot (or immediate).*
 - b. *Periodic.*
 - c. *Order of battle.*
 - d. *Interrogation.*
 - e. *Air photo interpretation.*
 - f. *From higher and adjacent headquarters.*
19. AUXILIARY AGENCIES.
 - a. *Military Intelligence Service.*
 - b. *Technical service intelligence detachments.*
 - c. *Army Security Agency (Communication Reconnaissance Organization).*
20. COMBAT PROPAGANDA.
21. ESCAPERS AND EVADERS.
22. STAFF VISITS AND SUPERVISION.
23. COORDINATION WITH OTHER GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS.
24. TRAINING.
 - a. *Rotation of duties.*
 - b. *Advice and assistance to subordinate sections and auxiliary agencies.*
 - c. *Collaboration with higher headquarters sections.*

CHAPTER 13

PLANNING

Section I. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING METHODS

167. GENERAL

Like any other staff section, the intelligence section plans all activities for which it is responsible. Intelligence planning begins before the planning of other staff sections. Until an initial intelligence estimate had been presented, little organized and detailed operational planning can begin. Accordingly, intelligence planning will always provide for the information that will be necessary for the other staff sections to begin their planning. Throughout any operation the intelligence officer will be prepared to give an estimate for the next operation, or to revise the current estimate to meet changed conditions.

168. COORDINATION IN PLANNING

a. Only rarely can the intelligence officer conclude his actions by himself. Almost invariably, any plans he proposes, orders he recommends, or action he takes, require coordination with one or more staff officers or general or special staff sections. The importance of such coordination cannot be emphasized too strongly. An intelligence officer who fails to recognize where coordination is necessary is certain

to cause confusion and delay in his headquarters, with consequent confusion and possible failure in operations.

b. The following list indicates some of the staff coordination necessary in planning by the division intelligence officer:

Prisoners of war-----	G-1, provost marshal, G-4, surgeon.
Censorship-----	G-1, public information officer.
Use of combat troops for intelligence missions.	G-3.
Escort, supervision, and briefing of visitors.	G-3, public information officer, headquarters commandant.
Location and construction of observation posts.	G-3, engineer, artillery officer.
Examination of captured equipment.	G-4, special staff.
Needs for maps, air photos, and studies.	All.
Map procurement, storage, and distribution.	G-3, engineer officer.
Air reconnaissance, photo and visual.	G-3 Air, air liaison officer, artillery officer.
Communication security----	G-3, signal officer, Army Security Agency.
Civilian internees-----	G-1, provost marshal, civil affairs officer.
Intelligence training-----	G-3.
Psychological warfare-----	G-3, special staff (including psychological warfare officer, if present).
Procurement and replacement of intelligence specialists.	G-1.

169. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PHASES

Intelligence planning is a continuing process. Based on an analysis of planning tasks, periods can be established at the end of which certain aspects of the planning must be completed before the plan can be further developed. Division of the planning period into phases facilitates coordination between the staff sections engaged in planning. The sequence of intelligence planning phases is generally as follows:

a. Preliminary Phase (before the receipt of a specific operational mission). Before the completion of a current operation, and before the commander receives any directives or orders for further action, his staff must be considering what this further action is likely to be. This applies particularly to the intelligence officer, for when the commander receives a directive or warning for further action, the intelligence officer must have immediately available sufficient information for the commander to make preliminary estimates and decisions. This situation may also exist when a headquarters is organized or at the beginning of any war or campaign.

b. Initial Phase (from receipt of mission to commander's decision). When a unit receives a new mission, all available pertinent information of the enemy and the area of operations is furnished to the staff so that definite operational, administrative, and logistical planning may be initiated. The security measures contained in the unit standing operating procedure are reviewed to determine if they are adequate for the security of the planning

and the operations. A preliminary estimate is also prepared and presented at the initial staff conference. This preliminary phase of intelligence planning ends after the initial requests for additional information are made to other headquarters and agencies, and when essential data (including a preliminary estimate) and intelligence aids are made available to other staff sections.

c. General Planning Phase (from commander's decision to D-day, H-hour). This phase, which in effect begins the definite planning period, features the concurrent preparation of various plans and studies. The most important are—

- (1) Determination of the essential elements of information required to complete the planning phase.
- (2) Preparation of a counterintelligence plan for the security of the operation.
- (3) Completion of plans to obtain all necessary information not immediately available.
- (4) Preparation of a plan for securing and distributing intelligence aids. These aids include material such as charts and models of the area of operations, gridded maps, air photos and mosaics, air photo interpretation reports, sketches and diagrams, hydrographic charts, and intelligence summaries.
- (5) The intelligence estimate is prepared after careful evaluation and interpretation of all available information. Preliminary estimates, which are based on initial and subsequent assumptions and changes in the

known enemy and friendly situation, are made throughout the planning phase (App. II).

- (6) Determination of essential elements of information including those prepared earlier which are still applicable, and those which concern the operational phase.
- (7) Preparation of a collection plan based on the essential elements of information which were approved by the commander. This plan is used only by the intelligence section concerned in order to assign collection missions (pars. 71-73).
- (8) Preparation of an intelligence plan.

d. Operational Phase (from D-day, H-hour to accomplishment or change of mission). Intelligence planning during the operational phase provides for collecting and reporting information as obtained, and disseminating intelligence produced from this information. Existing intelligence must be revised continuously as new intelligence is developed. The collection plan is altered as the situation develops so as to reflect current intelligence needs. Finally, preliminary planning (*a* above) continues in order to anticipate likely future action.

170. THE INTELLIGENCE PLAN

(par. 75)

a. General. The intelligence plan is one of several annexes to an operation plan. The purpose of this annex, as of any annex to an operation plan or order, is to present the details pertinent to one

function or technique—in this case intelligence—and thereby to keep the body of the operation plan brief, clear, and simple.

b. Form. The form of an intelligence plan is the same as that of an intelligence annex, with the addition of an eighth paragraph, "Auxiliary Agencies," and a possible ninth paragraph, "Miscellaneous." Several appendixes will normally accompany the plan (pars. 75-76).

c. Paragraphs in the Intelligence Plan.

- (1) *Summary of the situation.* Reference may be made to an intelligence estimate, which may be included as a separate annex to the operation plan.
- (2) *Essential elements of information.* One subparagraph lists the essential elements of information that concern the command. Additional subparagraphs outline the types of information required during specific planning and operational phases. Usually, reference is made to the "Combat Intelligence Plan" which contains the essential elements of information in detail.
- (3) *Reconnaissance and observation missions.* The types of information collecting agencies, and their employment and responsibilities, both in general and for specific planning and operational phases, is included. Reference may be made to the "Combat Intelligence" and "Air Reconnaissance" plans which contain further instructions concerning these missions.

- (4) *Measures for handling personnel, documents, and captured matériel.* Each of these sources of information is discussed in separate subparagraphs, generally with respect to their value, methods of processing, and special handling of particular types of personnel, documents, and equipment.
- (5) *Maps and air photos.* Major instructions regarding supplies and distribution of planning and operational maps, air photos, defense overprints, and relief models are announced in this paragraph. Reference may be made to the "Air Reconnaissance" and "Map and Photo" plans which contain additional instructions concerning these two items.
- (6) *Counterintelligence.* This paragraph contains instructions on counterintelligence measures during both planning and operational phases, and also regarding special counterintelligence measures, counterintelligence agencies, and reports. Reference may be made to the "Counterintelligence Plan" for details.
- (7) *Reports and distribution.* A subparagraph on reports lists the types of required intelligence reports and states how and when they will be submitted by subordinate headquarters. A second subparagraph outlines the intelligence publications that will be prepared and distributed by the headquarters issuing the plan. One subparagraph describes intelligence dissemi-

nation policies. Reference may be made to the "Combat Intelligence" and "Intelligence Administrative" plans for more complete instructions on reports and distribution.

- (8) *Auxiliary agencies.* A subparagraph under this heading indicates the employment of specialized intelligence agencies in planning and operational activities. Other subparagraphs list—
- (a) Agencies that are controlled by the intelligence officer.
 - (b) Agencies under the administrative control of higher headquarters but whose forward elements are under the intelligence officer's operational control.
 - (c) Agencies that are supervised by other staff sections but which require close coordination by the intelligence officer.
- (9) *Miscellaneous.* This paragraph discusses intelligence personnel, intelligence training, espionage, tactical propaganda, liaison, intelligence funds, and organization of the intelligence section. It should be used only when material cannot be included in the first eight paragraphs nor in appendixes thereto.

d. Scope. Many factors must be considered to determine the amount of detail to be included in a plan. Some of these factors are the mission, the area of operations, and the application of established practices. Others are the combat experience of the command, the provisions of its standing operating

procedure, and the adoption of new procedures. Each separate intelligence plan will stem from a different set of factors. Based upon his determination of the detail required, the intelligence officer may adopt part or all of the form shown in appendix V.

Section II. PLANNING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

171. GENERAL

a. The planning processes outlined in paragraphs 167 through 170 may be used in any type of operation; however, certain special operations may require slight additions to the processes or shifts in emphasis or in timing.

b. These special operations may be divided into two general types. The first type involves special operational *methods*; it includes airborne and amphibious operations. The second type involves special *conditions of environment*; it includes operations in areas of extreme conditions of climate or terrain. Both types of special operations may take place simultaneously.

c. Planning for special operations illustrates the use of strategic intelligence in combat operations, already noted in chapter 1. Strategic intelligence, produced for the most part prior to hostilities, provides the chief backlog of intelligence for such planning. It must be checked and supplemented by current reconnaissance.

172. AIRBORNE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

a. Planning for airborne and amphibious operations must take into account the following:

- (1) A preliminary marshalling phase. Counterintelligence plans must cover this preliminary phase as well as the actual combat phase.
- (2) Each action is an "initial engagement." There is no accumulated combat intelligence background of local details, as there is in continuous land operations. Intelligence furnished to participating units must be extensive and detailed.
- (3) Combat troops are completely committed to action at the beginning of operations. Details of coordination cannot be modified or adjusted as combat develops but must be carefully planned and directed prior to initial contact.
- (4) Objectives are always at a distance which is beyond the ground reconnaissance capabilities of the participating army forces. Reconnaissance missions must be adjusted to the types and limited number of agencies that will be able to perform them.

b. The preceding considerations usually require emphasis on the following points:

- (1) Inasmuch as the attacking units are especially vulnerable in assembly, transit, and at the moment of landing, the principal object of counterintelligence will be to preserve secrecy concerning the time, routes, and objectives of the operations.
- (2) Because of the critical nature of the actual landing, the intelligence effort will be directed to the production of accurate, com-

- plete, and detailed data on the landing areas.
- (3) Because of the sudden commitment to action, dissemination of detailed intelligence and distribution of intelligence aids in most cases includes the individual soldier. In a normal land action, the small unit entering action moves slowly enough so that its leader can orient himself as he moves forward. In an amphibious or airborne action there will be no opportunity for this progressive orientation; it must be accomplished prior to commitment.

c. In airborne and amphibious operations it may be advisable to have two intelligence plans: one to provide the necessary security, intelligence, and organization prior to the assault; and one to govern intelligence activities in combat.

d. For details of intelligence for airborne and amphibious operations, refer to appropriate field manuals.

173. OPERATIONS IN EXTREMES OF ENVIRONMENT

a. The intelligence problems peculiar to extremes of weather and terrain come under three general headings:

- (1) The problem of reporting and interpreting the significance of abnormal conditions accurately, and early enough so that our units will be able to take steps to meet them.
- (2) Problems of impeded communications that must be considered in planning reports, distribution, and dissemination.

- (3) Problems of impeded visibility or restricted operating conditions that must be considered in planning reconnaissance.

b. These problems usually entail the following:

- (1) Determining and reporting the environmental conditions is a matter of research, usually at higher headquarters. This information must be interpreted so as to indicate appropriate operational techniques; the types of weapons, clothing, equipment, and rations that should be used; as well as any additional special or modified equipment that must be obtained or improvised.
- (2) Communications may be affected by great distances, difficult terrain, extreme heat or cold, rain and ice, and electrical disturbances. Any or all of these conditions may exist at the same time.
- (3) Observation—land, naval, and air—may be seriously restricted by lack of daylight, precipitation, fogs, clouds, or dust. Inclement weather may restrict or prohibit the movement of many reconnaissance agencies.

c. Foresight will overcome many of the difficulties just noted, as for example, the provision for signal communication facilities that will not be adversely affected by the environment, or the provision for enough duplication of means to insure the desired results.

APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

- AR 300-15 Mapping and Charting.
AR 345-105 Records and Reports.
AR 380-5 Safeguarding Military Information.
SR 110-1-1 Index of Army Motion Pictures and Film Strips.
SR 310-20-3 Index of Army Training Publications.
SR 320-5-1 Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
SR 320-50-1 Authorized Abbreviations.
SR 380-310-1 Military Security, Counterintelligence Corps.
FM 6-130 Field Artillery Intelligence.
FM 20-100 Light Aviation.
FM 21-5 Military Training.
FM 21-8 Military Training Aids.
FM 21-30 Military Symbols.
(Joint)
FM 30-15 Examination of Enemy Personnel, Repatriates, Civilians, Documents, and Matériel.
FM 30-28 Military Intelligence, Military Censorship.
FM 30-101 The Maneuver Enemy.
FM 30-102 Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.
FM 30-103 Aggressor Army Order of Battle.
FM 30-104 Aggressor Army Representation.

FM 31-35	Air-Ground Operations.
FM 100-5	FSR, Operations.
FM 101-5	Staff Officers' Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure.
FM 101-10	Staff Officers' Field Manual, Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data.
TM 30-215	Counter Intelligence Corps.
TM 30-235	Military Intelligence Civil Censorship.
TM 30-236	Prisoner of War Censorship, Military Intelligence.
TM 32-225	Distributing and Accounting for Registered Cryptographic Material.
TM 32-250	Fundamentals of Traffic Analysis (Radio-Telegraph).
T/O & E 30-500	Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
T/O & E 30-600	Military Intelligence Service Organization.
T/O & E 32-500	Communication Reconnaissance Organization.
	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
JANAP 121	Joint Communication Instructions, Part I—General.
JANAP 122	Joint Communication Instructions, Part II—Security.

APPENDIX II

EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE— DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

G-2 Section
20th Inf Div
TEBANU 6037, —
050700 Jul —

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 4

Map: FARBEN, 1:50,000, TEBANU-QUILMIN

1. MISSION. Seize high grd GIRONNE 4442-PENDU 4245-PERU School 4749; protect crossing of I Corps at QUILMIN 5326.
2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

a. Considerations affecting the possible enemy courses of action and our mission.

(1) *Characteristics of the area of opn.*

(a) *Wea.*

1. During pd 5-8 Jul, wea will be clear and warm. Visibility will be unrestricted. Wind will be from SE at 5-8 mph. Temperature will range from high of about 75° to low of about 60°. Moon will be full on 5 Jul.

Light Data

			SUN-				MOON-	
	BMNT	BMCT	RISE	SET	EECT	EENT	RISE	SET
5 Jul	0330	0413	0444	1939	2010	2053	2002	0414
6 Jul	0330	0413	0444	1939	2010	2053	2046	0507
7 Jul	0332	0413	0445	1938	2009	2051	2124	0604
8 Jul	0333	0414	0446	1938	2008	2051	2156	0705

2. If Aggressor defends, clear wea will afford him good obsn over our avenues of approach into his psn. Any Aggressor atk will be afforded good cross-country mobility due to lack of precipitation. Wind direction does not favor Aggressor use of smoke.
3. Clear wea will favor us by affording good visibility and soil trafficability, thereby permitting us to use our air, armor, and arty. Wind direction favors our use of smoke.

(b) *Terrain.*

1. *Critical terrain features are—*

Ridge extending SW-NE through S`edge of CHENAY 4444.

Ridge from vic GIRONNE extending SW-NE through N edge of CHENAY including high grd extending S from vic PERU School.

High grd vic HAYE 3752.

Ridge extending S from vic FORVILLE 4352.

Brg over RANCE River at QUILMIN.

2. *Obsn and fld of fire:*

The high grd now held by Aggressor gives him excellent obsn over approaches into his psn.

High grd vic HAMON 4143, PENDU, and S of PERU 4749 provide Aggressor excellent obsn over UDY Creek—CHENAY area as well as over the area to N of MEEN Creek.

Fld of fire in area are generally restricted by numerous folds in grd.

Best fld of fire in area lie to E and NE of CHENAY.

Almost continuous wooded area along ridge GIRONNE-PENDU-PERU School severely restrict fld of fire in N portion of our zone.

However, fld of fire to N toward MEEN Creek from this ridge are generally good.

Fld of fire are particularly limited in vic of CHENAY.

3. *Obstacles:*

There are no natural obstacles to our adv.

CHENAY is a major artificial obstacle. Soil trafficability is good throughout area except along the beds of CARGO, UDY, and MEEN Creeks, all of which are fordable without prep at numerous places.

4. *Concealment and cover:*

Only limited concealment is provided by the vegetation in the S part of our zone. CHENAY affords good concealment and good cover. Protection from grd obsn and fire is afforded by abundant folds in the grd throughout the area. Excellent concealment is provided by the woods along the GIRONNE-PERU School ridge.

5. *Avenues of approach available to Aggressor are—*

Along high grd extending S from PERU School; UDY Creek valley; CARGO Creek valley.

6. *Avenues of approach available to our forces into Aggressor psn are—*

Along high grd extending from vic 4845 N to PERU School.

UDY Creek valley.

CARGO Creek valley.

7. *Road net is excellent for both Aggressor and our forces.*

8. *Terrain now held by Aggressor favors def in his present psn.*

9. *Terrain does not favor our atk initially. We will be fighting uphill with Aggressor holding superior obsn.*

10. *Best approach.* Our best avenue of approach into Aggressor psn is along high grd extending from vic 4845 N to PERU School because it—

Avoids cross-compartments and the obstacle CHENAY.

Possesses adequate room for maneuver.

Permits obsn of Aggressor's entire psn.

Facilitates use of armor due to excellent soil trafficability on high grd.

Insures early possession of good road net leading deep into Aggressor psn.

(2) *En sit.*

(a) *Str.* Div is opposed by aprx 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn, an armd recon bn, and an est 3 bn of arty. Morale of these trp is excellent. Aggressor units are 90 percent str in pers and equip. Combat efficiency is excellent. G-2, First Army, est that Aggressor can be expected to atk within the army area with as many as 300 ftr sorties and 150 bmr sorties daily.

(b) *Composition.* Units consist of elm of 16th and 17th Inf Regt, 620th Hv Tk Bn, all part of the Aggressor 8th Inf Div; 603d Armd Recon Bn. It is est that arty spt these forces is Aggressor 8th Div Arty less one lt bn which is known to be spt 44th Inf in vic of JANOU.

(c) *Dispositions.* See overlay 2 (omitted).

(d) *Recent and present significant activities.*

Aggressor forces opposing our div have taken up an excellent def psn along high grd extending SW-NE just S of CHENAY.

Aggressor is—

Improving and strengthening his psn throughout area.

Dumping engr sup vic BOCHE School.

Constructing road blocks and laying mines in vic CHENAY.

Aggressor has made no attempt to adv beyond present psn. His patrols have been inactive.

I Corps rept: Interrogation of prisoners of war indicate Aggressor is planning an atk against I Corps units which have crossed the RANCE River. Aggressor units now in contact with 20th Inf Div have been ordered to hold present psn until reinf.

Aggressor CT 44 formerly biv at BREIL 6930 is hv engaged with our 55th Inf Div vic of JANOU 7352.

Since early 2 Jul, Blue recon has been hv engaged with Aggressor at FROLOE 2558 in attempt to seize brg at PENHOUE 2060.

Air recon rept at 050700 Jul colm of about 100 empty trk was observed moving into ROLLE S0621. No trp mvmt from ROLLE were observed at that time.

(e) *Status of sup.* It is est. that Aggressor sup sit is such that sustained opn can be spt.

(f) *Reinf.* Est Aggressor inf bn vic of HAYE. Large Aggressor force believed to be an inf div loc in the vic of ROLLE.

b. Enemy capabilities.

(1) *Enumeration of en capabilities.* Aggressor can—

(a) Atk now, along our front, with 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn, and an armd recon bn, spt by an est 3 bn of arty.

(b) Defend now in his present psn or on successive psn to HAYE area with 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn, and an armd recon bn, spt by an est 3 bn of arty.

(c) Atk with 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn, and an armd recon bn, spt by an est 3 bn of arty, enveloping either our NE or SW flank with additional str and at times listed below:

	<i>Mtr</i>	<i>Foot</i>
1. Est inf bn vic HAYE.	050800 (or 60 min after start- ing mvmt)	051115 (or 4 hr 15 min after starting mvmt)
2. Est inf div vic ROLLE.	051740	081900

(d) Reinf his atk or def with fol units at the time listed:

	<i>Mtr</i>	<i>Foot</i>
1. Est inf bn vic HAYE.	050745 (or 45 min after start- ing mvmt)	050940 (or 2 hr, 40 min after starting mvmt)
2. Est inf div vic ROLLE.	051740 (or 10 hr, 40 min after mvmt is started)	081900 (or 84 hr after mvmt is started)

(e) Withdraw tonight during hr of darkness beyond HAYE area.

(f) Be expected to atk within First Army area with as many as 300 ftr and 150 bmr sorties daily.

(2) *Discussion and analysis.*

(a) There are no indications that Aggressor will atk prior to substantial reinf.

(b) Def by Aggressor in present psn is indicated by—
Employment of inf on good def terrain.
Improvement and strengthening of psn through-
out area.

Dumping of engr sup in vic ROCHE School 4346.

Arty disp in depth.

Const of road blocks and laying of mines in
CHENAY.

Aggressor patrols are inactive.

Aggressor has made no attempt to adv.

Aggressor trp are disp on relatively broad front.

Aggressor units in contact have been ordered to
hold present psn until reinf.

(c) There are no indications that Aggressor has actually started to reinf units in contact with our div. However, early reinf is indicated by I Corps rept to effect that—

Aggressor is planning an atk against I Corps
units E of RANCE and has ordered units
now in contact with this div to hold present
psn until reinf.

- (d) The only indication of Aggressor def on successive psn is the orgn of the grd in the HAYE-BRIG School area. In view of (c) above, this course of action is not considered likely.
- (e) There is no indication of Aggressor withdrawal beyond the HAYE area.
- (f) All or any part of Aggressor air can be conc in div zone. Air atk is a continuing threat.
- (3) *Relative probability of adoption of en capabilities.*
 - (a) Def of present psn with forces now in contact with aval air spt.
 - (b) Atk with aval units against our brghd with aval air.
 - (c) Either (a) or (b) reinf by est inf bn vic HAYE and est inf div vic ROLLE.

3. EFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OUR MISSION.

- a. An atk or def by Aggressor with forces now in contact may delay but will not prevent the accomplishment of our mis.
- b. Delay on successive psn or withdrawal tonight will favor accomplishment of our mis.
- c. Reinf by est Aggressor inf bn in vic of HAYE alone will not materially affect accomplishment of our mis.
- d. If Aggressor employs all of his reinf to spt an atk or def or to envelop our NE or SW flank, it is doubtful that our mis can be accomplished without additional reinf.
- e. The conc of all of Aggressor air effort in our zone will delay accomplishment of our mis.

/s/ SMITH
G-2

APPENDIX III

EXAMPLE OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT—DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

72d Infantry Division
CONDE-SUR-HUISNE 9099
091900 Aug 19 —

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 50

Period covered: 081800 to 091800 Aug 19 —

Map: FRANCE, 1:50,000, REMALARD-CHARTRES

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. Annex 1.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. Summary. Enemy action generally consisted of delaying tactics. Enemy troops in contact defended principally with small arms fire, and withdrew prior to engaging in close combat. A small-scale infantry-tank counterattack was made at 0430 east of MONT-LONDON 0399. Three similar counterattacks were made in the vicinity of MAGNANES 0496, from 0600 to 0900. None of these attacks was successful. Defensive positions are being constructed northwest and south of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE 0799 and east of the LOIR River.

b. New enemy tactics, and weapons or other matériel. Minefield south of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE extending from 071995 to 075987 contains new type of plastic mine which cannot be detected with mine detectors. 561st Engineer Technical Service Intelligence Detachment notified and furnished two mines for study.

c. Operations of enemy component elements.

- (1) *Air forces.* Ten enemy fighters strafed and bombed the division area in three attacks between 1800 and 2000 yesterday. Twelve planes attacked division area between 1600 and 1730 today. The strength of each attack varied between two and six planes. One of yesterday's air attacks against the 214th Infantry injured six soldiers, destroyed one truck, and damaged four other vehicles. An air attack late this afternoon in the division artillery area killed two soldiers, injured seven others, and damaged three howitzers. Enemy air also attacked along the principal axial and lateral roads. One plane was destroyed by antiaircraft fire near MONTLANDON at 1710 today.
- (2) *Armored units.* Enemy tanks were employed in three counterattacks in the 216th Infantry zone and one in the 215th Infantry zone. Attacks were of platoon strength except for one of two-platoon strength in the 216th Infantry zone. This tank effort was costly for the enemy. Of the 24 tanks reported in action during the period, 10 were either destroyed or damaged. A tank company moving south into the division zone on the GAINVILLE 2010-COURVILLE-SUR-EURE 2003 Road was attacked by our fighter aircraft. Four tanks were reported as damaged and two destroyed. Tactical air reconnaissance reported no movement of the armored concentration 5 miles west of PARIS. This concentration has been identified by a prisoner (patrol leader captured vicinity THIRON) as the 12th Armored Division.
- (3) *Artillery* (including rockets). Enemy artillery support was light to moderate, with defensive and interdiction fires. Heaviest shelling was in the zone of the 216th Infantry. FRETIGNY 9997 received 40 rounds light caliber last night, two medium caliber concentrations of 40 rounds each at 0850 this

morning, and intermittent shelling from 1400 to 1600 today. Rocket fire was received on the recently captured position at LE MONT ROUSSET, 9801 and Hill 274 at 0197. Enemy artillery employment during the night consisted of 14 reported harassing and interdiction missions on roads, crossroads, and villages in the forward areas. Two light battalions and one medium battalion were located opposite the division.

- (4) *Engineer.* Enemy is erecting wire entanglements and laying mine fields east of the EURE River between CHARTRES and DREUX. Mine fields have been located by patrols on high ground along roads northwest and south of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE (Annex 1). Fields will be marked by 100800 July.
- (5) *Infantry.* Enemy continued stubborn resistance, holding with small arms fire until outflanked, and then withdrawing with a minimum of close combat.
- (6) *Reconnaissance.* Aggressive enemy patrolling during the night was reported in the zones of the 211th Armored Cavalry and the 215th Infantry. Patrols were of squad strength in the vicinity of THIRON, ST DENIS D'AUTHOU 0094, LE MONT ROUSSET, and Ridge 987997. Five enemy were captured and six were killed. Enemy reconnaissance patrol of six vehicles attempted to overrun road block at GAUFEUILLU 0091. One light tank of the 6th Reconnaissance Company was destroyed before patrol withdrew.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

- a. *Estimated enemy losses.* Sixty-eight prisoners of war were captured and 35 enemy were reported killed. Effective combat strength of the 2d Battalion, 146th Infantry, is estimated at 65 percent and that of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, at 60 percent.
- b. *Enemy combat efficiency.* Combat efficiency is estimated as fair. The factors of understrength units,

good morale, and a shortage of ammunition contribute to the above over-all rating.

c. *Morale.* Prisoners of war and captured documents indicate that enemy morale is good. Several prisoners stated that despite their recent defeats, and our superiority in air, armor, and artillery support, morale was good in their units.

d. *Location and nature of enemy administrative installations.* Six supply installations are located in our zone. Prisoner of war reports that the ammunition installation supplying this area is located at CHARTRES at 356024. Antiaircraft artillery gun battalions are permitted 15 rounds each, of armor-piercing and high explosive per gun per day.

e. *Weather.*

(1) Weather during the period was generally clear with scattered clouds. There was a slight ground haze until 0800. After 0800 visibility was unrestricted. Wind was generally from south 10 to 15 miles per hour. Minimum temperature was 48° F. at 0345 and maximum temperature was 84° F at 1518.

(2) Weather forecast for period 100001 Aug to 110001 Aug: clear to scattered cumulus clouds at 8,000 feet. Ceiling unlimited. Visibility 8 to 10 miles with slight smoke and haze. Wind generally south to southeast 5 to 10 miles per hour. Minimum temperature 52° F. Maximum temperature 89° F.

f. *Terrain and defensive works.* Soil trafficability during period was excellent. Stream levels continue low.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. *Espionage.* Two enemy agents were seized by the road guard at RJ 973915 when they attempted to cross our line. The agents confessed that they were a part of a group of four, selected to obtain information of our locations and movements between NOGENT-LE-ROTHOU 8892 and LA LOUPE 0408.

b. *Propaganda and rumors.* Enemy propaganda leaflet shells were fired at ST DENIS D'AUTHOU. Propaganda theme contrasted war conditions at the front and at home. Our troops who surrender were promised to be among the first to be repatriated after the war is over.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. *Courses of action.* The enemy can—

- (1) Continue to delay in his present positions or in successive positions between line of contact and CHARTRES-DREUX area east of the EURE River with four infantry battalions and one tank company supported by three artillery battalions.
- (2) Reinforce his present position or any of the successive defensive positions with the unidentified infantry force in the vicinity of woods 1692 by 110300 August and with the armored division west of PARIS by 110700 August.
- (3) Attack from present positions or any of the successive defensive positions after 111100 August with the units now in contact plus the armored division west of PARIS and the unidentified infantry force in the vicinity of the woods at 1692.

b. *Discussion and analysis of courses of action.*

- (1) Delay in successive positions is indicated by the defensive construction northwest and south of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE and east of the LOIR River, as well as the location of small supply installations in rear of these positions. However, the more complete defensive positions being constructed east of the EURE River shown on air photos, indicate a determined stand in the CHARTRES-DREUX area.
- (2) Although the majority of the enemy's actions point to his employment of delaying tactics, he has a limited reinforcement capability. The unidentified force in the woods at 1692 is capable of moving during the night. The armored division in the vicinity

of PARIS has not moved at the present time. However, since the distance is not great and the roads are suitable for movement, it also has the capability of moving overnight into the battle area. As the enemy retreats toward the CHARTRES-DREUX area, the distance between the line of contact and the units above will be less, and their capability for reinforcement will be correspondingly greater. Until there is some indication of movement from these positions this capability must be given a lower priority than delay.

- (3) An enemy attack must be considered as long as enemy reserves are available. Until additional indications supporting this capability are noted, it must be given a lesser priority of adoption than the other courses of action which have been discussed.

c. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

The order of adoption by the enemy of the capabilities enumerated in *a* above is believed to be—

- (1) Delay with forces now in contact in present and successive positions.
- (2) Delay with forces now in contact in present and successive positions reinforced with the unidentified infantry force in the vicinity of woods at 1692 and the armored division west of PARIS.
- (3) Attack from present or successive positions with forces now in contact reinforced by the unidentified infantry force in the vicinity of woods at 1692 and the armored division west of PARIS.

JONES

Major General

Annex: 1—Enemy Situation (overlay) (omitted).

Distribution: X

OFFICIAL:

/s/ SMITH

G-2

APPENDIX IV

GUIDE TO DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
1. ATTACK-----	<p>a. Establishment or strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.</p> <p>b. Movement of hostile units forward.</p>	<p>Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in an attack.</p> <p>Prior to launching an attack troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.</p>	<p>Location enemy elements beyond which you are unable to penetrate. Particularly along line</p> <p>Movement of hostile units towards possible assembly areas vicinity of</p> <p>Movement hostile unit along road(s)</p>

<p>c. Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.</p> <p>d. Location of artillery well forward.</p>	<p>Location of enemy assembly areas from which an attack can be launched.</p> <p>Disposition of artillery in areas from which it can support an attack. Artillery located well forward, and generally in line.</p>	<p>Location bodies of troops in area(s)</p> <p>—</p> <p>Location, type, and caliber of artillery vicinity</p> <p>—</p>
<p>e. Increased patrolling.</p>	<p>Patrolling by infantry and cavalry is usually more active prior to an attack.</p>	<p>Location, type, and caliber of artillery in area(s)</p> <p>—</p> <p>Number, size, activity in infantry and cavalry patrols in area</p> <p>—</p>
<p>f. Enemy units disposed on relatively narrow frontages.</p>	<p>The yardstick is the normal frontage of the battalion in the attack.</p>	<p>Location flanks enemy units along line</p> <p>—</p>
<p>g. Covering forces being reinforced or replaced by new units.</p>	<p>Reconnaissance elements being replaced or reinforced by infantry may indicate an attack.</p>	<p>New identifications, particular attention infantry and armored units. Cavalry identifications. Location infantry and cavalry, particularly along line</p>

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
1. ATTACK— Continued	<p><i>h.</i> Increased activity rear areas.</p> <p><i>i.</i> Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations well forward.</p> <p><i>j.</i> Registration of hostile field artillery fire upon points within our defensive position.</p> <p><i>k.</i> Increased air reconnaissance.</p>	<p>Prior to an attack, supply and administrative activities generally increase in the rear areas.</p> <p>Command posts, supply and evacuation installations usually located well forward for an attack.</p> <p>Hostile field artillery may register preliminary to artillery preparation in support of the attack.</p> <p>Air reconnaissance is usually more active prior to an attack.</p>	<p>Numbers, type, movement and direction of traffic in area</p> <p>Location command posts, supply and evacuation establishment.</p> <p>Supply and evacuation installations vicinity</p> <p>Shell reports from subordinate units.</p> <p>Reports as to the amount and type of air activity over our position.</p>

1. Systematic air bombardment.

Preliminary to the attack, the enemy may engage in systematic "softening up" of our position by bombardment.

Reports as to the amount and type of air activity over our position.

a. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles and mine fields.

The installing or presence of demolitions and mine fields, etc., covering approaches to enemy position is additional protection.

Location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, mine fields, front and flanks present position.

Installation demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, mine fields along line

.....
Installation demolitions, gassed areas, obstacles, radiological and biological contamination, mine fields on high ground
.....

2. DEFENSE

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
2. DEFENSE— Continued.	<p>b. Deployment of infantry on good defensive terrain.</p> <p>c. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment and fortifying buildings.</p> <p>d. Entrenching and erection of bands of wire.</p>	<p>Dominating terrain with good fields of fire is usually selected by infantry for a defensive position.</p> <p>Engineer tools and equipment may be used in the digging of trenches and erection of obstacles.</p> <p>Digging of trenches and the erection of wire would probably mean the enemy was preparing to hold his present position.</p>	<p>Location infantry on high ground along</p> <p>Location infantry along river.</p> <p>Dumping ammunition or engineer supplies and equipment on present location.</p> <p>Dumping ammunition or engineer supplies and equipment on</p> <p>Entrenching and erection of wire on present position.</p> <p>Entrenching and erection of wire on</p>

e. Artillery disposed in depth. (To include antitank weapons.)	Artillery is usually disposed in depth and located centrally to support a defensive position.	Entrenching and erection of wire along line
f. Reserves located to support the defense.	Reserves are usually located in a position where they can be used on either flank to strengthen or counterattack.	Location of artillery in area
g. Movement to rear of troops previously located in forward areas.	Reconnaissance and covering forces may withdraw to the flanks or move to locations within the defensive position.	Location of troops in rear present line of contact. Troops located in area
h. Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations to rear.	Command posts, supply and evacuation installations usually located well to the rear out of reach of long-range artillery fire.	Movement of hostile units along road
		Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations. Supply and evacuation installations vicinity

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
3. WITHDRAWAL.	<p>a. Rearward movement of supply and evacuation installations.</p> <p>b. Movement of small elements straight to the rear from the front line.</p> <p>c. Movement of larger units to the rear.</p>	<p>Movement of these installations to the rear would generally indicate the forces which they were supporting were to move rearward.</p> <p>Small bodies of troops often assemble into larger groups (platoons, companies, and battalions) out of effective range of small arms before a general withdrawal.</p> <p>Large bodies of troops moving to rear would indicate the enemy was to occupy a position further to the</p>	<p>Movement of supply and evacuation installations to the rear.</p> <p>Location supply and evacuation installations.</p> <p>Movement of fully loaded supply vehicles to the rear.</p> <p>Movement small bodies of troops straight to rear.</p> <p>Movement large bodies of troops to rear.</p> <p>Movement large bodies of troops along road</p>

	rear or a complete withdrawal. -
d.	Movement to and occupation by reserves of positions in rear of or on flanks of the initial position.	Location of troops in rear or on flanks of present position.
e.	Organization of defensive positions in rear.	Troops located in area
		Entrenching, erection of wire on
		Dumping engineer supplies and equipment on
f.	Extensive demolitions, obstacles, mine fields, areas behind or on flanks of line of present contact contaminated with chemical, biological, or radioactive agents.	Demolitions, mine fields, obstacles, areas behind present line of contact contaminated with chemical, biological, or radioactive agents.
		Demolitions, mine fields, obstacles, areas along line contaminated with chemical, biological, or radioactive agents.

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
3. WITHDRAWAL— Continued	<i>g.</i> Loss of contact by any element.	Withdrawal of enemy may be preceded by our loss of contact with enemy elements at points along the line.	Loss of contact.
<i>h.</i> Rearward displacement of artillery by echelon.		Artillery units are often displaced by echelon to protect the covering force and furnish protection for new positions.	Movement of artillery between and Location and strength of artillery in area Number of batteries at (last known position).
<i>i.</i> Local counterattacks by both ground and air forces.		Counterattacks and air attacks may be used to cover disengagement.	Strength, composition, and location of counterattacks against subordinate units. Strength and type of air attacks against subordinate units.

<p>j. Location, density and size of smoke screens in area(s).</p>	<p>Delaying forces may disengage under cover of smoke or darkness.</p>	<p>Location density, and size of smoke screens in area(s)</p>
<p>k. Movement of medium and heavy anti-aircraft artillery from a pattern of position areas which is roughly parallel to the front to a pattern which is perpendicular to the front; i.e., from the defense of dumps and field artillery and headquarters areas to a defense of likely routes of withdrawal.</p>	<p>Anti-aircraft protection needed as supplies and personnel withdraw.</p>	<p>Locations and strength of medium and heavy anti-aircraft artillery.</p>

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
4. DELAYING ACTION.	Same as WITHDRAWAL, with the following additions: a. Enemy disposed on a broad front with little depth. b. Weapons and artillery well forward, disposed to engage us at maximum ranges. c. Construction or occupation of several	Early development of maximum fire power for short periods may increase delay. Disposition on a broad front will allow enemy to oppose encircling forces on routes leading to his rear. Development of maximum fire power initially may increase delay. Delaying forces may occupy positions in depth simul-	Location of reserves and organization of the ground in areas Examine air photographs of area in rear of the line of contact. Location, type, and caliber of artillery vicinity Location, type, and caliber of artillery in area(s) Entrenching and organization of the ground

delaying positions in depth simultaneously, in rear of line of contact.	taneously, or may delay in successive positions.	area(s) strength and composition of troops, vicinity Dumping of ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment area(s)
<i>d.</i> Increased activity by harassing troops on our flanks and rear.	The enemy may seek to disrupt attacking and enveloping forces.	Reports by units on our flanks and rear of strength, composition and location of harassing attacks.
<i>a.</i> Movement of additional troops toward the forces opposing us.	This action could increase enemy's present strength.	Number, type, and rate of movement troops toward present enemy position from Movement troops along road(s) toward present position.

5. REINFORCEMENT.

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
5. REINFORCEMENT—Con.	b. Increased traffic toward present position.	This increased traffic may bring up additional troops and supplies.	(Motor, rail, shipping, etc.) traffic from (N), (S), (E), or (W). (Motor, rail, shipping, air transport, etc.) traffic from..... (Motor, rail, etc.) traffic along road(s) and railroad(s) Type, number, speed enemy vehicles moving toward present enemy position from particularly along road Are decks of vessels crowded with troops and gear, or empty?

c. Identification of new units in combat zone.	The presence of new units in addition to units already present will increase enemy's strength.	New identifications. Identify
d. Increased aggressiveness or patrolling on part of force in contact.	This activity might indicate the presence of additional units.	Number, size, identifications, and activities patrols in area Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations particularly in area Location command posts, supply and evacuation installations.
e. Additional command posts, supply and evacuation installations.	Presence of additional units could cause an increase in number of these installations.	Lessening of small arms and supporting fires at Battalions or larger units unable to gain contact. Capture of objective.
a. Loss of contact by major elements in advance or attack.	Withdrawal by enemy or penetration of defended locality. Capture of critical objectives.	

6. LOCAL DEFEAT*

* Recognition of local defeat permits maximum exploitation by commander. Report apparent defeat by fastest means.

(1) Essential elements of information dealing with—	(2) Indications (analysis of essential elements of information)	(3) Explanation	(4) Specific information sought
6. LOCAL DEFEAT— Continued	<p>b. Large number of dead, or prisoners from same unit.</p> <p>c. Capture of command posts of major units.</p> <p>d. Capture of artillery positions; dumps, hospitals and other rear installations.</p>	<p>Collapse of organized resistance by unit.</p> <p>Loss of leaders; death, casualty or capture.</p> <p>Low morale.</p> <p>Elements penetrating deep into enemy's defensive position.</p> <p>Elements have passed through defensive position.</p> <p>Organized resistance by scattered service elements.</p> <p>Size, speed, depth, banks, bottoms, etc., all have their effect on any operation.</p>	<p>Identification of battalion or larger unit (in numbers).</p> <p>Capture of field officers.</p> <p>Capture of 50% of battalion or larger unit.</p> <p>Capture of regimental or higher command posts.</p> <p>Capture of artillery batteries or battalions.</p> <p>Capture of large amounts of enemy weapons or equipment.</p> <p>Size, speed, depth, banks, bottoms, and approaches to River.</p>
7. TERRAIN-----	a. Rivers-----		

<p>b. Critical terrain features.</p>	<p>Hills, ridges, valleys, plains, roads, routes of communications, etc., influence any operation and must be taken into consideration.</p>	<p>Military description of terrain in zone of action particular attention to</p>
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APPENDIX V

EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE ANNEX— DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

1st Inf Div
ZELLE 4671, BUTTANO
111900 Jul —

Annex 1 (Intel) to OPNO 8

Map: BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. See Periodic Intel Rept No 19, this hq, 111800 Jul —.
2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.
 - a. Will Aggressor cont to defend the SERE River psn? If so, with what orgn of the grd, to include loc and activities of local res?
 - b. Will Aggressor reinf his units now in contact? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Sp attn to inf div at MARD.
 - c. Will Aggressor atk prior to 120600 Jul? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Particular attn to the avenues of approach SE of FEROO 3959 and NE of ERGE 3678.
 - d. Will Aggressor withdraw beyond the div obj prior to our atk?
 - e. What natural or artificial obstacles or barriers exist within the div zone? What are their type and extent?
3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.*
 - a. Orders to subordinate and attached units.

*

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*

*

*Completed only to extent necessary to demonstrate preparation.

(3) *1st Inf.*

(a) Rept, as obtained, to div CP; negative rept every 4 hr beginning 112000 Jul:

1. Instl of dml, obstacles, and mine fld front present psn.
2. Evidences of fortification of bldg in zone, particularly in vic ALERTE 3074.
3. Entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present LC.
4. Progress of entrenching in areas vic 3277 and 3069.
5. Changes in loc and in est str of en forces near DATO 3169 and N of ALERTE 3074.
6. Rearward mvmt of en trp along roads: RUSTA 3274-KUNA 2776-LUNO 2828; DATO-LUNO.

* * * * *

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

(1) I Corps is requested to provide info of—

- (a) Evidence of fortification of bldg, particularly in vic of 2677 and 2664.
- (b) Extent of entrenching in areas vic 2664 and 2679.
- (c) Occupied and unoccupied arty psn in div zone, particular attn to psn RUSTA.
- (d) Changes noted in loc and est str of en forces between LUEI 2873 and NOJUO 2876.
- (e) Rearward mvmt of en trp along roads: XUELLI 3274-RAMOG 2776-ELLAMB 3841; DATO-LUNO.
- (f) Rearward mvmt of en trp along road: VILLE JOSSE 5285-LAMBALLE.
- (g) Loc of CP and sup and evac instl in area: LUNO-TEOC 1500-DRAUSO 2074.

* * * * *

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATÉRIEL. PW of rank of col or higher and other PW of special interest will be reported to div G-2 w/o delay.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOS.

a. *Maps.* Distr of map, BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT, as shown below. Distr is automatic and rqn will not be submitted.

Div hq and div trp-----	300
1st Inf-----	200
2d Inf-----	200
3d Inf-----	200
1st Div Arty-----	300
1st Recon Co-----	50
1st Engr C Bn-----	50
1st Tk Bn-----	100

b. *Photos.* The following air photos will be furnished:

- (1) Basic cover of div zone (1:10,000, aprx) six copies each regt; six copies div arty; 1 copy div engr, 1st Tk Bn, 1st Recon Co.
- (2) Annotated air photos will be distributed automatically, when available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Appendix A, Counterintelligence Plan.

b. To preserve secrecy of atk plans, the following measures will be adopted:

- (1) *All units.* Prior to atk, coordinate patrolling with 2d Inf Div and ensure all members of patrols wear shoulder patches of 2d Inf Div and that they carry no other ident.
- (2) *Div Arty.* Coordinate use of Army acft with 2d Inf Div to ensure min number of planes in air over 1st Div front at any one time prior to our atk.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. Effective 120800 Jul units will submit ISUMS at 0800, 1200, 1600 and 2000 daily, in lieu of times heretofore in effect.

JONES
MAJGEN

App: A—Counterintelligence Plan (omitted).

Distr: Same as OPNO 8.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ SMITH

G-2

APPENDIX VI

FORM FOR TACTICAL STUDY OF THE WEATHER AND TERRAIN

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing headquarters

Place of issue

Date and time

1. PURPOSE AND OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS.

Consider the purpose for which the study is being made and such other factors as serve to limit the area to be studied or aspects thereof. These factors may include, according to circumstances, the mission, the enemy capabilities, and the commander's decision.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA.

a. Climatic or weather conditions. Depending on the time interval between the preparation of the study and the proposed use of the area, describe existing or predicted meteorological conditions to include precipitation, temperature, fog, cloud conditions, moon phases, wind, sunrise, sunset, and when appropriate, magnetic phenomena.

b. Topography. Use specially prepared and colored maps or overlays and photographs to illustrate each of the following characteristics, and the effect of predicted weather conditions upon them.

- (1) *Relief and drainage systems.* Illustrate by layer-contouring, ridge-lining, hill-topping, or relief-shading the configuration of the ground, including slopes of hillsides, cliffs, bluffs, or critical slopes for personnel and vehicles; and by solid or broken lines and conventional symbols the configuration and condition of streams, including depth, slope, and condition of banks and bottom, as well as the location of crossing sites.

- (2) *Vegetation.* Indicate the location of woods, including types of trees, diameter of trunks, density of planting, and existence of undergrowth, as well as the types of vegetation in nonwooded areas, whether natural or cultivated.
- (3) *Surface materials.* Indicate the type and distribution of soils and subsoils in the area and determine the soil trafficability.
- (4) *Cultural features.* Describe or illustrate the man-made changes in the topography, including roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, towns, industrial areas, and fortifications.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA. From a consideration of the weather and the topography determine the following factors:

- a. *Critical terrain features.* Consider any terrain features that appear to be critical for either combatant, such as a dominating hill or ridge, the shoulders of a defile, a highway, a built-up area, or a communications center.
- b. *Observation and fields of fire.* Indicate by map the influence of hills, vegetation, fog, night, snow, and precipitation.
- c. *Obstacles.* Consider natural and artificial obstacles, such as swamps, dense woods, rivers, unstable soil, mine fields, areas contaminated with chemical, biological or radiological agents, and other man-made barriers.
- d. *Concealment and cover.* Consider the concealment afforded by woods, cultivated fields, fog, night, or snow covered areas, as well as the cover provided by ditches and valleys.
- e. *Avenues of approach.* Consider the road and rail net, terrain corridors, cross compartments, and soil trafficability.

4. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE AREA. Summarize the effect of the weather and the topography of the area. Consider the principal critical terrain features and the avenues of approach to them, including such factors as suitability for night operations, the use of heavy armor, and special obstacles to be breached, under each of the following headings:

a. Effect on enemy capabilities.

b. Effect on courses of action required to accomplish our mission.

(Initiating staff officer)

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